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“The Sons of Neptune and of Mars”: Organisational Identity and Mission in the 
Royal Marines, 1827-1927 
Existing historiography on the Royal Marines emphasises the institution’s early roles in the 
Age of Sail or more recent history as Commandos. While historically the Marines were 
formed from early army regiments, in 1755 the Marines were permanently established 
under the Admiralty, retaining much of its organisational structure and traditions from the 
army. Honoured as a Royal Regiment in 1802, they were left largely free to develop an 
independent organisational identity in line with established duties at sea and on shore. 
The Royal Marines, however, did not share an equal footing with their peer services. As a 
sub-organisation of the Royal Navy, Marines were sensitive to their inferior relative status 
with the army and navy and a common lament of Marines was a lack of public recognition. 
This was especially true for Marine officers who struggled to fit in to a rigid hierarchical 
military social structure. By the mid-nineteenth century, changes in warfare and 
technology eroded once established roles and missions of the Royal Marines. Royal 
Marine identity became increasingly in conflict with the Royal Navy and impeded a clear 
solution for a new operational mission and purpose. Absorption by the army, outright 
elimination, or forced restructuring of their organisation threatened the extinction of the 
Royal Marines. As the nineteenth century progressed, the Marines wrestled over concerns 
of redundancy and their officers as superfluous aboard ship. These portrayals contrasted 
with an often-blameless record of service and reputed bravery and efficiency. 
Opportunities to reorganise and reform at the conclusion of the First World War were 
mismanaged, necessitating a complete transformation in the mid-twentieth century. 
Challenging recent historiography on the organisational history and identity of the Royal 
Marines, this thesis demonstrates how the existential struggle of the Royal Marines was 




















Note on Terms 
Throughout this thesis, the Royal Marines will be frequently referred to as ‘The Corps of 
Marines’ and ‘Marine Corps’. These were terms of contemporary usage for the British 
Marines of this period and remain in frequent application today. I have therefore used 
these terms throughout my thesis to refer to the British Marines exclusively. In cases 
where foreign services are mentioned which are also marine forces, these will be further 
described using the name or abbreviated initials before their service (i.e. US Marine 
Corps).   
As for capitalisation and lower case, I have always capitalised Corps or Division in 
keeping with the organisational practices of the Royal Marines, unless it is directly 
inappropriate to the content or discussion. Marines are to be capitalised when I am 
referring to them as the institution or the term becomes descriptive (i.e. the Marines or 
Marine officers). When the discussion changes to individuals or collective persons, it is 
noted as ‘marine’ or ‘marines' in the lower case.   
Finally, in the matter or direct quotations from primary sources which includes published 
works, I have maintained in all cases the original authors’ capitalisation and emphasis 
(i.e., underscores, punctuation, etc.) practices for all direct quotes. These, where cited, 
are further described with details as to the original author’s purpose and emphasis. For 
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Glossary of commonly used terms and abbreviations 
 
ADM       Admiralty Archives 
CAB       Cabinet Papers 
CCA       Churchill College Archives 
CHAR       The Chartwell Papers 
HC       House of Commons 
LtCol       Lieutenant Colonel  
NMM       The National Maritime Museum 
RC        Royal Commission 
RM       Royal Marines 
RMA       Royal Marines Artillery 
RMLI        Royal Marines Light Infantry 
RMM       Royal Marines Museum 
RN       Royal Navy 
TNA       The National Archives 
USMC       United States Marine Corps 
















Claiming over 350 years of service, Britain’s Corps of ‘Sea Soldiers’, the Royal Marines 
has experienced dramatic rises and falls to its fortunes. While the earliest formations of 
maritime regiments were with the British army, the Marines became indelibly linked to the 
Royal Navy in 1755. At the start of the nineteenth century, the Corps was designated a 
Royal Regiment in 1802, but as the nineteenth century progressed and the Royal Navy 
adapted to changes in technology and warfare, the future of the Corps was increasingly in 
doubt. In addition, Royal Marine Officers also struggled with perceptions of social 
inferiority in the hierarchy of the British military forces, by both the other military services 
and the general British public. Some of these perceptions were very real, based on 
institutional practices in the War Department and Admiralty, while others were fabrications 
derived from social mores of the period. What were the obstacles which challenged the 
continued relevance and existence of the Royal Marines?  
This thesis is an examination of the unique military identity and the organisational 
development of the Royal Marines from 1827 to 1927. In current popular imagination, the 
Royal Marines clad in their iconic green berets, are the Royal Navy’s elite fighting force.  
Claiming over 350 years of service to Britain, the Royal Marines Commandos, as they are 
known today, underwent a comprehensive transformation in the mid-twentieth century, 
ushering in a complete transformation of their organisational structure and a radical shift in 
their operational role.1 These changes were so significant that, as noted by one eminent 
historian of the Royal Marines, marines of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries would 
hardly recognise their descendants of the latter half of the twentieth.2 The three services, 
or tri-services as they are known today are the Royal Navy, the British Army, and the 
Royal Air Force, while the Royal Marines remain as one of the aforementioned five 
fighting arms within the Royal Navy.3 Their present day role as stewards of Britain’s 
amphibious capabilities, belies their history as an embattled regiment whose existence 
was in fact most often precarious and not always assured. Traditionally marginalised 
midst their sister services in the Army and the Navy, by the late-nineteenth century new 
technologies and reforms adopted by the Royal Navy further perpetuated the perception 
that the Royal Marines occupied increasingly ambiguous space and were anachronistic to 
Britain’s imperial defence needs. The turn of the twentieth century brought further 
ambitious schemes to reform the Naval Service and threatened to make the Corps itself 
redundant. While this period of British history has been well recorded and examined by 
 
1 Julian Thompson, The Royal Marines: From Sea Soldiers to a Special Force, (London: Pan MacMillan, 2001) 3.  Julian 
Thompson has cited 1942 as a “watershed” year for changes in the Royal Marines.  The impact being, according to 
Thompson, that “the rate of change” that the Royal Marines experienced was such that by the last quarter of the twentieth 
century, the Corps would have been “almost unrecognizable” to anyone who had served in it during the first quarter.  
2 Thompson, Royal Marines, 2-3. 
3 The United Kingdom’s three services are the Royal Navy, the British Army, and the Royal Airforce 
https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/ministry-of-defence - accessed 2 March 2020. 
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social, military, and naval historians, few have examined the experience of the Royal 
Marines and its membership in detail.   
Naval history occupies a specialised appeal to the general public and a growing interest to 
academics. Texts on naval history have originally been perceived as only relevant to 
those with interests toward professional military education. Frequently, it has served a key 
function of informing the membership of the Royal Navy on matters of naval history and 
has been taught, studied, and researched largely in context to understanding military 
organisations, technology, military leadership, and grand strategy. Consequently, the 
substantive story of the Royal Marines, due in part to its own organisational weakness and 
its being chronically bereft of political clout, has followed a similar path finding it largely 
subsumed within that of the Royal Navy. More recently, naval historians have examined 
the Royal Navy and naval history through emergent lens of the so-called “new naval 
history”.4 This thesis aims to contribute to this growing body of work, separating the 
important story of the Royal Marines out from that of its larger parent body, and 
simultaneously examining the underexamined yet important developmental period of crisis 
and contribution for the Corps from 1827 to 1927.   
This study examines the organisational history of the Royal Marines. It will be argued here 
that the unique military identity and organisational culture constructed by the Royal 
Marines became increasingly incompatible and was in direct conflict with that of their 
parent organisation, the Royal Navy, by the turn of the twentieth century. This increasingly 
fragile identity compounded the problems of the Royal Marine’s elusive quest of defining a 
coherent mission, aggravated further by its own institutional failings to properly innovate 
and adapt. It was these failures and challenges which ultimately necessitated the 
complete organisational transformation which took place in the mid-twentieth century. This 
study of the organisational and social history of the Royal Marines in a defined period 
between 1827 to 1927, will examine these arguments using two interconnected themes: 
firstly, how the development and cultivation of the unique Royal Marine identity and 
organisational culture by its members set them apart from the other services, and 
secondly, how the Royal Marines as a military organisation sought to adapt their purpose 
and mission in this period. The analysis of key events and themes are anchored between 
1827 and 1927 and will demonstrate how the constructed identity of the Corps eroded its 
very purpose and function. While discussed in further detail in the first chapter, 1827 
signifies the date in which the emblems and traditions commonly used by the Corps to this 
date in their colours and uniforms were codified. The year 1927 serves as a useful 
concluding date where in a defining moment of the interwar period, a mission for the 
 




Royal Marines was simultaneously decided and yet remained unfulfilled. The development 
of the Corps was further complicated by its existence as two distinct yet entwined 
regiments under the same organisational umbrella: The Royal Marines Light Infantry or 
R.M.L.I, and the Royal Marines Artillery or R.M.A. The two bodies emerging in the 
nineteenth century to fulfil distinct functions invariably found themselves in competition 
with each other, underscoring and exacerbating the debate over the necessity of 
existence of the Royal Marines as a whole. This study will show that for the Marines, their 
constructed identity did not easily translate to a coherent mission, and that the Royal 
Marines in this period were frequently unable to convincingly demonstrate itself as a 
distinguishable and distinct enough military organisation to warrant further existence. 
How this study is structured 
This thesis will evaluate a wide range of sources – including letters and diaries, memoirs 
of Royal Marine Officers, Admiralty and War Office records, Parliamentary records, 
operational accounts, and early naval and military doctrinal treatises - to argue that the 
Royal Marines identity and organisational relevance was in a fragile state in this period, 
further eroded by its inability to adapt to and anticipate changes in warfare, technology, 
and adequately influence the trajectory of Britain’s Imperial defence needs. Preceded by a 
detailed literature review which will seek to better frame the methodology of this thesis, 
the remainder will be divided as follows.    
Chapters two and three will focus on Royal Marine identity. As the first substantive 
chapter launching the arguments of this thesis, chapter two asserts and demonstrates that 
the constructed identity of the Corps, both internally and externally, was in conflict with its 
parent service, the Royal Navy, raising further challenges to making it a distinguishable 
and viable organisation within Britain’s military forces. It begins with a brief historical 
review of the Corps from its earliest origins to the present day, contextualising themes of 
this thesis in this brief narrative. The chapter next provides detailed analysis of the 
emblems and established traditions of the Corps. It also analyses the aspects of how this 
constructed identity also fostered tension with the Royal Navy, its parent service, and 
highlights the precarious nature of the Corps’ identity and its organisational mission.  
Chapter three examines the relative status and questions of identity through the 
experiences of Royal Marines. This chapter shows why service and membership in the 
Corps affected the relative status of Royal Marine Officers in contrast to their service 
peers during this period in British society. In the hierarchical strata of Britain’s military and 
naval forces, where and how the Royal Marines were ranked and rated was of great 
importance to its members as well as to the organisation itself. The status of the Royal 
Marines as a sub-service within the Royal Navy will also be examined and show that 
Royal Marine Officers in particular struggled with perceptions by both the other military 
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services and the public of social inferiority. Using personal accounts by Marine officers 
and publications of the period, this chapter will show that social and financial obstacles 
faced by Marines were a contributing factor to the status of the Corps as an organisation. 
This chapter builds on my argument that the factors which influenced the constructed 
identity of the Corps were shaped by the marginalisation experienced by its membership 
in both the ranks of society and the military hierarchies.   
Chapters four, five, and six focuses on the organisational development of the Royal 
Marines in this period. Chapter four examines the operational role of the Royal Marines in 
the framed period. Significant challenges faced as a consequence of technology, social 
upheaval, and the experiences of war, were experienced by the military services in the 
defined period between 1827 and 1927. This chapter examines these changes and how 
they promoted a new discussion over the relevance and possible disbandment of the 
Marines. This chapter argues the Royal Navy failed to properly innovate new uses for the 
Marines but demonstrates a clear lack of innovation on the part of the Marines to develop 
their future potential. 
Chapter five examines how the Royal Marines and others within Britain’s defence 
community from the mid-nineteenth century, envisioned the adoption of a new role for the 
Royal Marines. This chapter will reveal how innovative thought came into conflict with the 
realities of Admiralty administration. This chapter argues while new ideas were put 
forward, they failed to inspire change leaving the Royal Marines in a vulnerable position at 
the start of the First World War. It will include an analysis of what some members of the 
Corps saw as the best option for the operational employment within the Royal Navy, and 
in turn explain why these options were never fully realised in the period up through the 
interwar period of the early twentieth century.  
Chapter six concludes the study with an examination of the operational experience of the 
Royal Marines during the First World War and the failed attempts to capitalise on the 
lessons in the early interwar period. It again demonstrates how the Corps’ established 
reputation for loyal and faithful service failed to translate effectively to a viable and 
coherent mission. It will reveal how the realities of war, the administration of the Admiralty, 
and the parochial institutional thought of the Royal Marines leadership itself created 
obstacles which failed to provide any promise of future relevance for the Royal Marines, 







Chapter 1. ‘Per Mare, Per Terram’: A literature review of the Royal Marines 
Richard Harding in his work detailing contemporary debates in naval history confronts the 
challenge and opportunities for historians in studying the Royal Marines: 
Unlike the [USMC]5, the Royal Marines have also suffered from relative historical 
neglect. Before the Second World War, there were very few general histories of the 
corps, and those that were produced were directly linked to the campaign to 
preserve the Royal Marines from impending budget cuts. The Royal Marines had a 
range of roles within the navy and on land during the First World War, but it was the 
Second World War that raised the profile of the corps as specialist amphibious 
soldiers, which remains central to their identity to the present day. Narratives of their 
battles and weapons, and the individuals who served, continue to grow, but detailed 
analyses of operations, organizations and effectiveness are far less common.6 
Harding accurately characterises some of the early histories of the Corps, which were 
indeed part of a concerted effort to both save the Corps from elimination and raise public 
awareness. As will be shown here, the story of the Marines has been largely written by 
Marines themselves in an effort to promote their own organisational narrative and to 
assuage its critics. This tradition has continued largely to this day, with more histories 
being written by the former members of the Marines as the history of the Corps continues. 
It will also be demonstrated further that historians, chiefly of naval history, have struggled 
to include the Royal Marines in their studies. More problematic is the challenge which 
Harding describes facing naval historians. As one reviewer has noted, the routine 
absence of the Royal Marines from the accounts of Royal Navy history is a 
historiographical reality.7 These challenges will be illustrated further citing some notable 
works and historians. Despite this, some efforts by historians have endeavoured to 
provide more evaluative and analytical approaches to Royal Marines history, illustrating 
the vast potential in researching this organisation. Finally, what will be considered is the 
body of work by historians who have applied methodologies and approaches in analysing 
similar themes and topics found in this thesis in other works on naval and military history.   
The “complete histories” of the Royal Marines 
The earliest histories of the Royal Marines have been written foremostly by Royal 
Marines. Similar in style and character, these histories provide largely chronological and 
general narratives of their history, while also providing some insights into the conditions 
experienced by its membership and observations about the relative status of the Corps to 
 
5 United States Marine Corps. 
6 Richard Harding, Modern Naval History: Debates and Prospects, (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2016) 55-56 
7 See Samuel McLean, “Review of Britt Zerbe’s: The Birth of the Royal Marines, 1664-1802”, History: The Journal of the 
Historical Association, 99, no. 337 (October, 2014) 690-691.  McLean specifically cites the omission of the Royal Marines in 
naval histories as a ‘phenomenological elision’. 
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the other services. The earliest substantive history of the Corps was compiled by Royal 
Marine Major Alexander Gillespie in 1803. Gillespie cited his rationale for such a work as 
follows:   
To drag from the land of forgetfulness, actions, long lain in oblivion; to place the 
revolutions and the achievements of a corps, endeared to its Country by a train of 
loyalty and valour, in one connected and analysed point of view, were the leading 
motives which urged the Author to essay a history of its origin and progress.8 
Published within a year of the Royal Marines becoming a Royal Regiment, the dedication 
of the history is to the foremost patron of the Corps at this time, the Duke of Clarence, 
whose importance will be described in later chapters. This first history would set a 
precedent for histories written by a line of Marine Officers through the years at intervals, 
chronicling the achievements of their Corps as they unfolded. The next such major work 
written by a Marine Officer is that of Lieutenant Paul Harris Nicolas’ 1845 book, Historical 
Records of the Royal Marine Forces, who cites his reasons for writing his history:  
 …influenced by a strong attachment to the welfare and reputation of the corps, in 
which I had the honour to serve, I felt persuaded that an impartial account of the 
services of the Royal Marines would not only reflect additional lustre on their 
distinguished character, but encourage a spirit of emulation, which is the strongest 
impulse to great and gallant actions; and as nothing can so fully tend to this 
desirable object as a faithful record of their glorious career.9  
Here again, the conviction is made plain by the author to relate the deeds of his Corps 
and regiment to the reader. Another early history of the Marines detailed the Corps 
history, published as a part of a wider collection of army regimental histories.10 Compiled 
by Richard Cannon, an army clerk at Horse Guards in 1837, this short history relied 
primarily on the earlier published histories by Gillespie for source material. The utility of 
this work, however, does serve to reinforce the lineage of British maritime regiments as 
part of the established army, and before they passed to control of the Admiralty in 1755.11 
As such, the history marked the place the Royal Marines inhabited within the British 
military hierarchy, and specifically in relation to the other regiments of the British army to 
which the marines found themselves most often compared.  
Another history in the late century by Major L. Edye published in 1893, would again echo 
the desires of his forebears to bring the Corps history to the forefront of the public mind. 
Edye felt a new history of the Royal Marines, “was urged upon him that it was his duty to 
 
8 Alexander Gillespie, An historical review of the Royal Marine Corps: from its original institution down to the present era, 
1803 (Birmingham: Mr. Swinney, Printer, 1803) ix. 
9 Paul H. Nicolas, Historical Records of the Royal Marine Forces, Vol. I (London: Thomas and William Boone, 1845) viii. 
10 Richard Cannon, Esq., Historical Record of the Marine Corps, (London: Parker, Furnivall and Parker, 1837) 
11 Cannon, Historical Record, 51. 
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go back to the earliest times, and, taking the widest possible view of his subject”, in his 
effort to illustrate the services of soldiers embarked on ships.12 The purpose of this new 
history according to Edye was to, “rescue from forgetfulness the origin, the changes, the 
trials and the triumphs of a corps to which he is proud to belong, and which should be 
endeared to his countrymen by its unfailing loyalty and the valour of its deeds”.13 His 
history, like the others, was meant to revive the glorious past and “inspire the unknown 
future”.14 Though originally advertised as a two volume history, a second volume was 
never compiled or published. 
The two volume history of the Corps, Sea Soldiers, by Colonel Cyril Field was 
published in 1924.15 Field’s imperative for the writing of a new work about the Royal 
Marine history, was to show “how the Royal Marines and their ancestors have 
acquitted themselves in the many and varied operations of warfare by sea and by land 
which have fallen to their lot.”16 Field also noted that following the First World War, “the 
‘proverbial man in the street’ has but the vaguest notion of what a Marine is”, and that 
the Corps’ exploits were lost within the grander narratives of the ‘Naval Brigades’.17 As 
Field recounted, “..the General Public has got into the way of thinking of the personnel 
of the Navy in terms of “sailors” only, and even when a Naval Brigade, composed of 
seamen and Marines, is landed for service on shore few people realise the share the 
latter have in the operations.”18 Field, like his predecessor Edye, was concerned that 
following the epic global struggle of the First World War, the laurels and achievements 
attributed to the Corps’ contribution were lost to the public.19 This new work was 
intended to set the record straight and emphasise the importance of the Royal Marines 
following the First World War, yet omitted a chapter on the late war. Work on this 
additional volume to accompany Field’s work was taken up instead by General Herbert 
Edward Blumberg in Britain’s Sea Soldiers – A Record of the Royal Marines During the 
War 1914-1919.20 Blumberg also wrote two other earlier histories of the Royal Marines, 
covering the earliest maritime regiments up to the First World War but were never 
published. All these works preceding Blumberg have at least one unifying theme which 
rings plainly beyond the conviction to broadcast the achievements of the Corps. As a 
sub-set of the Royal Navy these marines expressed a sense of marginalisation by its 
members in contrast to the other services.  
 
12 Major L. Edye, The Historical Records of the Royal Marines, 1664-1701, Vol. I (London: Harrison and Sons,1893) vii. 
13 Edye, Historical Records, viii. 
14 Edye, viii. 
15 Cyril Field, Britain’s Sea-Soldiers, Vol. I & II, (Liverpool: The Lyceum Press, 1924)  
16 Field, Sea Soldiers, Vol. I, i. 
17 Field, i. 
18 Field, i. 
19 Field, i. 
20 Blumberg’s account is a compilation of extensive notes and manuscripts he put together about the Marine history which 
are still held by the Royal Marines Museum, Eastney. He died before they were published in H. E. Blumberg, Britain’s Sea 
Soldiers – A Record of the Royal Marines During the War 1914-1919 (Devonport: Swiss, 1927). 
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Useful as both primary sources on the Royal Marines, but also containing critiques of the 
organisational nature of the Corps, these early histories are foundational blocks of the 
historiography of the Royal Marines as so many historians since have drawn from these. 
These early histories related the achievements of the Corps and contain the convictions of 
their authors, many notably themselves Royal Marines. As histories compiled chiefly by 
officers who serve within the stated period of this research, the authors themselves served 
as witnesses and therefore a source of information about this era; their biases and 
convictions come through as voices to this period. Their sentiments and testimonies will 
serve to accentuate further discussion of the subject areas which will be studied in further 
detail in later chapters. While these early volumes were certainly intended with Marines as 
a key audience for consumption, the tone of these earliest histories retain at least two 
palpable threads expressed in these volumes. Firstly, to promote the continued relevance 
and necessity of the Royal Marines in the British armed forces. Secondly, a desire to 
convey the deeds and value of the Royal Marines to the general public. All these histories 
had within them, a clearly stated agenda of justifying to the military and public at large why 
the Royal Marines should continue to exist. Consequently, these histories are varnished 
and lack objectivity, with some of the more unpleasant aspects of their service record left 
largely unexamined, such as their role in the Great Mutinies or in colonial campaigns. 
Despite these problems, the early histories provide a useful repository for information 
about the origins of the Corps and its history.  
A modest complete regimental history was completed in the post-war period since the 
creation of the Commandos was by Major General Moulton. Moulton, who entered the 
Marines in 1924, experienced the transition of the Corps to the Commandos. His short 
volume, The Royal Marines, provides a brief but useful chronological survey from 1664 to 
1970.21 It is noteworthy as a narrative for its inclusion of insights into the Commando 
transition and the trials faced by the Corps in self-preservation in the post-war era and the 
early stages of the Cold War. Of those written since the Second World War, two stand out 
in particular. Firstly, James D. Ladd’s By Land, By Sea: The Royal Marines, 1919-1997.22 
With the 1983 Falklands War being a major event for the Royal Marines which raised their 
profile significantly, as well as the Persian Gulf War of 1991, both are covered in the later 
edition. The book concerns primarily the history of the Commandos, so the period from 
1919-1940 is covered sparsely in a single twenty-page chapter. Detailed and well 
researched, the utility of Ladd’s work remains a definitive and comprehensive chronology 
 
21 J.L Moulton, The Royal Marines, (London: Leo Cooper, Ltd, 1972).  
22 An earlier edition covering 1919 to 1980 and missed the Falklands, a key event in modern Royal Marines history, a 
second volume included this, along with the 1990-91 Persian Gulf War which saw the deployment of the entire 3rd 
Commando Brigade. James D. Ladd, By Land, By Sea: The Royal Marines, 1919-1997 – An Authorised History, (London: 
Harper Collins Publishers, 1998). 
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of the Commando years, which as one reviewer has described, serves as a ‘fourth 
volume’ to the works of Field and Blumberg.23  
The other notable Corps history, written with a specific focus on the Corps’ commando 
transition in the twentieth century, was written by retired Royal Marines Major General 
Julian Thompson, The Royal Marines: From Sea Soldiers to a Special Force.24 The work 
of Thompson is most significant as a continuation of the historical work about the Royal 
Marines written by a Royal Marine, which probes the questions around Royal Marine 
identity with a keen analytical and interpretative approach to evaluating the Corps’ history 
with a highly experienced insider’s perspective.25 The overall focus of his work is the 
evaluation of the transitions of the twentieth century Royal Marines to the Royal Marines 
Commandos. Similar to Ladd, Thompson includes only two short chapters out of twenty-
six covering on the Royal Marines before the First World War.26 Long having considered 
themselves a distinct apart from the Royal Navy, Thompson argues that although the 
current Corps is the direct descendant of its pre-1941 ancestors, those Marines would 
hardly recognise the Royal Marine Commandos since World War II.27 Thompson has 
emphasised that the Marines were spared disbandment by embracing the opportunity to 
help shape and define British amphibious doctrine in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, then developing and retaining the commando mission adopted during 
the Second World War which ultimately saved the Royal Marines from perdition.28 He also 
touches on the subject of Royal Marine identity, highlighting the challenges of social 
acceptability and mobility for Royal Marine officers.29 For the purposes of this study, 
Thompson’s account cites an important instance of the malleability and mutability of 
organisational culture and identity. Namely, the Royal Marine identity was something that 
evolved over time from "soldiers gone to sea" to an elite commando force. Contrary to 
Thompson, this thesis will argue the Royal Marines had more difficulties in directly 
influencing amphibious doctrine in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. There is 
an argument then that transformation to the Commandos was essential, saved by the 
adoption of a new mission and purpose, saving the Royal Marines from a chronic cycle of 
disbandment experienced in times of post-war budgetary constraints.  
The most recent and ambitious attempt by Richard Brooks chronicles the extensive Royal 
Marine history and is worth mentioning here: The Royal Marines, 1664 to the Present.30 
This volume was to be, in part, an extension of his earlier work, The Long Arms of Empire: 
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Naval Brigades from the Crimea to the Boxer Rebellion.31 Brooks primarily focuses on the 
centuries through World War I, with nine of twelve chapters devoted to the pre-1919 
events and personalities of the Royal Marines history, in order “to provide the context 
missing from the wealth of books that focus exclusively on Commandos”.32 His work also 
advertises a “first single volume study of the Royal Marines’ history as a whole”.33 Brooks’ 
discussion on the nineteenth century Marines is constrained in part by his focus on this 
chronological approach to the history of the Corps, leaving him able to only allude to some 
of the social issues of the day experienced by marines. A chronological approach which 
attempts to compact 350 years of history into one volume leaves little room to provide 
further details on other subject areas which again highlights the challenge in compiling 
such a long organizational history. Outside of these works, naval historians have 
otherwise only tacitly engaged with the Royal Marines. 
Some challenges and successes in studying the Marines as approached by naval 
historians  
In the past sixty years, naval and military history has seen a wider interest from historians 
with a departure from once more traditional chronological narratives, studies of important 
military figures, and works on naval and military strategy. This new analytical focus has 
included works on social history and examinations of military organisations. The Royal 
Marines, however, have largely remained on the periphery of these studies, where 
discussion or even mention of marines is often brief or anecdotal, and often used to 
highlight or punctuate other themes and subjects. Studies devoted to the study of the 
Royal Marines have not only been few, but their examination has also posed challenges 
for some historians. The experience of the Royal Marines has been frequently subsumed 
and obfuscated under the broader narratives of naval history, as well as the specific 
studies which have revealed new aspects on the study of the Royal Navy and the British 
Empire. Some historians have blatantly excluded them in their approaches, others have 
acknowledged their existence without probing much further. A few examples of how 
historians have included or excluded marines puts this problem in focus.   
Michael Lewis in England’s Sea Officers, surveys the officers who served on the naval 
ships from the earliest traceable years of the Royal Navy to the early twentieth-century.34  
Written in 1939 using extensive records from the Admiralty, Lewis examines each role of 
the Royal Navy’s ships officers by profession and rank in turn, yet skips over the Marine 
officer entirely. The notable exception is his appraisal of the ill-fated Selborne scheme 
which sought to redefine naval officer training in the early twentieth century, and only 
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there does he note the attempt to subsume the role of the Marine officer entirely within the 
navy.35 Nicholas Rodger extensively covers the Georgian Royal Navy in his organisational 
histories, but these include little about the Marines. An example of Rodger’s cursory 
inclusion of the marines in his work The Wooden World, built almost exclusively from 
Admiralty records sources, where Rodger summarises the early marines with this phrase: 
“[Marines] were taught to handle a musket, and expected to fight ashore if landing parties 
were needed, but they were certainly at least as ill-trained as the average British foot-
soldier of the day.”36 Rodger’s work is devoid of any real inclusion of marines in the Royal 
Navy, and this unfortunate statement, which reduces at a stroke any hope of the Marines 
benefitting from any further critical analysis. Yet, the Royal Marines were part of the 
‘anatomy’ of the navy and they were an unavoidable and highly visible facet of the Royal 
Navy’s rhythms at sea and the Royal Dockyards. Rodger’s exclusivity of chosen source 
material, drawn chiefly from Admiralty records, likewise fails to add much in the way of 
any social dimension to the personages which shaped these organisations. The example 
of such works as these mentioned by Lewis and Rodger, fail to consider the possibility of 
examining the Marines in a new way. Lewis’ works, however, can be credited and praised 
as early efforts at widening the examination of a traditional military subject, the Royal 
Navy, into that of social and cultural history. Rodger, however, is an avowed critic of such 
efforts.37 Brian Lavery has extensively examined the ‘lower deck’ of the Royal Navy in 
Royal Tars, The Lower Deck of the Royal Navy, 875 -1850, and in Able Seamen, The 
Lower Deck of the Royal Navy 1850-1939, investigating the daily lives of sailors.38 Lavery 
defines the lower deck as, “a group of men (and later women) who perform the essential 
tasks of any navy”, and refines his description further around defining characteristics such 
as skill specialisation and the segregation of sailors and officers.39 Lavery, however, 
admittedly omits discussion of marines in any great detail in either of these volumes. In 
Royal Tars, Lavery states, “[marines] deserve a history of their own”, while tacitly 
acknowledging “how essential [marines] were to running a ship”, and important in so far 
as “the history of the navy and battles”.40 In his companion volume Able Seamen, Lavery 
again cites the absence of the ‘common seaman’ from traditional naval history, but once 
again states that his work does not deal with the Royal Marines in any detail.41 Although 
set in the Napoleonic era, Lavery’s earlier work on Nelson’s Navy provides only a very 
short, but also the most extensive, chapter of all his works to the treatment and discussion 
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of marines.42 Despite marines living and working in the lower deck spaces he was 
defining, Lavery found the meshing of marines to his study problematic in his social 
histories of the navy. Ambiguities on the nature of the space where marines work, such as 
the juxtaposition of the space they exist in geographically on both land and sea, or 
whether they must be defined further as a naval entity, or land combat organisation like 
the army. We may conclude that Lavery struggled in trying to fit marines into the 
framework of his own treatises of the Royal Navy. The Royal Marines have therefore 
defied a satisfactory definition for some naval historians as certain challenges arise with 
examining marines alongside sailors. Others have met the challenge with greater 
success. As will be discussed at length in later chapters, defining Marines in the context of 
the navy is further complicated by the fact that Marines self-identify as being members of 
a thing apart.43  
Other historians have deliberately focused on the Royal Marines with greater success but 
have also recognised these challenges. Don Bittner, a historian who has written 
extensively on Royal Marines history, has drawn a similar conclusion to Richard Harding 
on the present state of Royal Marines historiography: “the Royal Marines still do not have 
a definitive analytical and interpretative institutional history similar to Allan Millet's Semper 
Fidelis44 for the United States Marine Corps. For a service with a long and complicated 
history, founded in 1664, producing such a work would be a formidable challenge 
requiring dedication, time, and resources.”45 Despite this admission, Bittner is foremost in 
this new tradition for advancing our understanding of the Royal Marine identity by 
examining the Corps from an organisational and social lens, especially through his case 
studies of the careers and lives of notable Royal Marines officers. In Officers of the Royal 
Marines in the age of sail: professional and personal life in His and Her Majesty’s soldiers 
of the sea, Bittner evaluates the period of Corps history of the 1790s to the 1850s.46 Using 
a vast collection of correspondence and diaries from five Marine officers for source 
material, Bittner advances our understanding of the relative status of the Corps and the 
precarious nature of the careers and livelihoods of Marine officers. Two further works by 
Bittner advance our understanding of the themes concerned in this thesis. Bittner’s 
“Shattered Images”, examines the social origins and career dilemmas faced by officers of 
the Royal Marines from 1867 to 1914.47 In detail, this work unpacks and analyses the 
myriad of troubles faced by Marine officers in their finances, promotion and career 
prospects. Bittner concluded that Royal Marine officers in this period were largely made 
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up of men from middle-class families seeking careers which were socially acceptable, of 
value to British society, and provided a degree of economic sustenance.48 In “Britannia's 
Sheathed Sword: The Royal Marines and Amphibious Warfare in the Interwar Years - A 
Passive Response”, Bittner analyses the state of the Royal Marines at the conclusion of 
the First World War and their struggle to define a coherent mission.49 Bittner argues that 
despite a vast repository of experience in the Royal Marines following the First World War, 
especially in the developing area of amphibious warfare, the Corps did little to innovate or 
hinge their future on a definitive role.50 Bittner concluded that while Britain in the interwar 
years between 1918 and 1940 did not abandon development of an amphibious doctrine, 
budget constraints, split views within the Corps on the proper role for the Marines, and a 
narrow view within the Royal Navy on retaining the Marines in traditional roles failed to 
significantly advance it.51 Finally, Bittner’s expert editing and contextual commentary of 
the memoirs of Lieutenant Colonel Charles Frederick Jerram, offers a valuable insight into 
the life of a serving Royal Marine officer from the end of the Victorian through the Second 
World War.52 The collective body of work by Bittner, which is referenced liberally in this 
thesis, represents some of the best critical evaluation and analysis to date beyond 
traditional narrative with further evaluation of the organisational and cultural history of the 
Royal Marines.   
A recent and valuable contribution to the expanding examination of the Royal Marines in 
naval historiography is that of Britt Zerbe in The Birth of the Royal Marines, 1664-1802.53 
Zerbe examines the operational doctrine and identity of the Royal Marines in its earliest 
years, while also arguing that “the creation of an operational doctrine and identity”, was 
key to the success of the marines in this period.54 Zerbe’s further aims included, “an 
examination of an eighteenth century military force‘s creation of an operational doctrine, 
which would justify its purpose for existence and its place in the British military 
pantheon.”55 These themes explored by Zerbe are closely aligned to this study and taken 
up where Zerbe leaves off in 1802 into the nineteenth century and early twentieth century. 
Building on these themes, certain conclusions asserted by Zerbe are disputed here as 
they apply to the scope of this study and require further scrutiny.  
Zerbe in his analysis concluded that the Royal Marine identity was achieved in 1802 when 
the marines became a Royal Regiment: “the Marine Corps had a new level of identity, 
official acceptance and [professional/honourable] equality with the Royal Navy and the 
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Royal Regiments of the Army.”56 Zerbe asserts a definitive establishment of a unique 
organisational identity by the Royal Marines as their date of accession to a Royal 
Regiment in 1802: 
Over their forty-seven years’ formation before being made Royal, marines came to 
be seen as a vital constitutional element by the public. They were also the ideal 
symbol of amphibiousness even taking it to its fullest extent, making them 
identifiable with the nation as a whole. In the end the Marine Corps and many of its 
personnel were no longer to be seen as inferiors or hindrances to the Navy and its 
personnel but instead as a vital aspect of the Navy’s abilities to project power. By 
1802 the establishment of the Royal Marines’ signified that this forty-seven-year 
process of construction was finally complete.57 
Zerbe’s conclusions on the Royal Marines do not survive beyond 1802. The Corps could 
indeed celebrate the achievement of new royal regiment status, and this a defining 
moment. While the marines were always part of the Royal Navy and free to construct and 
develop their own unique identity, the identity created by the Marines did more to hinder 
their organisation as they later argued for their retention. This in turn created a culture of 
ingrained institutional paranoia over their possible extinction which continues to the 
present day. The marginalisation of the Corps continued in the long decades which 
followed. Even today, the Royal Marines are not identified as a distinct separate service, 
but as an organisation or formation within a service. This study will also show why the 
Marine identity was established, in the decades to come it was far from secure and 
grappled with the public consciousness. This thesis argues that despite any public 
recognition, the Corps identity far from being complete or well established, remained on 
precarious ground and in a fragile state throughout the nineteenth century into the 
twentieth century. This fragile identity in turn hindered real progress towards defining a 
coherent mission and eventually necessitated the radical reorganisation of the Royal 
Marines which occurred in the mid-twentieth century to ensure its survival.  
Zerbe also links the Royal Marine’s identity to their construction of an amphibious 
doctrine, which Zerbe asserts assured their existence and purpose: 
The Marine’s identity and doctrine was built at its core on the inherent flexibility of 
amphibiousness. The Marine Corps could change rapidly to fulfil any strategic needs 
of the country because there was no overriding single purpose for their existence. 
This rapidity of change is something Marines are still known for to this day. When 
the [3 April 1755] Order in Council came for the formation of a Corps of Marines no 
one had this in mind, but by 29 April 1802 this amphibious body was perceived as a 
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vital arm of the British strategic military capability. Marine operational doctrine and 
identity directly facilitated this organisation’s ability to continually adapt to the 
growing demands of the Navy and Nation.58 
This conclusion of Zerbe’s, as will be shown, is in direct conflict of the realities faced by 
the Corps in the late nineteenth century and also in the years of the First World War and 
interwar period where amphibious doctrine remained an abstract topic and was not a 
defined role for the Corps. The Marines were also not as inherently flexible as Zerbe 
suggests and that it was precisely the absence of a single identifiable and relevant 
purpose which proved a great inhibitor to their continued existence. This study will show 
why continued utility of the Marines was challenged and eroded over time and that rather 
than being innovative, the Corps was reactive with change forced upon it and complete 
extinction avoided only by timely interventions. Zerbe’s further assertions on the utility and 
purpose in the long eighteenth century established the Royal Marines as an essential 
component of the Royal Navy are stated as follows:  
[the Marines] developed the purpose and training regime to solidify their very 
existence. This operational doctrine was never to be placed in one document nor 
done by a single person. Instead the doctrine was an amalgamation of ideas, 
published materials, training strategies and combat experiences throughout this 
period. The system shows over this period in a growing development of an 
overarching doctrine for action on land and at sea. Marines possessed an incredible 
amount of operational flexibility for the eighteenth-century military institution. In 
battles or campaigns marines could be formed into special battalions for key land 
operations or the units on various naval ships could be used in a variety of mixed 
sized force operations. They were used as a mobile reserve force that could attack 
strategic areas or work as a tactical diversion before the main strike on another 
area. Ultimately, this flexibility and multi-dimensional aspects of their operational 
doctrine enhanced the Marines’ own sense of their amphibious military identity.59   
In fact, it was the lack of a coherent doctrine and a clear mission which was a root cause 
of the existential impediments faced by the Royal Marines in the decades to come. Zerbe 
has suggested that in the early operations of the British Empire, principally in the 
eighteenth century, the Marines served as an important link for the army and the navy, 
“because of the amphibious nature of the Marines, they could provide the ever 
increasingly important operational bridge for these two organisations upon sea and 
land”.60 The Royal Marines not only failed to provide this seemingly logical bridge between 
the army and the navy, but also were internally conflicted by this prospect as incompatible 
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with their own purpose and mission. Ultimately, as will be shown, it was in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, that better planning and synergy between the 
army and navy was necessary, with the Royal Marines increasingly aware that failure to 
define a contributing mission might spell their demise. Contrary to Zerbe’s conclusions, 
further evidence will demonstrate that Britain’s global empire domination through 
seapower defied the need for a comprehensive doctrine for amphibious operations in the 
decades that followed, denying the opportunity for the Royal Marines to champion or 
innovate developments much later in this emerging naval doctrine. While several of 
Zerbe’s conclusions as to the origins of British amphibious doctrine within the Royal 
Marines are disputed in this study, Zerbe’s work remains an essential volume for 
historians seeking to expand their study and a useful method to introduce the next 
segment of this historiographical evaluation. 
There exists then an opportunity for further contributions in the expanding field of social, 
cultural, and organisational history which has explores military subjects from new 
approaches. The need to produce these new histories also underscores the opportunity 
for historians, as noted by Harding and Bittner, to move beyond the exclusively 
chronological and campaign histories and explore other opportunities in researching the 
Royal Marines. What follows is further explanation on how this thesis will approach the 
rich opportunity for historians in further study of the Marines. Using the two-part approach 
outlined in the introduction, this thesis will build on some of the best recent scholarship by 
historians concerning the social and organisational history of the Royal Marines, and also 
approaches and methodologies by other scholars and historians that will aid this study.  
A proposed method to examine the Royal Marines: identity and organisational 
development 
In the past few decades, serious exploration of naval and military topics has migrated from 
battle studies and the studies of great leaders or heroes. Once viewed as a vehicle for 
imperial nostalgia and a device instructing military officers, military and naval history has 
become a topic for serious research by historians, and studies have rapidly proliferated. 
The relationship between British society and its military forces has been the subject and 
focus for historians in recent years, with the primary emphasis in scholarship and research 
accorded to the army and to the navy using social and cultural approaches to history in 
order to deepen our understanding of these services.61 Termed as ‘new military history’ 
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and ‘new naval history’, when characterised more broadly, many of these studies enter 
the category of the still growing examination of ‘war and society’ studies.62 As Don Leggett 
has cited, these developments have provided greater accessibility and interaction with 
naval history for historians in a wider landscape, with greater capacity for ongoing 
research agendas in maritime and imperial history, making possible a fuller study of the 
role of the navy in Britain’s maritime empire.63 Essentially, the aims of these studies are 
the ‘de-militarisation’ of military and naval history, focusing instead on combatants and 
their experiences, military culture and identity, race, civilian populations, or in geographic 
terms.64 This study will examine the Royal Marines as an organisational sub-set of the 
Royal Navy, or their organisational history, and their unique military identity. The two 
themes are interconnected. What follows is how some historians have engaged with this 
successfully and how their ideas and methods can be incorporated in this study. 
An organisational approach 
As Richard Harding has argued, “navies can be studied as organizations that were the 
most complex of their time”.65 How navies, armies, or for the purpose of this study, a 
regiment such as the Royal Marines operated encompasses both the issues of identity 
and how these organisations functioned. Specific to the idea of organisational history, 
navies are organizations created by the state for the purposes of implementing a national 
strategy.66 The availability of a vast archive of administrative documents for interpretation, 
coupled with more personal manuscripts from individual serving members, makes the 
study of these organisations an intriguing opportunity for historians. The Royal Marines 
are a sub-organization of the Royal Navy, but one which has seen limited study by naval 
historians. Military organisations cultivate their own unique cultural habits and customs. 
The British army, for example, has persistently propagated the importance of regimental 
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identities as significant to efficiency and the function of the army as a whole.67 Ultimately, 
these discussions and beliefs exact an important influence on decisions which result in 
significant outlays of government spending and the organisation around defence needs 
with all their ramifications.  
Historians Heather Venable and Terry Terriff have examined how one similar military 
organisation evolved and solved the problem of their own existential crisis. Examining the 
US Marine Corps in the same time period as this study, Venable in her organisational 
study of the US Marine Corps, examines how this organisation under similar pressures as 
the Royal Marines of redundancy and extinction, were forced to construct its own elite 
image.68 Venable’s argues that marines of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century 
could not claim a clearly defined mission within the American defence establishment, 
necessitating a public relations and advertising campaign to promote an image of marines 
as more elite and disciplined than soldiers, and more masculine than sailors and “out-
soldiering soldiers”. Venable demonstrates how the Marine Corps used its history of 
amphibious landings to align these activities to idealised martial masculinities and produce 
through their own Publicity Bureau, a range of printed posters and news stories which 
captured the public imagination. The deliberate engendering of the marine landing party 
was designed to inform the public that navy sailors were less manly in comparison. 
Venable’s argues that the US Marine Corps continued existence in this period was made 
possible by both success on the battlefield and a deliberate campaign of a constructed 
masculine identity in American society through advertising and public relations.69 The 
success of this campaign was considerable. As a result, Terry Terriff has shown how the 
US Marine Corps inculcated the same belief into its membership to the extent that a myth 
about the US Marines was created: “..in terms of cold mechanical logic, the United States 
does not need a Marine Corps. However, for good reasons which completely transcend 
cold logic, the United States wants a Marine Corps.”70 Terriff argues this statement has 
become the foundation of a mythological bond believed to exist between the people of the 
United States and the US Marine Corps.71 For the purposes of this study, there will be no 
comparative study of the Royal Marines to other similar marine organisations. As will be 
shown, unlike the US Marine Corps who at a similar crisis point following the First World 
War experienced a crisis regarding its organisational future, the Royal Marines failed to 
adapt and innovate in the same way as their American peers. The also did not achieve, as 
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stated by Terriff, the same mythological status in the British psyche despite their martial 
achievements. Yet, the Royal Marines inspired the creation of similar military bodies 
abroad, and in turn, as will be shown, drew from lessons and the practices of foreign 
militaries such as the US Marine Corps. As will be explained, the organisational structure 
of the Royal Marines as a sub-set of the Royal Navy or fighting arm, complicated their 
ability to push their agenda and was further inhibited by the lack of senior Marine officers 
in the upper echelons of the Admiralty.  
David French has critically examined the evolution of the regimental system of the British 
army and demonstrated the value of further study of military unit identities stating: “An 
economist might not recognize a regiment as a unit of production, and so the immediate 
relevance of the test, a proven ability to produce and distribute the goods and services 
deemed necessary to meet its basic needs, might be difficult to apply. But regiments were 
required to produce a service, success on the battlefield.”72 From this statement, we can 
understand how the cold hard fiscal realities of budget considerations, weighed the merits 
and contributions of one service against another; the reams of the Hansard army and 
navy estimates over the centuries attest to this. Added to this are the problems of how 
effectiveness is measured, and where units or ships are considered in like for like fashion, 
what discriminating factors can distinguish the merits or demerits for each are harder to 
come by. This is especially true, as will be shown for the Royal Marines. The Royal 
Marines experienced an organisational crisis where their function and utility were 
questioned and deemed no longer valuable. As a sub-organisation of the Royal Navy 
defined around specific tasks and roles, the Royal Marines were forced to evolve or face 
disbandment. The additional point of friction was the unique identity which they had 
crafted, as argued here very much on an incompatible model of a British army regiment.  
Examining culture and Identity: building a case for the Royal Marines 
Management consultant and business analyst Peter Drucker is known for having stated 
“culture eats strategy for breakfast”.73 The saying suggests that any organisation 
embarking on a set task or organisation changes will invariably be guided or driven by its 
own institutional culture, practices and traditions. Drucker’s argument claims the ethos, 
values, and ethics which employees share ultimately guides the direction an organisation 
will take far more than any strategy that does not take these cultural influences into 
account. Defining culture, however, proves elusive for scholars of many disciplines 
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despite its prolific use. 74 Management scholar Mats Alverson suggests that ‘organisational 
culture’, and especially the term ‘culture’ itself has no fixed or broadly used meaning, even 
in anthropology; it is a tricky concept, used to cover everything and consequently 
nothing.75 Among sociologists and business analysts, there remains a wide range of 
opinions on the definition of interpretation of the term ‘organisational culture’.76 This thesis 
uses the term in speaking, from a historical perspective, about how the Royal Marines as 
a military organisation have taken a serious interest in the creation and interpretation of 
those events, ideas, and experiences that were influenced and shaped by its members, 
and how its membership derived a shared identity, a sense of purpose, and a common set 
of beliefs. This thesis also uses the term identity to derive a better understanding of what 
membership in the Royal Marines mean to its contemporaries. Studies have increased 
examining aspects of military organisations using the terms identity and culture to argue 
the case for further study. Both terms require further explanation on how these are used 
by historians, especially in the study of military organisations and how they will be utilised 
in this thesis.  
This study also proposes that to better understand the challenges faced by the Royal 
Marines through their existence as a military organisation, it is important to better 
understand the challenges they faced in constructing their own identity. As Peter Wilson 
has cited, the cultural dimension of military organisations is frequently lost or subsumed in 
the pursuit of other debates.77 In essence, these studies seek to understand in part how 
military organisations develop, not only as their own culture, but in the course of asserting 
their relevance and utility, how they gain their own recognisable identity.78 Donald Bittner 
has cited how Royal Marines officers, in contrast to their army peers in this same period, 
came from more humble and frequently more impoverished backgrounds.79 Marines were 
also members of an overarching military hierarchy, dictated in part by the stratified 
characteristics of British society of the period, imposing complex issues of status and 
seniority between services. For officers, this facet of their existence was on public display 
through the respective army and navy lists, as well as the London Gazette, and 
membership in the Marines in a society fixated on familial origins and decorum, posed 
concerns for the socially mobile. For the Marines, the phenomenon or pattern of ‘naval’ or 
‘military’ families, where membership is related to multiple generations, is not unknown to 
the Marines.80 Peter Wilson suggests there are clear links between social and military 
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hierarchies, but that we should look beyond issues of class alone in order to identify what 
further shapes military cultures.81  
Culture informs identity, but the scope for the consideration of military culture in this work 
is bounded by two important factors: how it informs the specific case of a marine identity 
in conflict with its parent organisation, and how this identity inhibited its own successes 
and mission. To this latter point, Edgar Schein has cited how within an organisation as 
cultural assumptions form around the means by which goals are to be accomplished, 
these will inevitably involve the internal issues of status and identity, in turn highlighting 
the complexity of both the analysis of means and the issues surrounding efforts to change 
an organisation accomplishes its goals.82 This important point would become a central 
and perennial issue for the Royal Marines. Schein also states that organisations which 
experience survival crises often discovered in their responses to such crises what some of 
their deeper assumptions really were. Schein concludes that through this process, an 
important piece of an organisation’s culture can be genuinely latent.83 This result was not, 
as will be shown, the result in the case of the Royal Marines in this period. A key inhibitor 
was in fact another conclusion of Schein, and one argued here which proved detrimental 
to the Corps, which was consensus on the core mission and identity does not 
automatically guarantee that the key members of the organisation will have common goals 
or that the various subcultures will be appropriately aligned to fulfil the mission.84  
The relationship between land and sea identities, whether they be local, regional, 
corporate or national, is one that has in recent years increasingly attracted historians. As 
the popularity of the term “identity” has become among historians, more diverse have its 
meanings and interpretations become. Between practitioners of different disciplines, 
consensus is perhaps less important than framing it and using it in this case towards the 
examination of historical issues and better understanding of an issue.85 Jeremy Black has 
noted how the “recent emphasis on the culture of military organisation[s]” has helped 
“bridge traditional military and non-military concerns and methods”.86 Peter Wilson has 
stated, “that military culture is a specific form of institutional culture and that viewing 
armies from this perspective offers new insight into how they functioned and the nature of 
their interaction with state and society.”87 Wilson has offered a conceptual framework to 
better understand the norms and values of soldiers and armies in the past. He defined this 
approach further, stating that, “Military culture implies the existence of a specific 
institution, since the contention here is that it is different from a culture of violence, though 
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it may well be part of that, too.”88 Studies of the Royal Navy that have approached these 
themes include Margerette Lincoln and her work on the Georgian Navy, and Mary Conley 
on how ‘Jack Tar’ of the late Victorian and Edwardian navies personified accepted British 
values.89 Jan Rüger demonstrated how the Royal Navy was elevated in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century as a symbolic embodiment of the British nation, 
where “the enthusiasm for modern technology was indistinguishable from expressions of 
national identity”.90  
The importance or significance of military culture and identity, and how they are created, 
has been a subject of recent study by historians. Heather Streets has cited how the 
forming of a martial identity was key to the Highland soldiers and Sikh Soldiers, where 
service guaranteed degrees of status, popularity, and a strong sense of group, cultural 
and regional identity.91 In defining military culture, Williamson Murray stated: “Military 
culture represents the ethos and professional attributes, both in terms of experience and 
intellectual study, that contribute to a common core understanding of the nature of war 
within military organizations.”92  Other recent scholarship has presented a history of the 
navy as a social and cultural institution that can provide new understandings of the navy’s 
relationship with British society.93 In the words of one reviewer, “this new historiography 
guarantees that our investigation of the relationship between the Royal Navy and British 
society and culture continues to expand and adapt with British historiography generally.”94 
Mary Conley examined how the Royal Navy, and specifically the sailor, experienced 
positive change and image reform in this period, and questioning Mackenzie’s claim as to 
the extent the soldier surpassed or even overtook the parallel popular image of the 
sailor.95 Conley stated the image of sailors, and the presentation of the Royal Navy in the 
process, was reformed and no longer was the British sailor a ‘bawdy drunkard’ but a hero 
of the Empire.96 Conley argued that evolving imperial missions and ideologies of late 
Victorian manhood shaped the transformation of the navy by the late nineteenth century. 
According to Conley, a distinct agenda was underway to present the Royal Navy seamen 
as exemplars of British manhood abroad and hence personified the British global civilizing 
mission.97 That the sailor, as argued by Conley, was undergoing this image rethink at this 
time suggests the same may have been occurring for the marine. Isaac Land has cited the 
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utility of discussing individuals and groups, like the Marines who are susceptible to 
redefinition, in terms of ‘framing’ rather than ‘forging’. ‘Framing’, according to Land, allows 
groups, such as the sailors he discusses, to reconfigure their defined borders to suit new 
factors, either external or self-defined.98 These studies by Conley and Land offer a method 
for a considered approach towards better defining the Royal Marines in context to the 
Royal Navy as their own separate entity. Identity for the Marines was purposely stretched 
as much as their role and purpose could be reshaped as evidenced by their long history. 
This thesis argues that identity in the case of the Royal Marines was itself an evolutionary 
process and will further assert that identity, in the case of the Marines, was by necessity 
malleable.  
Conclusion 
Assessing the historiographical landscape of naval history and the more recent social and 
cultural studies of the Royal Navy, it is apparent that these themes have not been fully 
explored. Furthermore, studies of the Royal Marines to date have largely focused on 
either formative years of the eighteenth century and the Napoleonic Wars, or have instead 
examined the twentieth century and the Royal Marine Commandos which today 
dominates our contemporary understanding of the Marines. These factors combined have 
discounted the significance of the influential years of the long nineteenth century, and the 
significant social and cultural obstacles the Royal Marines faced from both internal and 
external factors. This thesis seeks to fill some of these gaps, and also to point to 
approaches for further study on military identities and culture. In this way, this thesis 
hopes to not only illustrate the importance of further examining the Royal Marines, but 
also how an organisation which has cultivated its own unique identity and role while a part 
of a larger parent group might be studied.  
The identified extent of this researched period, 1827 to early 1927, begins with the 
Marines following defining years for Britain in the Napoleonic Wars and at the end of the 
defining nineteenth century, and through the modern age of warfare of the First World 
War. It allows a focus on the Marines amidst the social changes occurring in Britain during 
the nineteenth century, as well as its involvement in the numerous campaigns and 
expeditions of the so-called Pax Britannica. It also intentionally avoids the significant 
cultural shift assumed by the Marines with their significant occupational and institutional 
transformation to the Commandos of World War II. While the proposed research period 
appears to be a wide time frame for examination, it is entirely necessary in order to 
consider the important episodes and factors within this interval, which will bring forward 
these key themes around which this research is framed into better focus.  
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My methodology will be to examine the development of the Royal Marines during the 
stated period, focusing on those relationships with British society, their communities 
where they lived, and their military peers. This method will delve into the relationship 
between the Corps and society, comparing its relative status amongst the other services, 

























Chapter 2. Military identity and the Royal Marines: apart, in conflict, in peril 
But the marines, and the marine artillery, like the noble war-horse, have contributed 
more than their share in all the great battles in which they have participated; and, 
like the war-horse, too, they have hitherto been unrewarded with anything but the 
bare provender which was indispensable to keep them fit for their work. - Sir Robert 
Steele, 184099 
Robert Steele, a Marine officer who first entered service in 1803, wrote these words in his 
1840 memoir and captures an important sentiment about the Royal Marines and the state 
of their organisation. Steele’s observation would be echoed similarly with frequency by 
others of his generation, and by many more in the decades to come. Steele conveys to 
the reader the image of his Corps labouring devotedly for the good of the nation yet failing 
to garner the recognition it deserved. Steele’s argument is an emotive one, based on his 
own perception and evaluation of the contributions of his Corps to many British military 
campaigns. This sentiment was duly linked to an espoused characteristic of Royal Marine 
organisational identity as that of an embattled regiment. This belief also insisted that the 
deeds of the Corps would be subsumed into those of the Navy, except in the rare cases 
where individual actions called out by necessity the organisation to which they 
belonged. This chapter explores the defining characteristics of the Royal Marine identity, 
both physical and intangible.  
A brief history of the Corps from its incarnation up to the present day opens this chapter. It 
further contextualises and highlights the key factors of Corps identity, points of tension, 
and an indication of how the Corps organisational structure and mission was forced to 
evolve. This chapter is next broken down in sections. The first examines the beliefs held in 
common to the organisation, in turn inculcated in its members such as the Corps’ 
memorable dates but also those of a distinct ‘otherness’ from the services, especially the 
navy. The next explores the outward displays, the uniforms and motifs used by the Corps 
as expressions of their service and membership. Before concluding, it will examine how 
the Corps was organised at this stage, and how its organisation along with its established 
traditions were at odds with its parent service. Underpinning this is an argument which 
states that the Marine identity was apart, frequently in conflict with the other services, and 
often in peril. Argued here is that the constructed identity of the Corps was fragile and in 
conflict with the Royal Navy, its parent service. This in turn raised further challenges to 
making it a distinguishable and viable organisation within Britain’s military forces. As the 
first substantive chapter launching the arguments of this thesis, this chapter defines 
further the significance of some key dates and events, principally between 1827 and 1927, 
to underscore the overarching aim of this thesis which is to show how the struggle to 
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retain and define a cohesive identity also came into conflict with the principle challenge of 
defining a coherent mission.  
Culture, Military identity, and the Royal Marines  
As Mats Alverson has stated, “Culture is not primarily ‘inside’ people’s heads, but 
somewhere ‘between’ the heads of a group of people where symbols and meanings are 
publicly expressed.”100 It is therefore important to consider how these emblems were 
significant to the creation of the unique identity for this organisation. In 2010, the Royal 
Marines website placed the following statement addressing this:  
There is much written about ethos and it is often wrongly conceived. However, far 
from being complex, ethos is actually straightforward; defined simply it is what a 
group does and how it does it. The ethos of the Royal Marines refers to our role and 
the way we fulfil it.101 
The importance therefore of a commonly understood ethos, built on a confirmed history 
and heritage is of importance to military organisations.102 In his detailed study of the 
present-day Royal Marines Commandos, Anthony King evaluated the Royal Marines’ 
ethos citing how the Corps’ attested long history and organisational evolution as 
contributing factors. In the construction of military identities are two important elements: 
the outward displays of emblems, uniforms, colours, badges and other recognisable 
displays; and the curation and maintenance of key dates and events, including battle 
honours, towards the construction of the organisational narrative. These are important to 
our understanding of military cultures and the progression of how these organisations 
understand and view themselves, including the outward displays and manifestations. The 
Royal Marines also addresses how their ethos is informed by their recognition of important 
historical tradition as follows: 
Whilst ethos is what we do and how we do it, it draws upon historical tradition. Corps 
history since 1664 gives us an identity, a collective pride and a host of great ‘dits’,103 
not to mention 10 Victoria Crosses! But our Commando role is relatively recent, 
dating back to Churchill’s demand for the raising of raiding forces to harass the 
Continent after the debacle of May 1940. Our symbol of the Globe and Laurel 
remains appropriate because, like our forebears, we must be prepared to fight and 
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win, anywhere in the world. The difference now is the way we fight – the Commando 
role – exemplified by the Commando dagger that is now our formation flash.104 
Much is included in this statement: the importance of a common history which inspires 
organisational pride, recognition of past achievements of its membership, the 
acknowledgement of the recent commando role, and finally the use of important emblems 
which are representative of common values and heritage. To this point, Anthony King 
cites the significance of the Corps emblem, the Globe and Laurel, and its interpretation 
and relevance to the current Royal Marines Commandos of today: “The history of the 
Corps and the Globe and Laurel itself are an essential part of the ethos of the Royal 
Marines today but it is important to realise that contemporary ethos is not a natural 
product of three hundred years’ service.”105 As King states, the contemporary green beret 
with the Globe and Laurel affixed does little to convey the earlier roles of the artillery or 
the light infantry.106 Even so, the significance and importance of the construction of a 
unique legacy remains important. In the British forces, the date of origin for a regiment or 
service conferred a hierarchical status on that unit. The Royal Navy frequently uses the 
moniker of ‘the senior service’ in relation to its relative status in the British military forces, 
alluding to early origins in English history. For the Royal Marines, agreement on the 
original foundation date varied. As will be shown, a specific date of origin for the Marines 
is more contentious, varying between 1664 and 1755, and contributed to internal debates 
over an agreed incarnation date. As King states, “the institutional memory of the Royal 
Marines remains important not because the Royal Marines really are the direct 
descendants of those soldiers who fought at Trafalgar then, but because this institutional 
memory imbues the current commando ethos of the Corps with a sacred tradition.”107 
Nevertheless, the effort to roll the nativity of the Corps over three hundred years, is as 
King states, “a case of an invented tradition.”108 As King cites, the key distinguishing factor 
is that the present day commando function of the Royal Marines bears very little 
resemblance to those roles formerly occupied by their forebears who wore the same 
badge.109 This chapter will examine the choice and creation of specific emblems, and how 
these put them at odds with other services. To gain further understanding about the 
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Who are the Royal Marines?  - creating and organisation and a unique identity 
The Royal Marines claim a long lineage of service to the nation. In 2014, the Royal 
Marines celebrated their 350 year anniversary with great pomp, at once connecting the 
present day Royal Marines those of the earliest army regiments raised in 1664, the Duke 
of York and Albany’s Maritime Regiment of Foot, of soldiers who would serve at sea.110 
For the Royal Marines, despite long association with the Admiralty for sea service, its 
early origins both functionally and administratively retained the characteristics of earlier 
infantry or foot regiments of the army to which they had belonged.111 Traditionally, 
regiments assigned for sea service were typically disbanded at one war’s conclusion and 
usually reformed at the start of a new one. From this process, the lineage of many British 
army regiments claimed marine and amphibious origins.112  
The Corps of Marines of the present day has in fact evolved from the latest reconstitution 
of the Marines in 1755 under the Admiralty.113 As will be explored, without this essential 
link to the navy and sea service, the marines might have continued to exist as another 
army regiment. The Marines were further organised into some fifty companies across 
three divisions at the Royal Dockyards and port towns of Portsmouth, Plymouth, and 
Chatham, and would, “be appointed to serve on board Your Majesty’s Ships and Vessels 
at such times in such Proportions and under such Orders and Regulations, as Your High 
Admiral or Commissioners of the Admiralty shall judge proper”.114 This latest incarnation 
of a British Corps of Marines, would finally break the cycle of precarious existence of 
Britain’s nascent amphibious force. The reinstated Corps of Marines provided an 
integrated force for service with the navy sea and on land, serving aboard nearly every 
class of naval warship, and from this point were left by the Admiralty to define the 
organisational character and identity of their regiment. Their role as soldiers who served 
on land and at sea with the navy would remain defining characteristics of their 
organisation. The marines of 1755 served with distinction in both the land and sea 
campaigns of their day, notably at Belle Isle in the Seven Year’s War, Bunker Hill in the 
American War of Independence, and Trafalgar during the Napoleonic Wars.115 Serving 
with the Royal Navy would prove to be the Corps’ defining characteristic, without which 
the Marines were otherwise undistinguishable from any other army regiment. The Marines 
also benefitted within the Royal Navy as the only service with fixed term enlistments and 
other predictable measures to their patterns of life, such as a barracks, duty at sea and 
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ashore, standard uniforms for both officers and men, and a system for professional 
advancement and training. Most importantly, Marines in this period could also rely on a 
well-defined occupational role within the navy rather than a specified mission. At sea, 
Marines protected the ship from boarding parties and could likewise aid in the direct 
engagement of other ships, or on land with naval raiding parties or ‘cutting out’ 
expeditions. Despite the early promise of amphibious potential, these early marines were 
still far from the elite crack troops of the later mid-twentieth century.116 Marines also 
served as the navy’s security force at sea to protect vital stores as well as provide a 
barrier between the sailors and the ship’s officers. In this way, Marines were also 
physically and visibly divided from sailors, in separate berthing and messing, and by their 
distinct red jacket which stood out in a period when most ordinary sailors did not have 
their own official uniform.117 While Marines were not entirely immune from collaboration in 
naval mutinies, their role in keeping good order and discipline at sea put them in a 
different category altogether from the sailors they served alongside. On land, Marines 
always returned to their Divisions where they lived in barracks, whereas sailors were kept 
aboard ship or disbanded when a ship was paid off. This fact, and other expressions of a 
Corps being marginalised by the other services, became embedded in the Marines’ 
unique military identity and culture, increasingly viewing themselves as a service 
“apart”.118 
The Napoleonic Wars and the peace which followed brought some organisational 
changes. In 1802, the Corps of Marines were granted the honorific title ‘Royal’, making 
them the Royal Marines.119 The Marines had also survived disbandment, but despite their 
achievements in the late war, the Royal Marines did not achieve the distinction of rewards 
and honours due to its membership, particularly the officers, equivalent to the other 
services for an organisation of its size. The creation of the Royal Marines Artillery had 
occurred in 1804 where detachments of marines were utilised to man what the Royal 
Navy termed as ‘bomb ketches’, essentially mobile artillery platforms for lobbing shells 
from heavy mortars for siege and bombardment purposes of shore installations.120 In 
1827, these artillery marines were consolidated into a distinct regiment within the Royal 
Marines, known as the Royal Marines Artillery or R.M.A. This new arrangement effected 
the unusual situation of effectively two regiments or organisations within a single regiment. 
The first, retaining the common title of Royal Marines, were the ordinary infantry soldiers 
serving in the divisions for sea service per their original purpose, and the second being 
the artillery. The artillery adopted a blue uniform, common to the traditional uniform of the 
Royal Artillery and of a royal regiment and would be known internally as the ‘Blue 
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Marines’. Otherwise, the Corps retained the red uniform common to the British army and 
would be known as the ‘Red Marines’. This development signalled how much the Royal 
Marines clung to the culture and traditions of the British army, which would prove a 
continued source of tension within the Admiralty and the Royal Navy. 
Following the Napoleonic Wars, Britain enjoyed a supremacy at sea with its Royal Navy 
with few prospective rivals, which would last throughout the nineteenth century. The 
Marines would serve throughout the nineteenth century in the numerous campaigns and 
expeditions of the so-called Pax Britannica. This era was also defined by reform of naval 
administration and manning, as well as new technology in steam ships and naval gunnery, 
and which now cast doubt as to the utility and future role of the marines. As will be shown, 
by the mid-nineteenth century, the traditional roles marines held in the navy would 
become anachronistic and defining a suitable role and mission would evade them. 
Increasing ambiguity about the role of the Marines were the subject of debates as to what 
role or purpose they served.121 As will be shown, this debate over a distinct role and 
mission would highlight the Marines as an organisation that was viewed by some neither 
useful nor well defined and underscore their fragile identity as sea soldiers. In 1855 
following the Crimean War, the infantry would be renamed the Royal Marines Light 
Infantry, or R.M.L.I., reminiscent of the army organisations which emphasised a fit and 
versatile force.122 The Royal Marines now had two distinct branches which effectively 
developed in parallel as independent regiments under one organisational body, 
developing their own separate identities along an army regimental model, while retaining 
allegiance and membership to the original parent organisation of the Royal Marines. While 
the arrangement may have created a sense of healthy internal competition, it will be 
argued here that having two competitive organisations within a parent organisation who 
itself struggled to define its own sense of purpose was in fact a recipe for disaster. While 
both continued to serve their functions for the Royal Navy, the problem of the Royal 
Marines actual purpose unravelled through the nineteenth century, as did determining 
their relative value and contribution. It will be shown how the Royal Marines propagation 
of this distinct organisational culture akin to that of the regimental culture of the British 
army, further contributed to their elusive quest of an organisational mission and served as 
further source of antagonism within the navy. 
By the mid-nineteenth, what had once existed as a clearly defined role within the Royal 
Navy became increasingly ambiguous. Improvements to naval gunnery decreased the 
likelihood of close actions at sea, and it was accepted that sailors with instruction were 
just as capable at repelling boarders as marines. Also, while the navy had previously 
relied on methods of both enticement and impressment to man the fleet, by the mid-
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nineteenth century the navy had improved the professional structure and occupational 
pathways towards developing professional skills and specialisations for sailors as will be 
examined in further detail.123 Occupations within the navy, from seamanship to gunnery, 
were now structured with training regimens and opportunities advancement in a career 
field. For the marines, the time-honoured role as a shipboard police force, keeping both 
order and discipline at sea and providing a thin red line between the officers of the fleet 
from would-be mutinous men below decks, was now considered redundant. Equally 
frustrating to the marines, sailors were being employed on land in military roles as landing 
parties and in the employment of guns, which the marines believed to be their own role 
and purpose. This idea that sailors could and might replace the one traditional roles of 
marines proved an alarming development for the marines. Increasingly, Marine officers 
were consigned as the least useful members at sea, even after the Chaplain on larger 
ships. This study will examine many illustrations of this in both private letters and official 
sources and documents, such as Royal Commissions. Defining what role the Marines 
would play in imperial defence, especially as the Royal Navy was adapting to the massive 
changes that the ‘age of steam’ brought about became increasingly urgent. The overall 
effect of these changes increased fears amongst Marines and their supporters of renewed 
threats of their disbandment.  
The early twentieth century saw the Royal Marines gain acclaim for their participation in 
South Africa in the Boer War and in the defence of the Peking Legation, but the 
achievements of the Corps during the First World War were all but subsumed into the 
great events of this global conflict. The Marines participated from early days with a landing 
in France and later in Belgium, among the first to be despatched. They participated 
notably at Gallipoli in 1915 and at Jutland in 1916, but their participation on the Western 
Front with the Naval Division is hardly well known.124 The daring 1918 raid at Zeebrugge 
garnered mixed results, but signalled their ability to conduct raids from the sea in modern 
war. Following the First World War, calls for more budget cuts and naval treaties seemed 
to doom the very future of the Corps as dramatic force reductions forced the disposal of 
the marine artillery entirely to avoid complete extinction. At this critical point, as will be 
explored further in this thesis, discussions about how the Marines might seize upon and 
develop British amphibious doctrine was examined but discarded.  
The remaining inter-war years saw marines remain in traditional roles on ships of the fleet.  
The Second World War and specifically 1942, described by Julian Thompson as a 
“watershed” year for changes in the Royal Marines, saw the adoption of the Commandos. 
The impact of this new venture, according to Thompson, would usher in a rate of change 
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for the Royal Marines resulting in the Corps becoming “almost unrecognizable” to anyone 
who had served in it all its preceding years. These Royal Marines Commandos inherited 
an organisation defined by nearly 300 years of struggle for survival and pursuit of a viable 
mission within Britain’s armed forces. In the present day, the Royal Marines have thus far 
managed to retain it. The challenges which exist today, as will be shown, have their 
origins in the crises found in 1827 through 1927. Here is briefly why.  
An organisation still in crisis 
The Royal Marines exist today, much as they were during the period of this study, as a 
subordinate division or ‘fighting arm’ of the Royal Navy.125 As the above history has 
described, the Royal Marines have frequently faced the challenge of maintaining a viable 
role in the ambiguous space between land and sea. Today, following periods of prolonged 
conflict in a new century, the Royal Marines again face similar challenges in this 
precarious balance as the United Kingdom’s designated amphibious forces for 
commitments and both land and sea.126 In a 2012 article for the professional Royal Navy 
journal, Naval Review, a Royal Marine Officer considered the historic conversion of the 
Corps to a commando regiment in context to the evolution of its own history and how the 
invention of the Commandos had created the added problem for the regiment of risking 
forgetting its amphibious past: 
The commando conversion has come at a significant cost to the Naval Service. It 
has occluded the older maritime legacy of the Corps. Most Royal Marines are ‘sea 
blind’, focused almost exclusively on the land environment (often not even the 
littoral). The only organisation carrying the torch of that maritime heritage has been 
the Landing Craft Squadron which sits apart from the commando units. As a result, 
the Naval Service has over the last 50 years lost its understanding and unified 
concept of maritime warfare. The [RM] and [RN] have evolved along quite separate 
paths. Royal Marines now have more in common with their army cousins than their 
matelot brothers.127 
The accusation of institutional ‘sea-blindness’ is one described further by Andrew Lambert 
in his recent work on the seapower identity of modern states and governments, warning 
that seapower and seapower identity for a state such as the United Kingdom requires 
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constant sustainment.128 Sladden further cites how the routine employment of Royal 
Marines to OP HERRICK129 to “rescue the Army’s deployment cycle” from the continued 
demand for additional ground troops in operations, was detrimental to an organisation of 
amphibious commandos in the Naval Service.130 Sladden also criticised Royal Marines 
objectives stated in the 2011 defence review within the armed forces as too broad and 
lacking supportability. Similarly, Sladden stated how the consequences of these more 
recent operations by Marines serving in a seemingly indistinguishable capacity and ill-
defined role alongside the army in Afghanistan, has today contributed to the problems for 
the Marines in redefining their purpose and role much as it did a century ago.131 While 
Sladden is an evident critic of these more recent developments, this study will show that 
these most recent employment of the Royal Marines have served in part to uphold a 
tradition of showcasing the Royal Navy at the forefront of operations worldwide, even 
deployed to unexpected or landlocked areas. By using the Royal Marines, the Royal Navy 
in perpetual competition with the army, is able to continue to demonstrate its utility to the 
British public that it remains involved in all aspects of British defence needs. 
More recently, the Royal Marines have been the subject of recent enquiries by the British 
government evaluating defence needs and the capabilities and platforms needed to 
provide for domestic security, as well as maintain Britain’s role as a member of 
international treaties and partnerships, such as NATO, and the continuing need for 
marines and the ships need to deliver them.132 Consequently, the Royal Marines today are 
facing a new organisational identity crisis as they seek to innovate, adapt, and reshape 
their organisation to match the United Kingdom’s defence needs. Announced in February 
2019, a new plan for a “Future Commando Force” called for the most dramatic 
reorganisation of the Royal Marines since the 1950s, and was revealed in a series of 
briefings and conference gatherings.133 In 2019, the Royal Marines announced the launch 
of a recalibration of their organisational mission to suit Britain’s defence needs. In a 
speech to the Defence and Security Equipment International in September 2019, the 
Commandant General of the Royal Marines Major Gen Matt Holmes, said: “The scale and 
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ambition of our transformation is significant. Nothing is off-limits and we aspire to be at the 
cutting edge of defence.”134 Described as, “the most significant transformation and 
rebranding programme launched since [World War 2]”135, the changes beginning in 2020 
would bring structural and mission changes, as well as changes to the uniform.  
On 27th June 2020, it was announced that the Royal Marines would adopt a minor uniform 
change. Months of speculation had indicated a more radical change, possibly including 
Marine Officers adopting naval officer ranks. An updated battle dress uniform with some 
modifications were announced, “fit for a new era of warfare, that is in-keeping with the 
maritime traditions of the corps, and also honours their commando forebears”.136 A short 
film on the Royal Marines web based YouTube Channel stated simply, “Sometimes for us 
to move forward, we must first look back”137 The "look back” is a change to the patch or 
'flash' on the battle dress uniform to a Red letter on blue which is part of the retro WWII: 
“The flash with red writing and navy-blue background will be worn once again, as 
commandos evolve to conduct more raids from the sea, persistently deployed to counter 
the threats of the modern-day battlefield.” The red and blue in fact goes back further to the 
red and blue uniforms of the two different components of the Corps - infantry, artillery.   
Another more subtle but unprecedented change was also included: “For the first time the 
White Ensign features on one sleeve, as a clear indication of the Royal Marines’ 
integration with the Royal Navy.”138 Since its reforming in 1755, the Royal Marines 
refrained from adopting nothing but the most general naval motifs to their uniforms, 
seeking to create for themselves a unique identity apart from the navy. This study will 
show how the original identity created by the Royal Marines created more friction with the 
Royal Navy, their service parent. Modelling themselves in multiple ways around the army, 
the original identity crafted by the Marines was at times adversarial, and over time 
increasingly fragile as traditional missions and functions eroded around them. Their 
necessity to the navy was not so clear, an identity as something other than naval was 
increasingly of detriment to the Royal Marines.  
In the late twentieth century, the Royal Marines had moved to a leaner and better 
equipped organisation Royal Marines shaped around the concept of ‘littoral strike’, 
believed by advocates of positional warfare as essential “to seize geographically limited 
areas that confer outsized political influence on the side that holds them.”139 The proposed 
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efforts would aim to more closely tie the Royal Marines to a range “scalable expeditionary 
strike force[s]” offered by the Royal Navy, but notably the raiding and destruction of 
enemy infrastructure and equipment to allow to enable the operations of the fleet and 
follow-on landing forces.140  The proposals have raised concerns among former Royal 
Marines. Julian Thompson, who led 3rd Commando Brigade during the Falklands War and 
also a historian of the Corps, levelled his concern that the changes proposed to the Corps 
mission, that: “their unique character is that they are able to operate in all types of 
landscape and conditions. What we do not want is to change that so they have to say, ‘no, 
we can’t do that’.”141 More alarmingly for some are the suggestions from within the Royal 
Navy to change the Royal Marines rank structure and uniforms, which presently is similar 
to that of the army, to match those of the navy.142 To the uniform changes, Thompson 
stated: “This is a disastrous idea. The Marines are soldiers serving at sea, not sailors who 
pretend to be soldiers.”143 These criticisms of over-specialisation and changes to uniforms 
are viewed by detractors as severe changes to the “unique characteristic” of the Royal 
Marines.144 Are these changes really about innovation, or are they a bid to remain relevant 
and prove again the utility of the Royal Marines to the navy and the British defence 
community? Clearly, there is an appeal to the history of the Corps, signalling a link to the 
past and the last unequivocal moment the Royal Marines, as Commandos, had a clear 
sense of their purpose. Two items from this passage will be examined in detail in this 
thesis as having a clear historical precedent in the defined period of this thesis. Firstly, the 
concept of littoral strike was first advocated by Royal Marines at the start of the twentieth 
century as a means to innovate a new mission for the Corps. This venture failed, and it 
will be explained why. Secondly, the idea of the complete sublimation of the Royal Marine 
ranks and uniforms also found advocates and detractors at the turn of the twentieth 
century; this too failed. What these recent proposals and concerns about the 
organisational structure, mission, and material culture of the Royal Marines have in 
common is that they are not new and include both rational and emotive arguments which 
have grappled over change to this organisation since its inception. As will be shown in this 
study, retaining their purpose and utility, while balancing their own unique identity, was the 
critical imperative of the Royal Marines through their history. 
In summary, the origins of many of today’s problems facing organisations like the marines 
are rooted in the past and worthy of examination. As these issues which centre on 
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important decisions and capital expenditures capture media headlines and public 
attention, the role of historians in analysing the origins of and the social and organisational 
issues that arise from the study of military organisations are of increasing importance.  
This renewed focus on innovation in the Royal Marines can be best characterised as a 
“renaissance” or a return to the most recent successful transformation and adopted 
mission of the Commandos of the Second World Two.145 Budgetary and fiscal constraints, 
cyclical in nature, reinforce the need for focused plans on government expenditures. For 
the Royal Marines, this moment again underscores the historical precarious nature of their 
organisation, driving an earnest desire to validate their relevance and utility. This 
preoccupation originates and is further defined in the period focused on in this study 
where we begin in 1827, a defining year for the Royal Marines.  
Forging the Corps identity 
On 20th October 1827, a combined fleet of British, French, and Russian vessels 
destroyed the Ottoman fleet at anchor in Navarino bay in Greece. The battle was notable 
as it was a decisive step for Greek and eastern European independence from the Turks, 
but also for being the last major engagement involving only wooden sailing ships. Corps 
historian Cyril Field noted in his history, “But little information is available as to the special 
doings of the Royal Marines at the famous Battle of Navarino, but as a large number of 
the Corps were present it cannot be passed over without some notice.”146 The battle 
would feature some of the last close ship actions, in which the marines would play their 
designated role in manning ships’ guns and repelling boarders of the Turkish fleet with 
their habitual efficacy. In this year, the Royal Marines could look back on the successful 
accession to an improved status as a royal regiment and the fact that since its 
reincarnation under the Admiralty it had not been disbanded per old post-war customs. In 
addition, it had managed to create its own unique identity within the Royal Navy, complete 
with its own uniforms, badges, emblems and motifs underpinning its status as soldiers 
who served at sea, its strong link to the Royal Navy, and to its benefactors in the royal 
family and other patrons.  
The establishment of early Royal Marine identity hinged on two important elements. The 
first was the crafting of a commonly accepted chronology from its origin to the present 
day. In the hierarchical culture of the British armed forces, this accomplished the essential 
function of placing the organisation in its position relative to the other service. The second 
was the creation of common emblems and symbols used in recognisable fashion for its 
own purposes – such as in uniforms and colours – and for the other services and the 
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public to recognise. The Marines had to ultimately make itself distinguishable from the 
army as not just another regiment of soldiers, but also distinctive within the navy as 
something extraordinary from the common sailor. Both would take time in crafting and 
would be subject to much change and debate. Essential to both elements is that the 
organisational narrative and its imagery commented and reinforced the operational 
function of the organisation.  
The Corps origin date 
For the Marines, accurately claiming an unbroken lineage across a successive line of 
maritime regiments remained tenuous and, as will be shown, had to be resolved by 
agreement on a common narrative. Despite this, the idea of stretching an unbroken line of 
service into history remains popular and is not an unknown concept among the British 
forces, as even the Royal Navy claims its own tenuous links to the ninth century navy of 
King Alfred the Great.147 While today, the Royal Marines accept the date of 1664 as its 
origin date, this was a matter of debate of the Corps earliest historians whose agenda was 
largely the crafting of a Corps narrative supported by a rich history. The early maritime 
regiments faced several incarnations and dissolutions, but these were claimed and 
absorbed by the Marines. While ultimately fixing on 1664, Field makes no 
acknowledgement of any gaps in the history of the Corps itself. Field in fact went further 
by stretching the boundaries of Corps history and making tenuous links to early marine 
origins to Roman antiquity and the ancient British ‘Sea Soldiers’, or Classiariorum 
Britannicorum.148 Field blended the earliest references to maritime soldiers into that of the 
early maritime regiments of the 1660s into the present day, and no specific mention of 
1755 as the date of the latest inception of the Corps. Gillespie’s history of 1803, written in 
part for the expressed purpose of marking the accession of the Corps to a Royal 
Regiment, chooses the now popularly accepted Duke of York and Albany’s Maritime 
Regiment, or Admiral’s Regiment149, as the early origin for his treatment of the Corps, but 
uses the date of 1684.150 Gillespie acknowledges 1755 as the date from which, “the 
Marine Corps has ever constituted a branch of the peace establishment.”151 Richard 
Cannon in his army regimental histories uses the 1664 date in his chronology, noting the 
formation of the Admiral’s Regiment and that, “from the 5th of April, 1755, the Marine 
corps have constituted a branch of the permanent national force, and have been provided 
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for in the annual votes of the House of Commons, on distinct estimates produced at each 
session, of the Navy, Army, and Marines”.152 Nicholas in his 1845 history, having mined 
Gillespie’s works extensively for his chronology of Corps memorable dates and other 
portions of his narrative, makes identical assertions on the earliest origins, as well as the 
significance of the 1755 date.153 The first departure from this consistency comes with the 
first volume on Corps history by former Deputy Adjutant General and Royal Marine 
historian H.E. Blumberg, who selected the date of 1755 as the best fitting date for the birth 
of the Corps, “as from this time more or less continuous letters and orders exist at the 
[R.M. Divisions] from which it is possible to trace the development of the Corps and its 
peculiar customs and traditions.”154 While the more popular date of 1664 remains the 
accepted Corps origin date, in keeping with the earliest regiments from the restoration 
period, Blumberg argued 1755 as the best and latest unbroken inception date for the 
Corps. This practice is very much in keeping with those of army regiments of the same 
period.155 The Royal Marines found validation then in establishing the earliest possible 
point of origin, however tenuous, in establishing their unit identity and established 
traditions. The disputes occurred largely over accepted points from which a concept of 
either the idea marines existing in British service, or the existence of the organisational 
structure.  
The Globe and Laurel – the significance of Royal Marine emblems 
Interpretation of Corps identity through emblems was essential in the creation of 
established traditions. The early marine regiments were army regiments, and these 
traditions were brought over when the Corps reformed in 1755. Many of these traditions, it 
is argued here, helped create the distinct separate identity within the navy, but also 
promoted antagonism and detachment which proved harmful to their long-term 
relationship with the navy. Ranks were identical to those in the army, not the navy. Early 
choice of a red uniform in use by the army, not the navy, made the Marines visually and 
physically distinguishable in the navy. Finally, while the Corps embraced its role with the 
navy as ‘soldiers of the sea’, only the most modest and general nautical motifs, as will be 
shown here, were adopted for use in their visual displays. The Corps even made use of 
regimental colours, an army tradition.  
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The earliest symbolism evoking the maritime nature of the Corps emerged at about the 
time when the Corps was reformed under the Admiralty in 1755. Coincidentally, it was at 
about this time when standards for the other regiments which made up the British army 
became standardised. A Royal Warrant issued in 1743 by the Adjutant-General’s Office of 
the War Department began to regulate certain features regarding the standards or colours 
carried by each regiment and limited the number to two for each battalion: one known as 
the King’s Colour or First Colour, and the Second Colour which was popularly known as 
the Regimental Colour.156 Colonels of regiments were now forbidden from adding their 
personalised crests and emblems on any outward displays of these regiments, a step 
which ensured an added measure of loyalty to the Crown. Certain standardised features 
dictated the size of the colours, the placement of motifs and emblems, numerals 
designating the regiment, size of the staff, other details. Special badges were granted to 
certain regiments, and the Marine Regiments of this period were granted the right to 
display “a ship with the sails furled and the rank of the Regiment underneath.”157 In 1747, 
just before the conclusion of the War of Austrian Succession, the Marine Regiments were 
transferred to the control of the Admiralty. It was on the order of the Admiralty that a 
fouled anchor was to be embroidered on the marine’s caps, making this the oldest 
emblem of the Corps; these were designed and later produced and issued by the end of 
that year.158  Importantly, the nature of the Marines’ service at sea was what made it 
distinguishable from other army regiments, and being linked with nautical imagery. These 
emblems of the fouled anchor were included as well on the regimental colours.159 There 
was a sense that the Corps was coming into its own, having now established itself within 
the navy and inventing new traditions.  
The year 1827 holds a most important place in Royal Marines history for another reason, 
In this year, the Duke of Clarence as Lord High Admiral and the Corps’ patron, made visits 
to each Division of the Royal Marines to present new colours. Beyond ceremony, it was 
the codification of Corps traditions and history into a tangible imagery.  In each town – 
Plymouth, Portsmouth, and Chatham - these were occasions of great state ceremony and 
significant for several reasons. Firstly, as a member of the Royal family and the 
presumptive heir to the throne, receiving the colours from the Duke was significant. The 
Duke of Clarence held an honorific title as General of the Marines, and in his own right the 
Duke had spent his youth and early career as a naval officer. On his visit to Plymouth, the 
city fathers welcomed him with a special address, stating: “We participate in common with 
the inhabitants of this populous district in the general diffusion of joy elicited by your Royal 
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Presence: presiding at the head of that service, in which we are reminded, that your youth 
was passed, and (notwithstanding your illustrious birth) subjected to its dangers and 
vicissitudes.”160 For these communities with strong links to the navy, this visit in particular 
was seized upon as an opportunity for a civic recognition of the value these communities 
played: “We rejoice at seeing your Royal attention directed to so important a branch of the 
public service, as that of the Naval Department, in which we may be allowed to take even 
a larger share of interest than other parts of the Kingdom”.161  
What made the Duke’s bestowal of the new colours unique on this occasion was that the 
new colours were different from those carried in the past. The Duke’s speeches spoke in 
detail of the designs approved by the King for the new colours. The year 1802 had 
signified a momentous occasion for the Corps becoming a royal regiment and the original 
buff colour facings on uniforms were exchanged for blue, so this was extended to the 
regimental colours. Battle honours recorded on regimental colours became a tradition 
adopted in 1768 to regiments to record the battles of the Seven Years War.162 Based on 
this new custom, a selection of over one hundred actions in which the former marine 
regiments had participated were offered for consideration by the King. At Chatham, the 
Duke acknowledged the difficulty in selecting the appropriate honours to award the 
regiment: 
His Majesty has selected for the Royal Marines a Device, to which their 
achievements have entitled them, and which, by his permission, I this day present to 
you; - a Badge which you have so hardly and honourably earned: - From the 
difficulty of selecting any particular pans to inscribe on these Standards, your 
Sovereign has been pleased to adopt ‘The Great Globe itself’, as the most proper 
and distinctive badge.163 
The King’s own royal cypher was added as another special honour, to which the Duke 
added in his speech to all the Divisions, “shall be added to that peculiar badge, The 
Anchor, which is your distinctive bearing, in order that it may be known hereafter that 
George The Fourth had conferred on you the [honorable] and well-earned badge this day 
presented to you.”164 Next the Duke drew attention to the Corps’ own adopted motto, ‘Per 
Mare Per Terram’,165 which was deemed the accurate representation of the Corps and 
their duties. Other emblems, such as the laurels surrounding the globe, were retained in 
commemoration of the battle of Belle Isle in 1761, although its precise origins are subject 
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to debate.166 Finally, the problem of battle honours was resolved by the addition of 
“Gibraltar, in recognition of the important national services you performed there.”167 The 
Duke closed the presentation, stating: “In presenting these Colours, the gift of your 
Sovereign, into your hands, I trust, - I am confident, - you will defend them with the same 
intrepidity, loyalty, regard for the interests of the country, that have marked your 
preservation of your old ones; and if you do, your Sovereign, and your Country, will have 
equal reason to be satisfied.”168 The new emblems also continued to incorporate much of 
the original nautical imagery, reinforcing its existential link to the navy. The 1827 colours 
codified in design and layout what been a development and evolution of emblems and 
honours cementing the Corps to the Royal Navy and as royal regiment; they remain in use 
today.  
The traditions and emblems created by the Royal Marines were so potent as to inspire 
foreign regiments to emulation. Allan Millett has cited how the American Continental 
Congress created the Continental Marines in 1775 to pursue the same role at sea as their 
British counterparts.169 Millett cites how the US Marine Corps had already by 1858 been 
inspired by the example of the Royal Marines’ Latin motto of “Per Mare, Per Terram” and 
adopted it as their own. They also modelled the American Marines’ emblem, with some 
modifications, to include the globe similarly to their British counterparts.170 Heather 
Venable in her work on the identity of the US Marine Corps has shown how much the US 
Marines borrowed from the Royal Marines, the older and better established organisation 
than their own. Venable has revealed how the works of US Navy Captain Richard Collum, 
who argued for the existence of the US Marines at a time others clamoured for their 
disbandment, mirrored and extensively borrowed the arguments of Lieutenant Paul 
Nicolas’s Historical Record of the Royal Marine Forces (1846) in an effort to correct 
perceived flaws in the American Corps’ narrative and justification of future existence.171 
 
166 To this day, Royal Marines are taught that the laurel leaves were granted. Earlier devices following Belle Isle saw the use 
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49 
 
These examples demonstrate how the Corps’ reputation and traditions gained positive 
notice abroad.  
Over time, these emblems were reproduced in memorials and other imagery wherever 
possible. In later years, at the commissioning and installation of the Royal Marines 
Memorial in London in 1903, it was important to continue to evoke and emphasise the 
maritime and nautical spirit of this sea serving regiment which included the traditions of 
both the infantry and the artillery which had served so long. The Corps emblem of the 
globe and laurel also include the respective emblems of the light infantry bugle and the 
grenade for the artillery. Each corner of the plinth was likewise decorated with carved 
dolphins, emphasising the nautical nature of the regiment; the placement of the statue by 
the Admiralty buildings was likewise an important consideration.172 Erected in memory of 
Royal Marines who died in the Boxer Rebellion Campaign in China and the Boer War in 
southern Africa, it featured two bronze figures on a Portland stone plinth designed by 
sculptor Adrian Jones, one of a Marine stoically guarding a wounded comrade at his feet, 
rifle with bayonet fixed presented presumably at the enemy. The base was decorated with 
bronze plaques by Sir Thomas Graham Jackson depicting the battles in South Africa and 
China, and a Roll of Honour of the two original campaigns. On April 25th 1903, the new 
memorial was positioned in the Cambridge Enclosure in St James' Park and unveiled by 
HRH The Prince of Wales, the Royal Marines Colonel in Chief.173   
The statue, positioned immediately adjacent to the Admiralty, as seen in images 1 and 2, 
saw the orientation of the two principal figures apparently gazing across the Horse Guards 
Parade towards the Headquarters of the British Army, or at the time, the War Office. The 
monument was to be known as the ‘Graspan Royal Marines Memorial’, for the battle 
fought during the relief campaign led by General Lord Methuen of the besieged city of 
Ladysmith, where the Royal Marines as part of the Naval Brigade would suffer their 
greatest losses in many years.174 A guard of honour, consisting of 100 Marines belonging 
to the Portsmouth, Plymouth, Chatham, and Eastney divisions, who were also veterans of 
the campaigns in Africa and China, were on parade for the event.175 Among other 
distinguished visitors and guests also in attendance was then Major Lewis Halliday, a 
recent recipient of the Victoria Cross for action at the Peking British Legation from the 
Boxer War in 1900; he would be the fourth Marine by this date to have ever received this 
honour.176 
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In his speech at the unveiling, the Prince of Wales stated: 
This memorial has had from the first my heartiest sympathy, and more especially the 
proposal that it should occupy some prominent position in the capital of the Empire.  
The site chosen seems to me to be particularly suitable, for, as our motto implies 
that the Marines serve afloat and on shore, it is only right that this memorial should 
stand in close proximity to the buildings of the Admiralty and of the Horse Guards, 
the historical headquarters of the Army.177 
Placing a monument of this sort in London, and ultimately by Admiralty Arch, signified in 
one sense, a tangible emblem of the Royal Marines’ permanency on the threshold of the 
government ministries. It served also, to remind the public of those Royal Marines who 
had recently perished in two separate noteworthy military actions which brought honours 
to the Corps and their military prowess. 
Heroes, patrons, villains, and the Royal Marines 
Significant to the discussion of the creation of the organisational identity, historians 
examined the prominence and importance of influential figures or heroes. For the Royal 
Navy the legacy of Admiral Lord Horatio Nelson, who captured the national imagination 
and who remains an important figure to this day of naval identity, has been the subject of 
extensive study by historians.178 As Quintin Colville and James Davey have stated, 
Nelson’s service in the Royal Navy was “the career of a man who brought these worlds of 
navy and nation together as no other.”179  Nelson, with the full spectrum of his complex 
character, service, and accomplishments still being analysed in detail to this day by 
historians, remains the pinnacle of British naval heroes.180  For the British Army, the 
legacy of the Duke of Wellington for his victories over Napoleon and his long tenure as the 
Commander-In-Chief of the British Army resonates the strongest.  Wellington’s impact on 
the organisation and administration of the British Army would leave a lasting impression 
with its own consequences.181  In his day, he was likewise revered and ‘hero-worshipped’, 
including by a young Charlotte Bronte.182 The enduring legacy and importance of 
representative heroes from military service, who have transcended to the national stage 
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and psyche, cannot be understated according to Richard Harding: “In the public mind the 
leader as hero is still the dominant model of naval leadership. While twenty-first-century 
navies are fully aware of the complexity of leadership in defence organisations, they are 
also aware of the role heroes play in public perceptions of the force and the need to 
present history and the navy in a heroic mould remains important.”183 The Royal Marines 
who gathered many champions and supporters in their time to either promote or save their 
organisation, have also lacked a single publicly identifiable figure of prominence. There is 
an explanation for this argued here. The Royal Marines as a sub-organisation could not 
hope for a member of its ranks to achieve the status of Nelson or Wellington or a similar 
commander. To do so, Marines would need the added benefit of attaining field command; 
in this period this was not possible or available to them. Instead, the Royal Marines would 
have to look to the martial achievements of individual members to seek heroes. This, 
however, proved to be another unwanted tradition of the Corps: that of few rewards and 
honours.  
At the heart of Steele’s quote at the start of this chapter was the conviction that the Corps 
was overlooked and underappreciated. Ironically, Steele was in fact one of the very few 
Marine officers who would later gain a knighthood in 1817.184 Despite this, Steele’s remark 
was not without foundation. The Royal Marines had difficulty influencing its public image 
because it rarely received recognition for its own actions. As a functional arm of the navy, 
its record would be subsumed all or in part in a grander record of events. As Nicolas 
would cite in his history, the rewards distributed to Royal Marines for their role and 
participation at Trafalgar were few. Honours, promotions, and peerages were granted to 
the elite brotherhood of naval officers, as was the custom of the day:  
Amidst all these abundantly scattered rewards, only one solitary mark of distinction 
was extended to the corps of Marines serving in the fleet, - a force amounting to 92 
officers and above 3,600 rank and file; of whom 2 captains and 2 subalterns were 
killed, 5 captains and 8 subalterns wounded: the brevet rank of major, conferred on 
captain Thomas Timmins, was considered adequate to the claims of marines, 
whose gallant exertions so materially contributed to the important result of this 
gloriously-fought day!185 
Notable exceptions included rare cases where individual actions called out by necessity 
the organisation to which they belonged. This grievance of a misdistribution of honours 
and recognitions to members of the Royal Marines, or recognition of the Corps itself, 
occurred with some frequency throughout their history becoming a prominent identifiable 
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characteristic of Royal Marines’ identity as an embattled regiment. There is evidence, 
however, to validate these claims. Omissions of the Royal Marines from public mention, 
even on the national stage, were not infrequent. In early July 1814, at the conclusion to 
the Napoleonic Wars, Parliament voted on a “Thanks to the Navy, Army, and Royal 
Marines”, with a motion proposed and read by Lord Castlereagh, “given to every 
department of the service, by which the character of the country had been exalted, and its 
glory secured.”186 Castlereagh proposed:  
That the Thanks of this House be given to the officers of the Navy, Army, and Royal 
Marines, including the troops employed in the service of the East India Company, for 
the meritorious and eminent services which they have rendered to their King and 
country during the course of the war.  
A discourse followed recounting the contributions of each service. Of the navy, 
Castlereagh noted that, “although no such splendid victories as those of the Nile or 
Trafalgar had occurred, the House would feel that its thanks were equally claimed for 
services that excited less notice, but were scarcely of less importance.”187 The navy would 
again feel this spirit of competition a century later, as will be shown, in the First World 
War. For the army, and its commander the Duke of Wellington, Castlereagh suggested 
that, “the admiration and veneration of surrounding nations upon ourselves, upon our 
armies, and upon that illustrious individual who had taught our soldiers the art of war on 
so grand a scale, and had led them to the fruits of their perseverance and discipline, 
victory and glory.”188 Castlereagh concluded with thanks to the militia and to the East India 
Company. Taking his seat, Castlereagh then stood interrupting the House Speaker in the 
reading of the next question recalling that although he had omitted to cite the service of 
the Royal Marines, “their exertions spoke better for themselves than any language he 
could employ.”189  
In 1840, a Royal Commission appointed to enquire into the naval and military promotion 
and retirement system cited a complaint from Royal Marine officers, “that there was an 
unequal distribution of brevet rank, and of other distinctions and rewards for service, and 
an unjust apportionment of prize money, in reference to corresponding ranks in other 
services.”190 In his testimony to the 1840 commission, Captain Willes would recall this 
singular distinction granted to the Corps at Trafalgar: “The great victories by sea and land 
gave promotion of an extensive character to the army and navy, while the utmost which 
fell to the royal marines, even for Trafalgar (where more than 3,000 of the corps served in 
 
186 “Thanks Voted To The Navy, Army, And Royal Marines”, HC First Series, Volume 28, Wednesday, July 6, 1814. C. 616-
621, c. 618.  
187 “Thanks Voted”, HC, C.617.  
188 “Thanks Voted”, HC, C.617.   
189 “Thanks Voted”, HC, C..618-619.   
190 The Sessional Papers Of The House Of Lords: Session 1840, Vol XL.  From here noted as “Sessional Papers 1840”. 
Sessional Papers, 1840, vii.   
54 
 
the fleet), was the brevet rank of major conferred on one captain only.”191 The awarding of 
brevet ranks was, however, a dubious distinction which would last for many years. 
Awarding of the rank, in fact, provided little in the way of further responsibility, less in the 
guarantee of any stability, and little in further pay compared to the full commissioned rank. 
Years later, recalling his own brevet promotion to Lieutenant Colonel for service in the 
Boer War, General Sir George Grey Aston would state in his memoirs that “brevet rank is 
of no value to a Marine”.192 Aston reflected that at this time, service equivalency in the 
promotion lists did not exist for brevet Colonels in the Marines and the army. A brevet 
Colonel in the army would take his date of promotion with them when promoted to the 
Colonel’s list, whereas a Marine would not. Aston reflected: “It all sounds rather 
complicated, and like the riddle about that man’s father and my father’s son, but the effect 
of it was that, when I did get on the Colonel’s list, I lost eight years in seniority compared 
with the Army.”193  
The Royal Marines gained acknowledgement for their accomplishments in other ways, 
such as the awarding of the Victoria Cross to some of its members.194 Instituted in 1857, it 
became one of the few ways Marines of all ranks might have the opportunity to gain 
personal recognition, as well as honours reflected on their organisation.195 To date, 
however, only ten Victoria Cross medals have been awarded to the Royal Marines since 
its inception, of which nine of the ten were awarded in the period up to the First World 
War. Despite their participation in the numerous land and sea campaigns of the British 
Empire, the number of medals awarded to the Corps is in marked contrast to the numbers 
awarded the other services in the same period.196 The undesirable traditions of slow 
promotion, and few rewards and honours were therefore well established from an early 
period. The Corps, however, benefitted greatly from the attentions from key benefactors or 
patrons.  
In its formative years, the Corps perhaps most impressed the senior members of the 
Royal Navy who for their own reasons took interest in promoting the wellbeing of the 
Corps. Blumberg stated in history the belief that Anson, “took the Corps under his wing”, 
and that “he had to resist many efforts by politicians to foist unsuitable officers on the 
Corps.”197 As Britt Zerbe has revealed, Anson’s initial appeal as a protagonist for the 
Corps is far more complex; Anson was “definitely a prime mover in the establishment of 
the Corps of Marines, he was however neither its sole architect nor the significant 
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influencer on its structure.”198 The First Sea Lord, and also Royal Marine General through 
his sinecure post, Admiral John Jervis, is supposed to have played a key role in 
convincing the King of giving the Corps the ‘Royal’ title for accession to a Royal Regiment. 
Jervis reputedly stated he but “inefficiently done did my duty,” in this regard, but speaking 
of the marines stated that “if ever the hour of real danger should come to England, they 
will be found the country’s sheet anchor.”199 The gain of royal regiment status in 1802 was 
a momentous step in adding to the recognition of the Corps, but also hopes of continued 
interest and assistance from the royal family. The Corps would benefit further still from its 
connections to the Royal family. 
It is noteworthy that following the death of William IV, who as the former Duke of Clarence 
was a great benefactor to the Corps, no member of the royal family took on the title of 
Colonel-In-Chief of the Corps; the title of Lord High Admiral would go into commission 
until the next century. Without a specific royal patron or benefactor, the strain on the 
Corps was palpable until Queen Victoria in 1882 appointed her second son Prince Alfred, 
Duke of Edinburgh, as the first honorary Colonel Royal Marines.200 Following his death in 
1900, the title lapsed briefly until the Duke of Cornwall and York, later George V, was 
named Colonel in Chief of the Royal Marines, a title which he retained upon becoming 
King.201 Throughout his life, George V would retain a close interest in the matters of the 
Corps and would on several occasions, to be examined in chapter six, personally 
intervene when he felt the Corps’ future existence was in peril. On March 7th 1918, now 
King George V, visited the Royal Marines training depot at Deal in order to inspect the 
training and progress of the newly formed 4th Battalion, who were destined to participate a 
month later in the raid at Zeebrugge. The King was alleged to have been so impressed 
with the bearing and quality of the recruits, that he directed in future the senior squad of 
recruits in training should be designated as ‘The King’s Squad’. Not long after his visit, the 
King further directed that the best recruit should be awarded a distinctive badge, ‘The 
King’s Badge’, as to be worn in all orders of dress no matter what rank the marine should 
attain later in service.202 Both accolades remain in effect to this day.203 George V as a 
benefactor to the Corps will be discussed in a later chapter where his intervention saved 
the Corps from possible extinction.  
Yet just as the Corps benefitted from key patrons, it had a great share of detractors. While 
many of these would come forward in the debates over their future function and service 
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potential in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, two are worth mentioning here. 
The first, ironically, was the son the Corps’ great benefactor the Duke of Clarence. Lord 
Frederick Fitzclarence was the son of William IV, formerly the Duke of Clarence, through 
his mistress Dorothea Jordan.204 The Clarence Barracks in Portsmouth where the 
Portsmouth Division of the Royal Marines was based had been named for William. 
Profiting from his royal connections, Lord Fitzclarence began his military career at the age 
of fourteen as an ensign in the Coldstream Guards; by the time he was twenty-four he 
was already a lieutenant Colonel with a reputation for devotion to military study and 
training and the discipline of his men, both moral and physical.205 Reputedly, Fitzclarence 
approached the problems of command with the belief that his officers were fools and all 
his regiments in need of correction.206 In 1847, Fitzclarence was appointed Lieutenant 
Governor of Portsmouth which also gave him command of the South West military district 
and the garrison of Portsmouth. As the Royal Marines belonged to both the Admiralty and 
the Portsmouth garrison, friction soon emerged with the Marines and the new commander 
over his jurisdiction of the forces billeted in the town now at his disposal. On his arrival in 
Portsmouth, Fitzclarence scrutinised the training of his officers in manoeuvres with weekly 
Brigade size drills on Southsea Common.207 From the correspondence in the Admiralty 
records of the Portsmouth Division, a dispute between the Portsmouth Division and 
Fitzclarence began almost immediately.208 In a detailed letter from Colonel Thompson 
Aslett, the Commandant of the Portsmouth Division, to Sir John Owen, the Deputy 
Adjutant General of the Corps, Aslett alerted Owen of problems he encountered with the 
new District and garrison commander, owing to absences of Marine officers at 
Fitzclarence’s Brigade drills and the priority in importance of orders of the Garrison 
Commander over that of the Admiralty.209 Attaching copies of several letters and 
correspondences between himself, Fitzclarence, and the Garrison, Aslett expressed to 
Owen: 
…that [Fitzclarence] is desirous of exercising an interference with the duties and 
interior economy of the Division, as well as the authority of the Commandant, which 
has never before been done by his predecessors – I have to request you will be 
pleased to submit this notice to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, and to 
solicit their Lordship’s further instructions for my guidance.210  
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Further letters from Fitzclarence highlight the Garrison Commander’s displeasure at the 
allowance Aslett makes for his officers and men for passes in the town. A strict 
disciplinarian, Fitzclarence made few allowances for the soldiers to do the same. Yet other 
requirements from Fitzclarence on Aslett as Commandant of the Portsmouth Division, 
appeared to infringe unreasonably on Aslett’s authority as a Commander and on the 
reporting chain the Marines had with the Admiralty. Fitzclarence requested lists of 
defaulters and their punishments on a weekly basis, which Aslett duly complained about 
to Marine Headquarters. Compelled to intervene, Owen appealed directly to Fitzclarence 
for remedies, including inspections at Fitzclarence’s pleasure of the Division punishment 
books and logs in order to avoid, “the necessity of going to the Horse Guards and the 
Admiralty on a subject which bears upon the interior economy of the Marine Corps.”211 
Neither intimidated or dissuaded from a seemingly veiled threat, Fitzclarence sought a 
solution which he had the unique means to facilitate and implement; he would move the 
Marines out of Portsmouth to nearby Gosport on the opposite side of the Portsmouth 
dockyard.   
Owen was likely concerned early on about the logistical challenges of removing the 
Marines to Gosport while they still had duties in the dockyard and with the fleet. In a letter 
to the Second Sealord, Admiral Frederick Berkeley, however, Owen seemed prepared at 
least for such an outcome: 
Whereas I am humbly of the opinion that the Marines, being a Naval force, should 
be always placed in the vicinity of the Dockyard. If however it is determined to make 
the exchange of Barracks, at Portsmouth for the Forton Barracks, and place the 
Marines in a position outside the Works and thus remove them from participation of 
duties with other branches of the service, I do not think any better position could be 
found than Forton.212 
Gosport was still relatively close to the dockyard, and the reality of a physical removal to 
Gosport was perhaps not without added benefits of avoiding further confrontation with 
Fitzclarence. The move was soon confirmed and the Marines finally vacated the Clarence 
barracks on March 29th 1848.213 By 1850, Fitzclarence departed Portsmouth to take a 
posting in India where he subsequently died.214 By 1923, the barracks at Forton were in a 
terrible state and the Admiralty in a time of post-war austerity was not prepared to pay to 
repair. Adjutant General H.E. Blumberg took the last church parade for the marines at 
Gosport on 29 July 1923.215 After seventy-seven years at Gosport, the Marines returned to 
Portsmouth on the 1st of August 1923, and transferred the Division colours to Eastney. 
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Following the amalgamation of the Royal Marines Artillery and the Light Infantry in 1924, 
Eastney Barracks became the Headquarters for the Corps. At the time in 1847, on the 
surface at least no lingering resentment was apparent over the move, as was the case in 
a farewell banquet to Fitzclarence in Portsmouth attended by the Marines.216 Yet no 
details as to reasons for the acrimonious move to Gosport are included in any written 
history of the Royal Marines.217 The only clue is a in a history of Portsmouth compiled by 
William G. Gates, which allude to the actual reason that, “Lord Frederick Fitzclarence, the 
Governor, 1847-51, was unable to make use of them for the military displays in which he 
took great pride and delight.”218 The event reveals other key points about the status of the 
Royal Marines at this point in the mid-nineteenth century. Firstly, Admiralty intervention 
was conspicuously absent throughout the exchanges between the Marines and the 
Fitzclarence. Admiralty records are not clear, but one solution seems probable. The 
Admiralty concerned itself chiefly with the ability of the Marines to provide detachments for 
the Portsmouth fleet and their dockyard duties; so long as these were not severely 
disrupted, a dispute with the War Office was not worth their time. Secondly, whereas 
previously, harmonious relations had persisted based on an understanding and respect of 
how the marines might integrate efficiently around their duties into the garrison, the 
command relationships deteriorated in part due to rivalling personalities. The impact to 
marine identity was that the move to Gosport further underscored the inferior relative 
status of the Marines at this time in comparison to the army regiments in the town, 
demonstrated by the fact the Admiralty was not prepared to forego further acrimony with 
the War Office.  
The other noteworthy detractor of the Corps was the First Sea Lord of the Royal, John 
‘Jackie’ Fisher. As Blumberg would note in his history of the Royal Marines: “Fisher did 
not hold the Royal Marines in great esteem. He was inspired with no friendly feelings for 
the Corps and in fact is reported to have tried to abolish it.”219  This opinion was not 
without sufficient evidence as Fisher’s efforts at naval reform would inspire periodic 
animosity from the marines. Fisher’s views of the Marines had been shaped over time, 
remarking in 1897 that: “Owing the gradual alteration in training brought about by the 
abolition of sails as the propelling agency; the seamen have a considerable amount of 
what may be called military training grafted on to their training as sailors. The result is, 
that a bluejacket can do anything that a Marine can, (except perhaps march as well); and 
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in addition he can do a great deal of absolutely necessary work connected with service 
afloat that a Marine cannot.”220 In a 1902 letter to then First Lord of the Admiralty Lord 
Selborne, Fisher wrote: 
The only officer we can never educate is the Marine Officer…And if the Marine 
Officer is to be of any use to us, he is absolutely useless at present (or rather he is 
worse than useless because he occupies valuable space on board!), we must get rid 
of his military training or, perhaps better (as so conclusively urged by Sir George 
Tryon), we ought to get rid of him altogether!221 
Fisher also advocated what others before had suggested, that an eventual amalgamation 
of the two marine branches ought to occur as, “there is no reason at all for apportion of 
the Marine forces being specially trained as Artillery. The training which is useful when 
embarked is common to both R.M.L.I. and R.M.A.”.222 Fisher framed his views in 
accordance with his beliefs on the best employment of the marines in their function at sea, 
not on land, and one which led him to conclude on the marine artillery that, “the training of 
the Officers R.M.A. is a long and expensive one and there is no work that they can 
usefully perform on board ship to justify it.”223  
When the Royal Marines established their memorial on London, Fisher saw it as another 
reason why the Marines as an organisation were incompatible with the navy. In a letter in 
October 1905 to Sir William May, then Commander in Chief of the Atlantic Fleet, when 
discussing the prospects of a naval garrison at Gibraltar, expressed his opinions on the 
Marines and their new memorial statue. Fisher here voiced strong sentiments about the 
Marines: 
Nothing will ever induce me personally to agree to garrisoning Gibraltar entirely with 
Marines! Or having a Marine General as Governor! The last end would be worse 
than the first! It must be purely a Naval Government! and solely under the Admiralty! 
The Marine Officer can't be loyal! Just look at that statue outside the Admiralty in 
honour of the Marines, recently put up by them! [it] has its back turned on the 
Admiralty, and it's looking at the War Office! The Marine Officers (not the Marines) 
are always hankering after the Army! D--m the Army!  Another reason! If we had 
3,000 Marines locked up at Gibraltar, we should want another 3,000 Marines at 
home as their relief, and then the total number of Marines would be so great they 
would cease to be Marines, as they would have no sea service hardly.224 
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Fisher admitted in his letter that his sentiments expressed were not a “studied effusion”, 
but nonetheless insisted they were correct.225  He may not have been struck by the irony 
of his comments, by the fact that the principal battle honour of the Royal Marines is 
“Gibraltar”. That the Marines would not be linked to service on ships or any sea service 
appears to have been of primary concern to Fisher, fixated as he was on economies and 
efficiencies to the navy. He wrote that marines “at present only [30 per cent.] of their 
whole service is on board a ship”.226 Fisher astutely struck at a core attribute of the Royal 
Marines, crucial to their identity which was recognised by the Marines themselves: without 
a link to the sea service, they would cease to be Marines. This important conclusion was 
vital for another reason: if the Marines could not argue a distinguishable and distinct role 
to the navy, then what was the continued need for them in the Naval Service? While 
service organisations expected cuts to their budgets at the conclusion of wartime, the 
Royal Marines would face the unique circumstance of having to justify their existence 
entirely. Even while ships and regiments would face cuts, no serious arguments for the 
elimination of the navy or the army in their entirety ever emerged. Records of service, 
traditions, honours, were therefore not only important for matters of pride and esprit de 
corps, but on a practical basis for institutional survival. Fisher will be discussed further in 
later chapters.  From this section, the impact of significant impact of benefactors and 
detractors defined some seminal moments in the trajectory of the Corps. They contributed 
to how the Corps continued to be structured and organised and how it created its identity. 
As this thesis has argued, however, the Corps identity was also fragile because its 
traditions and structure were based on that of the army. Introduced here before 
concluding this chapter is the problem of two regiments – the infantry and the artillery – 
and what this would mean for the Corps as an organisation modelled on the army within a 
naval organisation.  
The Artillery and the Light Infantry - the problem of two regiments 
The continued existence of two semi-autonomous sub-organisations within an existing 
sub-organisation, created long term problems for both a cohesive Corps identity and in 
fixing on a viable Corps mission. It will be shown here how the existence of two parallel 
organisations which evolved semi-independently, and modelled after army regiments, 
within the Corps created more problems in defining a coherent mission and put the Corps 
itself at odds within the Royal Navy itself. The creation of essentially two separate 
organisations or regiments within an original sub-division of the Royal Navy, would cause 
much difficulty for the Corps evolving identity and organisational culture.  
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In 1816, the Royal Marines Artillery adopted the blue uniform and other designs of the 
Royal Artillery.227 This followed with the adoption of distinctive blue coats worn by the 
Royal Artillery, from which they would be known as ‘the Blue Marines’, another distinction 
from the traditional red coats of British Infantry and the tradition of the so called ‘Red 
Marines’.228 The Royal Marines Artillery would continue however to blend the motifs of 
their occupation, such as the fuse lit grenade or bomb, and that of their parent regiment 
into their uniforms and other outward displays. Since 1804 and the earliest instance of 
artillery marines, the marine artillery companies were trained in the army model with the 
Royal Artillery at Woolwich, then divided amongst the marine Divisions. A new barracks 
would be built in 1848 at Woolwich Common for the training of marines at the Royal 
Artillery depot separate from the army.229 The consequence, however, of training so 
closely alongside the army created, as will be shown in the case for Marines officers, 
unfavourable comparisons to their army peers in terms of career prospects and utilisation.   
The navy did find an early use for these technically proficient marines trained in all things 
gunnery when in 1806 marines began to instruct naval officers at the Royal Naval College 
at Portsmouth.230 In 1832, the Royal Navy gunnery school at HMS Excellent in 
Portsmouth was made a permanent establishment which now included permanent posts 
and roles for the marines.231 This arrangement, however, drew early criticism from Sir 
Howard Douglas, an artillery officer and writer on naval matters. From its early suggestion, 
the idea that Royal Marines might instruct naval officers and seamen was to Sir Howard, 
“extremely prejudicial, destructive indeed of those facilities which would be offered to 
naval officers to cultivate artillery knowledge.”232 This statement, as will be shown in later 
chapters, would characterise later appraisals of some naval officers of the benefits and 
demerits of marines trained in the use of artillery and gunnery for the Royal Navy.  
The marine artillery would, however, distinguish itself throughout the long century, such as 
the siege of Sweaborg during the Crimean War with the devastating application of heavy 
mortar fires in forcing a decisive victory.233 By Order-in-Council on the 22 October 1859, 
that a Division for the artillery would recognised, “for the benefit of the Corps generally, to 
place the Artillery Companies on a more efficient footing, by forming them into a separate 
Division to be called the Artillery Division of the Royal Marines with the same staff and 
advantages as the other Divisional Headquarters.”234 In 1867, the Royal Marines Artillery 
finally had its own home at a new barracks at Eastney in Portsmouth, moving from Fort 
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Cumberland at the eastern most corner of Portsea Island. The Woolwich Division, for 
matters of both efficiency and economy but with uncharacteristic callousness, was 
abolished in 1869.235 Marine Artillery officers were placed on half-pay and men turned out 
of their barracks; the resulting protests provoked a scandal from which a number of the 
officers were reappointed and the men reassigned.236 This experience in turn would make 
the Woolwich Division the shortest-lived Division of the Royal Marines. The training of the 
Marines themselves had many similarities, but the artillery had the added roles and 
training of both artillerymen and engineers. The officers, once attaining more senior roles 
and rank, could find themselves in interchangeable roles, and much later those officers 
brought up or having attained their original commission in the artillery, for example, might 
find themselves at the head of the Light Infantry Divisions. George A. Schomberg, later 
Deputy Adjutant General of the Corps was one such officer, as was George Aston, a 
Royal Marine Artillery officer who would later lead the Portsmouth Division. The 
organisation of the Royal Marines Artillery, and its unique training and role within the 
Royal Marines, had encouraged the development of separate culture within the Corps. 
The Corps regarded itself as an organisation in which two unique regiments, the Light 
Infantry and the Artillery, would coexist.   
The Light Infantry was a creation from the existing divisions, essentially renaming those 
marines not of the artillery. The Royal Marines Light Infantry, was reminiscent of the army 
organisations which emphasised a fit and versatile force, as captured in the 
announcement in the London Gazette on the 31 January 1855 which stated: “That the 
Corps of Royal Marines may be designated a 'Light Corps,' and equipped and instructed 
as such, agreeably to your Majesty's regulations for Light Infantry Regiments of the Line; 
this training being considered best adapted to the nature of the service which the  Corps is 
generally required to perform when employed on shore."237 The Royal Marines Light 
Infantry would adopt the bugle emblem in 1856 to their uniform238, a distinguishing 
characteristic of similar army light infantry organisations, but there is no further evidence 
that any traditions such as the ‘super-quick step’ of the British army were ever adopted.239 
Writing in 1924, Corps historian Field who was himself an RMLI officer, questioned 
whether or not the title was meant as “a reward for the services” of the ‘Red Marines’,240 
and stated that the title of ‘Light Infantry’, was a “curious title to bestow on a Corps which 
is generally composed of men of above average size and height.”241 Having two separate 
organisations within the same organisational body was a problem some marines were 
prepared to recognise. As will be shown in later chapters, despite the high level of training 
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and efficiency of the marine artillery, the navy could never satisfactorily resolve what to do 
with them. This would eventually result in a traumatic amalgamation of the Light Infantry 
with the Artillery in 1924, examined in detail in the final chapter, which would prove a 
significant organisational development for the Corps.   
Conclusion   
The Corps identity was developed from its earliest stages on its origins from the army 
maritime regiments. This incompatibility of service cultures – the army and the navy – 
coupled with the tacit approval of the Admiralty to allow the Marines to continue to create 
their own unique sub-culture within the Naval Service invited friction and further problems 
over time. A sub-organisation of the navy organised in part and inspired further by the 
army invited conflict. As cited, additional functions for the marines, such as the 
incorporation of the artillery, were added over time. These additional functions created 
opportunities to diversify but also complicate an organisation which increasingly as the 
nineteenth century unfolded found itself on unstable ground. 
It was from this period, 1827, that the Corps gained a greater sense of itself, essentially 
refining its identity built over seventy years. Important emblems, motifs, and events – the 
globe, the laurel, and Gibraltar as the key battle honour – became firmly established at 
this time and have likewise survived the most significant changes of the Corps to this day. 
The constructed identity of the Marines was distinct from the navy but enmeshed with 
traditions linking it definitively to the Naval Service. Equally important to the development 
and the survival of the Corps was the interest and patronage of key figures, such as 
members of the Royal family, who took keen interest in them. The Corps relied, and 
ultimately would depend, on these important links to the Royal family as a Royal regiment 
which were especially important as a last resort to the Corps’ survival. The patronage of 
key members of Britain’s naval and royal elite proved essential as vital lifelines for the 
survival and sustenance of the Corps.  
As a regiment, the Corps developed and maintained a reputation for bravery and reliability 
in a time of need, yet also one with an embattled status of never quite gaining the 
recognition it deserved. This remained a recurring theme as it progressed into the 
twentieth century and will be demonstrated again with further evidence in later chapters. 
The status of its members included attributions of marines as an awkward accompaniment 
to the army and navy, holding a poor relative status in relation to the other services, and 
its members as possibly uncouth or at least unrefined. The status of its members, 





Chapter 3. “The Cinderella Service”: Relative Status and the Royal Marines Officer 
There’s one advantage about the Marine service that is not nearly enough 
appreciated. It effectively cures the vice of personal ambition. Lucifer might still have 
been in heaven if he had been a Marine officer. – Sir George Grey Aston, 1919 242 
Not without a little humour, Major General Sir George Grey Aston closed his personal 
memoirs about his life of service in the Royal Marines with this succinct observation. In 
other studies of military officers, class has been a frequent subject of much analysis 
addressed by historians. In the previous chapter, allusions were made to the questionable 
origins and character of marines in contrast to their peers in at least one novel by Jane 
Austen. But was there also a question of relative status among the services, as to which 
service was preeminent in the minds of the citizenry, as well as amongst the services 
themselves? The earliest Marine officers were also army officers, and once the marines 
were reformed under the Admiralty, the Marines most emulated the army in their 
organisational structure as well as their ranks. As a consequence of their origins, Marine 
officers especially, found themselves compared most to army officers. The argument put 
forth so far is that this made for a conflict between an army culture held over by the 
Marines and that of the navy to which the Marines definitively belonged. Introduced in the 
previous chapter were the unwanted traditions of lack of recognition both to the Corps and 
its members, poor promotion prospects, and a third to be examined here, fiscal woes. 
Using the experience of Marine officers, this chapter will examine the question of relative 
status and will argue further that the Royal Marines as an organisation suffered from an 
inferior status from its other service peers.   
By examining the experiences of Marine Officers, it will be argued here that the relative 
status of the Corps worsened as the century went on, exacerbated by an unclear mission 
and inability to adapt to change. Specifically, this chapter will analyse the foremost 
challenges faced by Marine Officers - social status, wealth and education – and how these 
impacted their status among their military and naval peers. While these factors were 
obstacles for those who would be Marine Officers, these factors also had long standing 
impacts not only to their relative status as individuals, but to the organisational body they 
represented. It will be argued that the social and financial obstacles, as well as those 
factors arising from the relative status of marine officers to their peers, were also 
detrimental factors to the organisational development of the Corps.   
Both Don Bittner and Julian Thompson have cited how increasingly by the middle of the 
eighteenth century, the Marines were described as a ‘poor man’s regiment’, and hence 
low in the social and military hierarchy.243 This association, with both relative poverty and 
a low status, had its origins in 1755 with the Marines reformed under the jurisdiction of the 
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Admiralty, and continued into the twentieth century. How this unfortunate description of 
both relative poverty in wealth, social origins, and social status came to be associated with 
the Royal Marines has been the subject of some recent examination by historians. Britt 
Zerbe cited early examples of poor pay, promotion, and recognition in his work covering 
the Royal Marines up to the start of the nineteenth century.244 This chapter will use some 
experiences of Marine officers from the closing period of the Napoleonic Wars, whose 
personal woes best characterises the common experiences of Marine officers at the start 
of the century. The analysis which follows in this thesis pushes the lines of enquiry further 
to how this affected Marine Officers and their experience of service in the Marines, how 
this was perceived by Marine Officers in contrast to their peer services, and how this 
translated and affected the reputation of the Corps itself.    
Analyses of military officers and the officer corps, collectively and by individual service, 
have become more important in approaches of aforementioned new naval history and 
new military history. As Richard Harding has noted, Royal Navy officers have received 
significant attention, as have sailors and the so called ‘below deck’ examinations of their 
lives.245 The experience of the Royal Marines along similar lines of enquiry have had to 
date little detailed examination, offering numerous opportunities for further study. As a 
social elite, the records of these officers are more widely available, more diverse, more 
complete and consequently better preserved than those of the much vaster population of 
soldiers and sailors. The public and private papers of its membership, including biography 
and autobiography, have long been an important aspect of naval history but one 
deserving of further critical analysis. This chapter continues with the experience of Marine 
Officers at the start of the nineteenth century. 
The early Marine Officer 
The previous chapter noted how the organisational structure of the Royal Marines was 
based on that of the army regiment and the earliest of incarnations of the aforementioned 
‘Maritime Regiments’.246 It was for these reasons the Royal Marines saw the most 
frequent comparisons to the army regarding career prospects, pay, and promotion. In this 
period, however, the army retained control and access to the privileged officer ranks 
through a purchase system, but also nomination from the regiment they wished to enter 
which created real barriers for those without means or access to either of these 
conditions.247 This was also true of the marine or maritime regiments. Until 1755, officers 
serving in designated maritime, or marine, regiments purchased their commissions like 
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every guards, line infantry, and cavalry officer in the army. 248 During George II’s reign, an 
ensign’s commission in a line regiment would sell for £400 to £500249 and a captain’s for 
around £1,100250, and, in the Guards or cavalry, for considerably more. A commission in 
the army was therefore an important display of both wealth and social status, and for 
those inclined to advancement on the social spectrum, could be a valuable investment.251 
All ranks up to lieutenant colonel could be purchased, and more often than not for prices 
in excess of the regulation amount, depending on the type of regiment and where it was 
stationed.252  Throughout the eighteenth century, and until 1871 when purchase of army 
commissions was completely abolished, promotion in the officer ranks of the army was 
often a matter of having the necessary funds to buy the next step up the ladder, as well as 
finding someone who wanted to sell out. 253 In this time when the Marines formed a part of 
the Army as maritime regiments, which, in times of peace especially, were ordinarily liable 
to be reduced or done away with, the price of a Marine Commission was always less than 
that of the one in the Line.254 Marine officer commissions went for much less. An ensign’s 
commission in the Marines, however, was worth only about £250.255  For those aspiring to 
careers as officers without the connections or purchase power to enter the navy or the 
army, joining the Marines was the only option available for military service if they could not 
afford to buy a commission in the army or obtain a nomination to the Artillery or 
Engineers, or for some other reason were not able to obtain a navy commission. 
Commissions in the Artillery and Engineers were obtained by nomination and by entrance 
to the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich, where artillery and engineer cadets were 
trained and where admission was by competitive examination, which will be described 
later here.256   
With the restoration of the Corps of Marines in 1755 under the Admiralty, the 
commissioning opportunity through direct purchase was abolished for Marine officers.257  
Retention of the purchase system, however, would have otherwise put the officers of the 
Marines on a different system to their service peers in the Royal Navy. Furthermore, no 
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cash valuation existed of navy commissions existed at this time, making retention of such 
a system incompatible with the Naval Service. Without the option to purchase into the 
Marines, those who would be Marine Officers were dependent on finding the necessary 
patron to sponsor entry to the Naval Service and then into the Marines. Prior to the 
entrance examinations which included academic tests, finding a patron was the single 
most important and deciding factor for those seeking a commission. Officers for the new 
Corps of Marines would originate primarily from the army, most from the half-pay list from 
the disbanded marine regiments following the War of Austrian Succession. Other officers 
would later choose the Marines as they simply had no money for a commission in the 
army.258 This also began the reputation of the Marines as the ‘poor man’s regiment’.259 
This unfortunate reputation adhered primarily to the officer class. The struggles in 
obtaining a Marine officer commission in this early period are well recorded in letters and 
memoirs, and have also been the subject of detailed examination by historians.260   
To best illustrate the problems of officers in the period examined, it is useful to examine 
some examples of how these problems existed at the start of the century. This chapter will 
use many letters, diaries, and written histories of the Royal Marines by Marine Officers, to 
provide some insight into their own perceptions of their aggrieved status. A particularly 
illustrative example of the commonplace problems faced by Marine officers of the early 
period is that of Lieutenant Lewis Roteley of the Portsmouth Division of the Royal 
Marines. In the letters of Roteley, in addition to some other sources, we can gain a picture 
of some of these early challenges.   
Born in Swansea, Lewis Roteley was the son of an innkeeper and former sailor who had 
served in the Royal Navy and saved the money necessary to purchase the Mackworth 
Arms, an inn in Swansea.261 His father invested in young Lewis’s education, which would 
later prove essential in securing a commission as an officer.262 Lewis first examined a 
career as an army officer, but soon found the lack of money and family connections and 
patronage problematic.263 Lewis would enter the Marines, according to Swansea lore 
through an appointment secured fortuitously by Lord Nelson on a chance visit to Swansea 
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to his father, “to say your son’s conduct here has been altogether what I would wish would be deceiving you.” The 
schoolmaster suggested Lewis’s father “if he appears to have a mechanical turn or genius, would it not be best to put him to 
a trade, but if upon the other hand you and Mrs Roteley with his consent are inclined to place him in a counting house you 
may depend on his being very capable.” 
263 RMM 1981/435/5, The Roteley Papers, 11 October 1803, Greenwood & Co., London, to Lewis Roteley in Swansea. 
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in 1802.264 Following his appointment to Portsmouth Naval College, Lewis became a 
Royal Marine Officer assigned to the Portsmouth Division of the Royal Marines in 1805.   
In Portsmouth, Lewis’ preoccupation became his position on the Marine ‘list’, which 
determined seniority of all officers in position to their own rank amidst their peers. The list, 
and one’s position on it, would become an obsession amongst officers since promotion in 
the Marines was only available by seniority as one could not ‘purchase up’ as was the 
case in the army. Slow promotion was at this time, and would remain, a harsh reality. In 
August 1805, Lewis wrote to his father about concerns over his placement on the seniority 
lists: 
If you will look into the monthly Navy list you will find in the Marine list upwards of 
280 Second Lieuts all to be made First Lts before it comes to my turn as they are all 
promoted by seniority. I am particularly fortunate in joining the Division at this time 
as there is an augmentation going to take place consequently upwards of an 
Hundred Second Lts will be made Firsts which will put me a great ways up on the 
lists provided I am entered upon the Admiralty lists from the time I passed. I am 
sorry to find through the neglect of the Clerk, it frequently happens they are not put 
down regularly as they join sometimes a person is just below 20 or 30 who are 
entered after him if that is my case it will be a material injury to me as it will keep me 
so much longer before I am promoted.265 
For Roteley, his commission obtained, he would experience the first of many bitter 
disappointments of his career. In another August letter to his father, Lewis relates the 
realities of how the system of patronage opened opportunities for, “a Young man who had 
a little interest with the Field Officers was appointed over my head,”266 leaving Lewis to 
wait for assignment to another ship.  
Further letters showed financial woes beginning to take hold as the additional costs of life 
for a new officer in the Division, even before the hope of going to sea, such as lodging 
expenses, for which he was compensated to an extent.267 Other costs included a ‘fee’ to 
the Sergeant who taught him his drill, and another to the band and the guard on his first 
night as mounting guard. 268 Financial preoccupations seemed paramount at this early 
stage of his career, replete with lists of bills and expenses related to two distinct 
 
264 The story of Nelson’s arrival in Swansea in August of 1802 was told in The Cambrian Daily Leader, 20 October 1916.  
The story, as described here, would be the source for many later retellings of the same story based in part on Swansea 
town records – accessed online 4 September 2017:  
http://hdl.handle.net/10107/4102415|title=NELSONSVISITTOSWANSEA - The Cambria Daily Leader|date=1916-10-
20|accessdate=2017-09-04|publisher=Frederick Wicks}}</ref>. 
265 RMM 1981/435/8, The Roteley Papers, 14 August 1805, Lewis Roteley in Portsmouth to his father in Swansea.  
266 RMM 1981/435/7, The Roteley Papers, 29 August 1805, Lewis Roteley in Portsmouth to his father in Swansea.  
267 RMM 1981/435/8. Here Lewis stated: “My pay as Second [Lt] is only 4/8 the Barracks being full allowed 6/0 [per] week 
for lodgings money those I have got will cost me [8]. My first [months] pay will go for Fees of Commissions I was obliged to 
pay one Guinea to the mess (being an established rule) on my first entering it likewise 10 shillings per week for mess.” 
268 RMM 1981/435/8. Here Lewis stated: “When Perfect is my exercise I shall have to pay the Drill Sergeant 10.6 for [is] 
trouble. I am also told I must Guard 7s and the Band 1.1.0 the first nights of my Mounting Guard.” 
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categories: uniforms and equipment for going to sea.269 When outfitting themselves in the 
proper expensive uniforms, officers selected a tailor who supplied the necessary items 
appropriate to their rank and status. However, this was usually done on credit and the 
tailor had to wait many years before he received payment. Roteley’s uniform expenses 
were listed in extraordinary details to his father, totalling £42 and 8 shillings. Roteley had 
engaged an agent to manage his financial affairs and arrange the transfer of some £40 to 
pay off some of his debts.270  
On 2 September 1805, Lewis Roteley would begin a letter to his father with, “Dear Father, 
I am ordered to embark on board the Victory tomorrow morning which [completely] ready 
for sea only waiting for Lord Nelson’s return from town.”271 Within two months of joining 
the Portsmouth Division, Roteley would find himself aboard HMS Victory as the third 
Marine lieutenant in his detachment of four marine officers, led by a captain, and would 
indeed serve at Trafalgar. Still, the major preoccupation of Lewis on the eve of departure 
for what he could not have guessed would be the epic naval encounter of his generation, 
was embarking with his necessary kit, settling his bills and debts with creditors in 
Portsmouth, and the expenses for joining Victory’s mess.272 “To mess on board will cost 
me after the [same] of £50 or £60 a year independent of what is allowed by the ship. We 
have capital dines on board”, Roteley wrote to his father days before sailing.273  While at 
sea, officers would have their basic meals and subsistence paid for, but the mess culture 
in the navy encouraged, and indeed expected of its members, to outlay from their own 
pockets monies to provide additional comforts and provisions while at sea such as wine, 
port, and other comfort items.274 His final letter cited problems in settling accounts in 
Portsmouth stating, “I this day paid £20 towards my Mess on Board the Victory. In 
Consequence of which I was not able to take up My Bill.”275 His post scriptum summarises 
his predicament: “Please send me £5 and place to my account for having paid for two 
table cloths, bedding, 6 shirts, and Two Silver Spoons. I am without a Guinea to take out 
with me.”276 From his initial kit and uniform list, as well as from subsequent letters, it is 
apparent that Roteley made economies on this initial outlay, as subsequent letters to his 
father request monies for items ranging from additional shirts, bedding, dining cutlery, 
tablecloths, linen, and other sundries for life in the Division mess and later when he would 
discover that he would be going to sea, and join HMS Victory.   
Lewis Roteley would serve in action aboard Victory at Trafalgar as the third Marine 
lieutenant in his detachment of four marine officers led by a captain of marines. He would 
 
269 RMM 1981/435/8, RM 1981/435/9, RM 1981/435/10, The Roteley Papers. 
270 RMM 1981/435/8, RM 1981/435/9, RM 1981/435/10, The Roteley Papers. 
271 RMM 1981/435/9, The Roteley Papers, 2 September 1805, Lewis Roteley in Portsmouth to his father in Swansea.  
272 RM 1981/435/8, RM 1981/9, RM 1981/435/10, The Roteley Papers. 
273 RMM 1981/435/10, The Roteley Papers, September 1805 Roteley from HMS Victory to his father in Swansea.   
274 Lavery, Nelson’s Navy, 109-112. 
275 RMM 1981/435/11, The Roteley Papers, 11 September 1805 Roteley from HMS Victory to his father in Swansea.   
276 RMM 1981/435/11.   
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be near Nelson himself at the time he received his fatal wound. His letters include a hand 
written report about marine casualties at Trafalgar, citing the death of the captain of their 
detachment, Charles William Adair, and the wounding of First Lieutenant James Goodwin 
Peak, and Second Lieutenant Lewis Buckle Reeves.277 Lewis was also injured, though not 
severely. Lewis secured as a memento of the battle Nelson’s blood stained stockings, 
which remained in his family’s possession for many years.278 With the other Marine 
officers killed or wounded, Lewis Roteley temporarily took command of the marine 
detachment. Roteley’s letters give further detailed accounts of his recollection of the 
battle, and in later life he would relate these and other fantastic stories, such as the myth 
of ‘Nelson’s Blood’ at society dinners in Swansea.279 For an officer short on living 
expenses, he would wait many more months for his share of Victory’s prize money.280  
Despite his active role at Trafalgar, Roteley was still without the sufficient patronage to 
enable him any further advancement and new opportunities. Immediately after the battle, 
Roteley’s concerns returned to financial matters and his next assignment. In March 1806, 
he wrote his father in Swansea about his frustration with the assignment process 
favouring those with influence and patronage: 
I beg you will lose no time in sending me some cash to pay wife and child’s 
expenses home as well as some to pay my subscription towards Mess in case I 
should be embarked. I expected to be aboard HMS Diana she has been some time 
in the West Indies wants repairs and will remain some time here. But a young man 
who had just joined the Corps having a Relation of no small interest with the 
General was put into her. The same thing took place with respect to the Medusa 
Frigate where she made a demand on the person below me upon the Roster was 
ordered for that duty. I think they are determined I shall not go to sea again in any 
Frigate whatever. If I do not get into one I shall certainly write to the Admiralty and 
[state] my services and make it known to them how Irregular the Roster is kept with 
respect to their embarking officers out of their turn. 281 
Concerning provision for his family, Lewis had indeed married young, and had a young 
wife and daughter who would, according to his letters, spend most of their time living with 
family relatives in Swansea cushioning the costs of supporting his family.282 By April 1806, 
 
277 RMM 1981/435/17, The Roteley Papers, List of Marine Casualties at Trafalgar.  
278 The stockings today remain in the collection at The National Maritime Museum.  
279 RMM 1981/435/45, The Roteley Papers; RM 1981/435/46, The Roteley Papers. See also Brian Carter, Formative Years, 
1803 to 1806, Special Publication 31, (Portsmouth: Royal Marines Historical Society, 2005) 110, for description of Roteley’s 
speeches in Swansea.   
280 RMM 1981/435/10, RM 1981/19, RM 1981/435/28, The Roteley Papers.  For more on the naval prize system in Roteley’s 
era, see Richard Hill, The Prizes of War, The Naval Prize System in the Napoleonic Wars, 1793-1815, (Stroud: Sutton 
Publishing Limited, 1998). 
281 RMM 1981/435/19, The Roteley Papers, Roteley in Portsmouth to his father in Swansea.  
282 Few letters survive between Lewis and his wife, Elizabeth.  Roteley had a daughter Jane, who never married. The 
papers, letters, and other effects of her father would survive in her care. Jane Roteley died in 1896 with no descendants and 
was buried with her parents in Swansea. The Times (London, England), Saturday, 7 March 1896; pg. 14. 
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Roteley was successful in joining the newly fitted HMS Milan, for another rotation at sea 
through a common practice of an exchange of duties with a willing officer, facilitated by 
payments and bribes to a “Person High in office” which he described in another letter to 
his father.283 Joining the mess was the source of more financial woes: “I am informed our 
mess on Board will cost us £60 a year each.  They have already made a demand upon 
me for £30 as we are now laying in Six Months Stock.” He was again forced to implore his 
father for further financial aid.284  
Prize money was the hope of all sailors and marines of this era. Lewis’ father would 
receive on his behalf in October 1806, his prize money from Trafalgar.285 Lewis’ tour with 
HMS Milan would be brief, he would transfer to HMS Cleopatra at Halifax, Nova Scotia 
and see some small actions around the Caribbean earning him some desperately needed 
prize money to sort his finances.286 War, at least, meant opportunity for advancement, 
fame, and possibly some financial returns. In 1807 while off Nova Scotia in HMS 
Cleopatra, Lewis wrote his father: “Now nothing less than an American War can make up 
for my disappointment which we are anxiously looking for I think our government will 
never put up with the insults of these a set of runaways the [worst] of society whose very 
existence has been in consequence of England.”287 
As his letters at this time indicated, the coupled expenses of life in the mess and meagre 
pay which stretched his finances to their breaking point, Lewis faced the unsavoury 
experience of being ‘called out’ by another naval officer, a Lieutenant William Longfield, 
second lieutenant of HMS Cleopatra, on a stop in Bermuda:  
I experienced no small inconvenience at Bermuda in consequence of not being able 
to get my Bills Cashed which subjected me to some insult from those on board that I 
was not upon the best of Terms with and who were enabled with their prosperity 
[and] Prize Money to command more cash [then] I would however I convinced them 
I was not to be insulted with impunity.288  
 
283 RMM 1981/435/20, The Roteley Papers, Lewis Roteley to his father from HMS Milan, 30 April 1806. Roteley stated to his 
father: It cost me Ten Pounds to get into the Frigate…I consider myself particularly fortunate in being appointed to her on 
that day. Had I remained one day longer on shore I should have been ordered on board the Elephant [74 guns] Which sails 
this evening with the convoy for the West Indies.  It cost me for a Handsome Present to a Person High in office and Trifle to 
the officer who exchanged Sea Duties with me who by the by had no idea at the time that this ship would fall to his lots.  He 
has since offered me Twenty Guineas to [cancel] the Exchange.” 
284 RMM 1981/435/20, The Roteley Papers, Lewis Roteley to his father from HMS Milan, 30 April 1806.   
285 RMM 1981/435/25, The Roteley Papers, 4 October 1806, letter from prize agent to Lewis Rotley, father.  
286 RMM 1981/435/26, The Roteley Papers, 15 January 1807, letter from prize agent to Lewis Rotley, father. In this letter, Lt 
Roteley was informed he would receive £10 for the capture of an American merchant ship, Manhattan. 
287 RMM 1981/435/28, The Roteley Papers, 15 January 1807, Roteley from HMS Cleopatra to his father in Swansea. 
288 Underlining of ‘Terms’ is Roteley’s emphasis. RM 1981/435/28, The Roteley Papers, 15 January 1807, Roteley from 
HMS Cleopatra to his father in Swansea.  
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The result was a challenge and a duel between Roteley and Longfield.289 A second 
challenge from Longfield was avoided when Longfield committed suicide while awaiting a 
court martial for ‘improper conduct’.290  
Roteley would be promoted to First Lieutenant in 1808 and stay on with HMS Cleopatra, 
fighting in a ship to ship action in the capture of the Topaze in January 1809, and would 
be present for the invasion of Martinique in 1809.291 The surviving letters provide few 
further details of his later career, although he would live to receive the Naval General 
Service Medal in 1848, for which he would have two service clasp devices, denoting his 
participation at Trafalgar and Martinique.292 Roteley would also experience time on half-
pay, which would not be an uncommon experience for many Marine Officers. Before his 
death in Swansea in 1861, Roteley had the rank of brevet Major while on foreign military 
service abroad.293 As this rank was not a permanent appointment, it did not transfer into 
his retirement pension, and Roteley only managed a first-lieutenant’s pension from the 
Royal Marines.294 From the Marine Lists and his obituary, we know he would return to 
Swansea and enjoyed a degree of fame for his service at Trafalgar.295  
Lewis Roteley’s career holds valuable examples of the career of Marine officer who 
served in the early nineteenth century, his letters and career offering some insights into 
the experiences of officers like him. We see the thoughts of a junior officer, struggling to 
make ends meet and advance his career. While they are but one example of the struggles 
of a junior of this period, they set a clear precedent for what officers like him would 
experience throughout the nineteenth century. Despite his early education, without the 
intervention from senior naval officers he otherwise lacked the necessary patronage as 
the son of an inn landlord to an officer’s commission. We can see his concern and 
preoccupation over his placement on the promotion roster and furnishing his uniforms and 
kit for going to sea, and how pay and financial problems plagued him for much of his early 
career, despite any status he may have gained as a veteran of Trafalgar. Finally, we learn 
that despite some brevet commissions to more senior ranks, these did not afford Roteley 
any further pay on his retirement.   
Similar experiences were found in the same period by Sir Robert Steele, who entered the 
Marines in 1803, and noted the role of patronage as the first step towards a commission: 
“A commission in the marines was only to be obtained by interest with the first Lord of the 
 
289 Roteley here cites “going out” with a Lieutenant Longfield on two occasions during the same cruise.  It is not clear from 
Roteley’s letters if both quarrels or insults, which resulted in duels, were both due to the same disputes over unpaid mess 
bills. RMM 1981/435/28, The Roteley Papers, 15 January 1807, Roteley from HMS Cleopatra to his father in Swansea. 
290 Mark Barton, “Duelling in the Royal Navy”, The Mariner’s Mirror, 100:3 (August 2014), 302.  
291 "Obituary of Eminent Persons", Illustrated London News (London) 18 May 1861, 477. 
292 The medal roll for the Naval General Service Medal, 1793-1840, also notes Roteley receiving the medal and clasps, see 
ADM 171/8, Nominal roll of surviving officers and men entitled to clasps of the Naval General Service Medal for actions 
between 1793 and 1827. 
293 "Obituary of Eminent Persons", 477. 
294 "Obituary of Eminent Persons", 477. 
295 RMM 1981/435/46; RMM 1981/435/56; RMM 1981/435/60, The Roteley Papers.   
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Admiralty or some of his colleagues or supporters in Parliament; and my father had never 
as he said, dabbled in elections, or made a merit of giving his vote.”296 Steele would rely 
on another family relation, a Marine Officer, to assist in the appointment to the Admiralty 
Board.297 Steele also offers some perspective of what the Admiralty interview boards were 
like at this time, but also the efficacy of family connections in gaining access, perhaps 
regardless of the individual quality or merits of the candidate. In his memoir, Steele used 
an allegorical illustration of a prospective officer, a Richard Rodel, sponsored by his father 
who was himself a Major in the Marines: 
After the usual questions, all of which the Major, (who acted as sponsor and [god 
father], as well as father, to master Rodel) immediately answered, the candidate 
was desired to place himself under the standard; when the president observed, 
‘Why, Major Rodel, I am very sorry, but your son is at least about two inches below 
the standard’. This brought the Major to the front. He put out his fore foot, drew 
himself up and said, ‘My Lord, why Richard is all but as tall as I am,’  (to be sure the 
Major was about as broad as he was long), ‘besides gentlemen,’ (addressing the 
board) ‘I have a large family I was wounded at Acre with Sir Sidney Smith I have 
served thirty-six years in the corps; and look, my Lords,’ (turning master Rodel 
round like a top, and seizing him by the nape), ‘why he's got a neck like a bull.’ Their 
Lordships could not resist the appeal, and young Rodel was added to the strength, if 
not to the height of the corps.298 
Patronage was a deciding factor, if not the sole factor in gaining initial entry to an officer 
commission for Marines. Other factors, such as social origins or being a ‘gentleman’, as 
well as education level and access to wealth and financial means would later become 
preeminent. Steele recalled the moment the Admiralty Board would enquire into the 
nature of the candidate’s background and parentage:   
‘And what's your father, Sir?’ asked a thick individual, who sat on the left of the 
President at board. Thinks I to myself, I wonder what that signifies to you. I however 
looked at him full in the face, and said, ‘My father, Sir, is a gentleman.’   
‘I thought,’ said Captain Gambier, (since Lord Gambier, then one of the naval lords, 
and who always had a kindly leaning to the church,) ‘that is, I understood your father 
to be a clergyman.’ 
The president looked up. ‘Yes, my Lords, so he is by profession,’ said I; ‘but I 
thought the question referred to his birth.’ 
 
296 Sir Robert Steele, The Marine Officer, Vol.I, (London: Henry Colburn, Publisher, 1840) 26. 
297 Steele, The Marine Officer, Vol.I, 29-30.   
298 Steele, 36.   
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‘Sit down,’ said the president. ‘Mr. Marsden,’ (to the secretary at the bottom of the 
table) ‘give him his certificate.’299 
In this, Steele was not too dissimilar from many of his contemporaries.  As a vicar, his 
father would have been considered a member of the gentlemanly class by virtue of both 
his function and the education required of a vicar. For Steele, this proved adequate.  
Steele’s memoirs likewise captures the tone of initial jubilation of being accepted into the 
Corps and receiving his certificate of appointment, followed by the shock effect of the 
financial obligations suddenly incurred: 
"You will have the goodness, Sir," (to my father) "to leave that certificate with me, as 
your son has been recommended by General Averne. I shall take care that he is 
appointed to the Portsmouth division, and he will receive his commission at 
headquarters, when he has been reported fit for duty by the adjutant. Meanwhile," 
(in a subdued voice,) "have you any particular person, to whom you would wish to 
give a preference, in furnishing his equipments?" 
"Equipments sir?" repeated my primitive parent, "what equipments?''  
"Why his outfit his uniform his appointments to be sure, and by and by his sea kit. At 
least two hundred pounds will be required to start him properly." 
"Then God must help me," said my alarmed sire.300 
Like Roteley, Steele also cited the problem of the seniority list, where newly minted 
officers could find themselves fixed within a lineal standing with little hope of ascending to 
the next rank with any expediency. Upon receiving his commission, and later learning of 
his standing in relation to that of the ‘young Rodel’, the son of the Marine major in Steele’s 
illustration who had also received an officer commission along with Steele, Steele noted: 
For my part, I was so happy that I paid little attention to these things at the moment; 
but when the Admiralty list came out, and our standing and seniority in the corps 
was known, I had too much reason to remember and regret them; for some young 
officers who went up to pass the board, long after I had joined the division, stood 
above me upon the list of second lieutenants, and above them, of course, stood the 
first born of Major Rodel. I therefore strongly advise all parents and guardians 
having sons or wards destined to a gradation corps, to make their ground good with 
the hireling who makes out the list, especially if they are to come in, as I did, at a 
large augmentation, on the breaking out of a war.301 
 
299 Steele, The Marine Officer, Vol I., 35.  
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Steele’s allusion of either endearing or the outright bribery of Admiralty clerks cites the 
power these administrative persons could have over the careers of junior officers. 
Lewis Roteley’s experience remains one of the best examples of the unique challenges 
faced by Royal Marines Officers at the start of the century over social origins, wealth and 
education, and sensitivity over the relative status of their Corps. Both the examples of 
Roteley and Steele neatly demonstrate the challenges faced by Marine Officers 
throughout the nineteenth century in their chosen service profession: meagre pay, slow 
promotion, few opportunities for recognition or reward, and the uncertainties of continued 
employment or a retirement pension. These struggles impacted the matter of the relative 
status of the Royal Marines in relation to the other services, which as will be shown 
affected the later crises of existence and identity related to the continued retention of the 
Corps. With an understanding of the unique challenges an Officer of Marines faced at the 
outset of the nineteenth century, we will see how these problems persisted in 
recognisable patterns in the careers of other officers.  
Social origins, education and other financial woes 
Robert Steele recounted his own opinion of Marines in society in his memoirs:   
As a body, no other country has a more formidable or better disciplined, or a more 
efficient force loyal and true to the crown, they have always been found good at 
need, animated by the highest principles of military virtue, governed by precepts of 
the strictest honour and integrity, and pursuing individually a straight path of duty to 
their sovereign and to society, they are entitled to a place, if not amongst the 
highest, certainly among the most meritorious classes of either public or private life - 
they may not be what I once heard a mustachoied Dandy term a "fashionable 
corps," but they are more - they are a "respectable corps," - a corps of gentlemen, 
taken from the middle, and most healthy, as well as most moral part of the British 
community, and are, as soldiers arid men, "sans peur, et sans reproche." Still, I 
must repeat, a more neglected body does not exist in the service.302 
The insight of Steele on the Corps in this period being at once not a ‘fashionable corps’, 
but one made of ‘gentlemen, taken from the middle’, is reflective of the consummate view 
of the Marines in this period about their status. Marine officers overwhelmingly came from 
middle-class families and were unlikely to be men of wealth or from wealthy families.303 By 
the twentieth century the question of social origins may have mattered somewhat less, 
though increasingly it was acknowledged that officers of Marines did not come from 
 
302 Steele, The Marine Officer, Vol. II, 269-270.  
303 Bittner, Shattered Images, 46. By way of contrast, an Army infantry officer was estimated to need a private income of 
£150 to £200 per year, while a cavalry officer would require £600 to £700 per year. Edward Spiers discusses this and other 
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wealthy families. In his memoirs, Frederick Jerram, who entered the Corps in 1901, 
reflected that:  
It seems customary to commence any backward with the words ‘I was born of poor 
respectable parents.’ Goodness knows mine were poor and Victorian enough. I 
mention these pre-Corps days [as] they have a very direct bearing on my own 
service career and discount the very prudent idea that one could not exist in the 
[Service] without considerable private means.304  
Education in the early nineteenth century would become a primary factor in deciding a 
future commission in the Marines. It was a simple and useful method of determining if a 
candidate had not only the requisite learning, but also the requisite wealth to obtain it, 
hence a demarcation point between social classes. In 1839, the Admiralty Board 
convened a new series of examinations for entrance to the Marines. All candidates for 
commissions would be required to possess competent knowledge that would be examined 
through tests to be held at the Royal Naval College, Greenwich.305 The Admiralty 
instructions of 1839 read as follows: 
The following Qualifications are required in Candidates for Commissions in the 
Corps of Royal Marines: — Every Candidate will be required to possess a 
competent knowledge of 1st. Common and Decimal Arithmetic. — 2nd. First Six 
Books of Euclid. — 3rd. Algebra, as far as Simple Equations. — 4tb. A portion of 
Plane Trigonometry, and the Use of Logarithms And to write English correctly from 
dictation.306 
From 1839 onwards, commissions would be offered to individuals who achieved 
satisfactory scores on a series of examinations.307 Equally important, after the Cardwell 
Reforms of the 1870s the Corps which abolished the purchase system, the Corps would 
now be on equal footing with the army as to how it procured its officers, namely through 
admission boards and formal examinations. Prospective Marine officers took the same 
tests as candidates for admission to the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich, and the Royal 
Military College, Sandhurst.308 Each individual listed his choice in order of preference, and 
the final results in order of merit determined his options: Sandhurst, Woolwich, or the 
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Royal Marines309.  These tests emphasised the classics taught in and the modern 
technological fields of knowledge ignored by the public schools. The nature of the entry 
examinations required an appropriate education such as generally obtained in private 
schools, often followed by study with a private tutor or ‘crammer.’310 As Major General A. 
N. Williams commented over six decades after entering the Corps in 1913:  
I had been taught Latin and Greek but no science. I was well educated. I was very 
confident. I was a prefect at my school, and I went to a ‘crammer’ for nine months to 
learn something of science and engineering. This just got me through.311  
While influence and connections remained important, access to an education had become 
a necessity. Therefore, the key to commissioned officer status was increasingly not by 
social background or patronage, but in fact having the financial means to pay for the 
education which was necessary to pass the initial entry bar; the two had an obvious 
connection, but were not synonymous.  
Despite this, commissioned officer pay was low and remained essentially unchanged for 
much of the century. For most Marine Officers, once a man entered the Corps, he stayed. 
Of the 895 officers commissioned between 1867 and 1913, 486 of these, or 54 percent 
retired as Royal Marine officers.312 A further 86 died on active service as a result of 
combat, and 116 from noncombat causes.313  Thus, a total of 688, or 77 percent, of the 
officers commissioned in the forty-six years prior to World War I, ended their careers as 
officers of Royal Marines. Men having devoted such an investment of time, resources, 
education, and investment into the study of the military arts, indicated a desire to make 
the military service his career. Generally, he either retired or died as a Marine or 
transferred to another branch of the armed services. A total of 130 of those commissioned 
between 1867 and 1913 exercised this option. Of these, nearly all transferred to the Army, 
British or Indian, except two who entered the Royal Navy and six who transferred to the 
Royal Air Force.314 The remaining 11 percent who left the British service prior to normal 
career termination, a majority of these did so on the initiative of the Admiralty because 
they did not conform to the expected standards of professional competence, personal 
integrity, or individual behaviour expected of a commissioned officer. As stated, the 
officers usually lacked independent means, hence their preoccupation with pay, promotion 
and seniority. These issues became more acute as they remained in grade years, even 
decades as shown, and other concerns in life such as marriage and supporting a family 
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emerged. Royal Marine officers became beholden to their careers in order to sustain their 
lives and livelihoods, and had made heavy investments of time and money into their 
profession. With no other particular skills befitting their status to turn to, Marine Officers 
therefore became dependent on their careers and the elusive prospect of promotion.   
Steele observed in his own memoir remarks how his new uniform provided an impact in 
his local community outside Winchester: “I took great pride in putting my uniform all on; I 
appeared in it at church the only Sunday I was at home; I wore it at an assize ball, to the 
great amusement of Charlotte Wentworth, and several other spinsters; and paid visits in it, 
to some of the nobles, clergy and gentry of the vicinity.”315 Steele clearly recalled that his 
new marine uniform provided him not only a new status, but also a provision for access to 
the local elites of his own community. Yet once a commission was obtained in the 
Marines, the problems of inadequate pay, debt, and slow promotion further aggravated 
the condition of many officers. Marine officer pay was low, and remained essentially 
unchanged for years. Service in the army and the navy as an officer carried expectations 
of outlays of money for necessary items, such as uniforms, but also for social 
expectations as well. The subject of wealth, inherited or otherwise, and the preoccupation 
over funds to sustain their own livelihoods, but also the necessary expenditures expected 
of officers in their lives in the mess and elsewhere, were a persistent concern. For those 
ultimately successful in obtaining a commission in the Marines, advancement in the Corps 
would be a frustrating enterprise. Marine officers also lacked independent means and their 
concern with pay, promotion, and rank seniority remained persistent problems which were 
expressed in their own personal writings. These issues only persisted with years of 
service, possibly aggravated when facing the ideas of gaining a family or supporting one.   
The financial problems of a new officer joining the Marines often emerged early their 
career. Until gazetted as officers, all prospective officers were ‘gentlemen cadets’. This 
new status incurred new costs associated with military life, namely the uniforms and 
accoutrements for which all officers were expected to pay outside of their own salary. All 
probationary officers had to have the financial resources to meet the many monetary 
commitments associated with their position, which began immediately, the regulations 
stating each, “should be prepared with a sum not less than £40 for outfit, and £10 for 
mess, washing, and other expenses.”316 Lending credence to Thompson and Bittner’s 
characterisation of the Royal Marines as a ‘poor man’s regiment’, financial matters were a 
major factor in influencing many to select the Marines over the Army as Major General 
A.N. Williams, who entered the Corps in 1913, cited:  
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The son of a family friend in the Corps told my father and me that the expenses in 
the Marines would be less than the other services. My father was a clergyman and I 
had five grandfathers who were clergymen. We were, therefore, very poor. Yes, I did 
consider the Army but a young gunner friend of mine advised the Royal Marines on 
economic grounds.317 
Another officer of the same period, Major K.E. Lawrance, would recall similar motives 
when choosing services:  
I’m afraid that this was mainly for the unromantic reasons that it was only in the 
Marines that one received a [2nd Lts] commission immediately on joining and 
because an [RM] officer, at any rate, could live on his pay if he were very restrained 
in his [shoregoing] amusements and very moderate in his demands on the 
wardroom’s wine store when on board.318  
Marine General George Grey Aston would reflect at the opening of his memoirs: "The 
poverty part of the conventional opening must come in, because it is the dominating 
feature in the life of most Marine officers."319 Aston concluded financial woes were such a 
constant concern for both himself and other officers, they dominated his narrative: "The 
poverty part of the conventional opening must come in, because it is the dominating 
feature in the life of most Marine officers."320 Aston also recollected his own experience as 
an officer entering service in the 1880s, showing little had changed regarding the initial 
outlays for uniforms from earlier years: 
Few Marine officers in those days had anything more than their pay to live upon, 
and they managed to do so by rigid economy and by relying on the patience of 
tailors who seldom pressed for payment but fixed their prices accordingly. It was 
seldom possible to pay ready money for the ‘richly gold-laced’ and embroidered 
garments and appointments we were obliged by regulation to wear; a suit of mess 
dress alone cost over 15 per cent of a year’s income of a subaltern, and we had 
many costumes, but the tailor long suffering and willing to wait. I think that he looked 
upon the supply of clothes to us as a ‘legitimate gamble’, and I don’t think he had to 
wait a long time for it sometimes.321 
Another officer, Lieutenant Colonel Frederick Jerram, would recall his own circumstances: 
“To the newly joined officer not the least of his embarrassments was one of finance.”322 
On his initial expenses, Jerram recalled: “an uncle had stumped the £100 for my uniform 
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so I was saved going into debt for that.”323 As Jerram would also note, despite their new 
officer status, the arrival of the Marine officer to his new establishment, on shore or at sea, 
would be furthermore be a humbling experience: “the sight of an officer’s furniture arriving 
in a handcart, as portrayed in one of Col. Drury’s books was a common sight.”324 
Lieutenant Colonel William P. Drury was a Royal Marine officer and author of several 
books who would recall the financial implications of similar unwritten practices on 
reporting to the Plymouth Division in the early 1880s: 
A multiplicity of printed instructions awaited the perusal of the officer who mounted 
Main Guard, and there was a traditional obligation he had to discharge which was 
neither indicated on the order board nor (presumably) came within the ken of the 
Authorities.  It was a heavy tax both upon his head and purse; for it entailed at his 
own expense the alcoholic refreshment, in which he was bound to participate, of 
every sailor or soldier officer whose thirst prompted him in passing to call upon the 
subaltern of the guard. With half a dozen bottles of whisky, then, beneath the table 
in his room and discreetly screened by the table-cloth, the young officer began his 
twenty-four hours' tour of duty, and it is scarcely surprising that more than one 
untoward incident resulted.325 
In the mess, an officer might be required to live on strict economic terms. Drury in his 
memoirs reflected thusly on his time as a Lieutenant in 1880 and the financial burden of 
his own mess expenses: “Beyond a rare tankard of ale at dinner and a single glass of 
wine in which to drink the Queen’s health on guest nights, no fanatical pussyfoot could 
have been more abstemious. I neither smoked, played billiards, nor went to theatre, not 
because I was a prig, but because I was a pauper.”326 Frederick Jerram would note a 
similar experience in 1901: 
In these days it is difficult to realise that everyone drank and smoke and that to 
refuse a drink was an insult, and not to stand your share was worse. But these hard 
cases could appreciate, if not understand a complete abstainer; but it had to be 
complete. By this means I could just live on my pay with no extras. Fortunately 
dinner was a vast meal which you filled up all the next day and which nowadays 
would keep you for a week or more.327 
Even at sea, money troubles might continue to plague the Marine officer, as evidenced in 
the concerns over mess bills by newly commissioned Second Lieutenant Henry Woodruff, 
 
323 RMM 11/13/165, Jerram, “Reminences”, 4.   
324 RMM 11/13/165, 4. LtCol W.P. Drury was a Royal Marine Officer, commissioned in 1880 and retired in 1903.  Besides a 
career in the Marines, he wrote 18 books between 1899 and 1939, plus his memoirs, In Many Parts: Memoirs of a Marine, 
(London: T. Fisher Unwin, Ltd., 1926) cited in this chapter. He would likewise later serve as one of the early editors of the 
Corps journal, The Globe and Laurel. 
325 LtCol W.P. Drury, In Many Parts, 74. 
326 Drury, In Many Parts, 34.  
327 RMM 11/13/165, LtCol C.F. Jerram, “Reminences”, 4.  
81 
 
at sea for the first time in HMS Castor in 1855.328 The excitement of being at sea for the 
first time, including stops at ports of call in exciting places such as Bahia in Brazil and 
Cape Colony in South Africa, resulted in his expenditures on everything from exotic fruits 
to a monkey329, and from his messmates the purchase of a pistol and a jacket, and from 
another messmate, a war souvenir of a silk shirt reputedly taken from Chinese rebels.330 
These frivolities seemed to have ultimately got the better of Woodruff. The pistol proved 
faulty, and disputes over restitution resulted in fights with other officers.331 In despair at his 
financial predicaments, and no doubt over fallouts with his mates in the close quarters of 
the ship, Woodruff noted:  
I’m afraid it is all up with me now. I shall be obliged to leave the ship on account of 
my debts. My mess and wine bill become due tomorrow and I have no means of 
paying them. The only thing I can do is to be economical as possible and never get 
into debt.332  
Sadly, shortly after transfer to HMS Dart, Woodruff would die in a horrible accident a few 
months later off the East Coast of Africa on 29 April 1856.333 Despite serving only a year 
with the Royal Marines, his meticulous journal provides us with a detailed look of life at 
sea and the experiences for a new Marine Officer in this period. 
The very same concerns about spending money, on any degree of leisure activity was 
also echoed by Captain Alfred Burton with HMS Alfred. “I abstain from recreation,” said 
Burton in an 1831 in a letter from Malta to his mother stating, “my messmates are mostly 
young men without a thought, and able to spend more than my income. You will scarcely 
believe me – but even our Midshipmen keep horses which they have purchased since we 
arrived.”334  A ship’s mess, Burton wrote to his mother, “is a most ruinous place to be for a 
man with a narrow income.”335 Like Lewis Roteley, Burton was a veteran of Trafalgar, 
having served on HMS Defence, and served a longer career until his death in 1840. 
Burton entered the Marines in 1804, and like Steele, was the son of a clergyman.336 His 
letters to family also reflected similar fiscal concerns. In 1812, while serving aboard HMS 
Rota in the Mediterranean, Burton wrote to his sister of three prizes taken from French 
privateers: “I rate my profit at about 15 or 20 pounds, but do not expect to receive it [for] a 
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long time as our agent is remarkably dilatory.”337 This emphasis of Burton’s, and many 
other Marine Officers, concerns over their just and expedient shares of prize money was 
justifiable as Burton’s pay amounted to about seven pounds per month being two to three 
months’ salary in prize money alone. As a Lieutenant at Trafalgar, Burton would have 
shared in some of the prize money for the capture of the San Ildefonso by HMS 
Defence.338   
More unusual in matters of relative status was the nexus of affairs of personal honour 
involving debt, insults, or slights, which were also perceived injuries to the Corps. Marines 
were highly sensitive to insults, real or perceived to their Corps. Lewis Roteley had 
notably fought a duel over unpaid debts to the mess, but not engaging in the duel would 
have reflected poorly on his own reputation as well as all other Royal Marines. Portsmouth 
was the scene of the last recorded duel between military officers in Britain in 1845 
between military officers, a Royal Marine Officer, Lieutenant Charles Hawkey, and a 
former officer of the Hussars, James Seton.339 The affair briefly captivated a reader 
audience with salacious details of inappropriate advances and an alleged affair between 
Seton and Hawkey’s wife emerged, culminating with a challenge and a meeting in 
Gosport near Browndown Camp.340 Of note, however, it was reported that when 
challenged by Hawkey, Seton had dismissed the possibility of a meeting as appropriate, 
that “a light cavalry man could never give satisfaction or mix himself up with an infantry 
one”.341  Even as an attempt to evade a fatal meeting with the bombastic Hawkey, such a 
reproach from Seton was as a further snub, not only to Hawkey, but to the honour and 
reputation of the Marines. In the meeting at Gosport, Hawkey shot Seton who was fatally 
wounded, whereupon Hawkey briefly absconded. When the trial for wilful murder brought 
Hawkey to the assizes, the determination of the jury was that Seton had ultimately 
succumbed to the complications of surgery in extracting the bullet from his wound, and not 
from Hawkey’s injury. Hawkey was acquitted.342 During the trial, however, Hawkey’s 
defence counsel offered that Seton had, “spoke in terms of contempt of the branch of 
service to which Lieutenant Hawkey belonged,” suggesting the honour of his Corps was at 
least as important as that of his wife.343  
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Promotion and Career Prospects 
With the Marines now firmly under the jurisdiction of the Admiralty, for those officers who 
would be soldiers gone to sea, becoming part of the navy resulted in even worse 
promotion prospects. Because the Marines adopted a seniority model for promotion, slow 
promotion became the harsh reality for career minded officers. Generations of Marines 
would be plagued with infrequent promotion, or simply no opportunity to advance. 
Gillespie, the author of the early Royal Marines history, was himself at the time of writing 
his history still a first-lieutenant with over twenty-four years of service.344  
Officers of Marines also frequently had opportunities to compare themselves to officers in 
the other services. During a punitive mission to New Zealand in 1834 to rescue British 
whalers and their families who had been attacked by Māori, an episode which would 
become known as ‘The Harriett Affair’ for the name of the whaling ship, Lt Clarke of the 
Royal Marines had other things on his mind besides the mission at hand. Marines from 
the man-of-war HMS Alligator and a colonial schooner Isabella arrived in Taranaki in 
September 1834 with a detachment of sixty soldiers from the 50th Regiment of Foot, the 
‘Queen’s Own’.  These soldiers and marines would also be the first British troops to come 
into armed combat with Māori.345 Once ashore, the weather and climate proved as much 
an adversary of the insurgents. Whilst awaiting orders to move against the Māori, Clarke 
while in conversation with his counterpart of the 50th, a Captain Johnson, learns his army 
peer is disgruntled over the slow promotion prospects in his own regiment. Of this 
encounter, Clarke wrote in his diary, “During my sojourn on this duty, I could not refrain 
from chewing the bitter cud of disappointment at finding myself, after twenty-five years, 
still a subaltern in command of such a post, yet senior in the service to Captain Johnson 
of the Queen’s Own, who considered himself as unfortunate, as well as a neglected 
man.”346 Clarke had originally entered the Marines as a Second Lieutenant in February 
1810.347  Within four years of the ‘Harriet Affair’, Clarke would at last be promoted to 
Captain in 1838, retiring on full pay as a Captain.348 Similarly, in 1833 Burton, at the end of 
his career while serving as the Marine Officer on HMS Alfred, would write ironically that, “it 
is no recommendation now a days that an officer has seen service. The young men are 
only jealous of him, and affect to think if he had any merit he would have long ago have 
been promoted. If ever I go to another ship, I mean never to let it escape me that I was 
ever at Trafalgar.”349 Burton’s commentary on the mess reaction to his service at Trafalgar 
may not indicate any particular attitude of younger naval officers as regards veterans of 
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the battle, but perhaps Burton’s own chagrin at being still a Captain of Marines while those 
naval officers of HMS Defence had since moved onwards to more senior roles in the 
service. As a Marine Captain, Burton would have held the equivalent rank of Lieutenant in 
the navy. Navy Lieutenants would have been comparatively younger officers, expected to 
have reached their rank following service and training as a midshipman by their 
twenties.350 
While Marine Officers languished in a promotion rut, often for decades, opportunities for 
marriage and family would have emerged, and concerns of how to support these 
financially would have been a preoccupation. Earlier in the century, Roteley solved his 
problem of supporting a young wife and daughter by sending them to live with family and 
relatives to save on expenses for most of his career, both while at sea and even while 
based with the Portsmouth Division.351 Captain William Elliott confronted the problems of 
pay, marriage, and family in the 1850s when he decided to marry in 1852, but had to 
determine to live on his salary as a Captain. Means available to him were not uncommon: 
exchange of ships, foreign service, and other appointments for cash. In total, Elliott 
between February of 1852 and March 1855 made four exchanges of billets totalling 
£235.352 Elliott even petitioned a prospective patron in the Lords Commissioners of the 
Admiralty for an appointment as an instructor at the gunnery school at HMS Excellent in 
Portsmouth, which he hoped would bring additional pay and benefits. “Such an 
appointment to me would be of the utmost importance, being a married man with a family 
entirely dependent on my pay as a Brevet Major”, he wrote. “I shall ever feel most grateful 
to you for your kindly doing what you can for me, for since my marriage (now more than 4 
years) I have been afloat and of course during that time my expenses have been doubly 
increased,” Elliott implored.353 His quest for this appointment, despite service experience 
and qualification, ultimately failed him in this instance.354 Drury himself married the 
daughter of a vicar outside of Plymouth. His relative poverty was a concern of his, noting 
that the marriage, “between a poor parson's daughter and a penniless subaltern would 
have landed us both in the workhouse,” forced a wait of some ten years from his betrothal 
to his wedding day.355 Similarly, LtCol Jerram noted on the topic of marriage that, “if you 
couldn’t afford to marry, you waited until you could.” He added: “Nowadays every junior 
officer subaltern thinks he’s ENTITLED to marry and that it’s up to the government to give 
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him the means to do so. But in those days, the government paid us for commanding our 
men, and not a whole family.”356 
Naval sinecure and the ‘Blue Colonels’ 
If the realities of slow promotion were harsh, harsher still might have been an unfortunate 
practice instituted by the Admiralty at the time of the 1755 reconstitution of the Marines, 
that of naval sinecure roles in the Royal Marines. Known colloquially as the ‘Blue 
Colonels’, Gillespie highlighted this practice in his earliest history where the Admiralty 
bestowed sinecure ranks in the Marines to senior naval officers: admirals as generals, and 
post-captains as colonels within the Marine Divisions of Portsmouth, Plymouth, and 
Chatham. The term as such did not infer any connection to the blue uniforms attributed to 
the artillery of the time, and later to the blue coats of the Royal Marine Artillery, known as 
the ‘Blue Marines’. Instead, it reflected the connection of the officer to the Royal Navy and 
his blue naval uniform in contrast to that of the red coat of the Marines. While holding no 
particular operational function, the rank and role was designed as a sinecure to which no 
duties or command authority were assigned. These positions served as emoluments and 
provided a considerable stipend to a select few. Noteworthy beneficiaries included the 
likes of Nelson, Collingwood, Howe, Cockburn, as well as Jervis and the Duke of 
Clarence.357 Gillespie cited his disdain for this practice as follows:  
Disclaiming every prejudice, I am led to ask how far either policy or justice can 
sanction the transmission of such an institution to posterity?  They were originally 
the benevolent grants of a grateful Monarch, to distinguished individuals.  As such 
indeed they have continued to be; but experience has [shewn], that Field Officers 
are the very life of discipline, and that if so respectable an addition were 
[unalienated] from the active members of the Corps, this principle would be still 
more animated.  A man who suppresses his feelings upon any that demands them 
is unworthy of the name. How is the thought, that the Marine Veteran, who ascends 
by the rules of slow gradation, can never reach the summit of his profession! 358 
This articulation of a long-standing grievance against the Admiralty by serving Marine 
officers punctuates Gillespie’s narrative, and calls sympathetic readers to the plight of 
career officers. To Marines, the naval officers that were granted these promotions within 
the Marine hierarchy were an affront to many whose prospects for advancement were 
consequently dim.359 There were some sympathetic voices in the press of the day. One 
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author, signing simply as ‘A Friend to The Marine Corps’, cited what the morale of the 
marine officer corps concerning this predicament: “What zeal can an Officer have, I would 
ask, who after more than a quarter of a century spent in defence of his King and country 
still remains a Subaltern? What must be his feelings at the neglect he has experienced, 
conscious of having merited treatment, very far different.”360 Another dissenting voice 
stated in the 1830 Hampshire Telegraph and Sussex Chronicle:  
The Officers of the Marines only ask that they may be placed on a level in point of 
promotion with the Artillery and Engineers, who like themselves rise by seniority; in 
short they only ask for justice, they require nothing more, yet strange to say even 
this is denied them, and I cannot better prove the truth of this assertion, than by 
stating that many of the Captains actually serving, have been more than 34 years; 
the First Lieutenants more than 25 years; and the Second Lieutenants more than 18 
years in the service.361 
The sinecure naval roles would be struck down in a session of Parliament on 14 February 
1833, but ironically with few impassioned speeches about the injustices against the Corps.  
Instead the vote seemed motivated by the blunter instrument of fiscal reform. The debates 
on the motion for the stoppage of sinecures and pensions, opened with the Member of 
Parliament for Middlesex, Sir Joseph Hume, a frequent sceptic of the naval estimates 
brought before Parliament and a champion of reform, stating: “The state of the country 
loudly demanded the most rigorous economy on the part of the Government; and the 
Parliament were bound to relieve the country from its present burthens.”362  The pensions 
and sinecure roles of the army and navy were in fact a principal target for this motion. First 
Lord of the Admiralty Sir James Graham stated that for the Admiralty sinecure roles were: 
“Narrowed to the propriety of continuing to have two Generals of Marines, four Colonels of 
Marines, a Vice-admiral, and a Rear-admiral of England. The whole amount of salary 
received by the whole of these officers was [£4,740].”363  However small the sum, Sir 
James stated that if called for, it was the duty of the House to strike this sum from the 
Admiralty books. The House divided, the ayes came to 232, the noes 138. A majority vote 
of 94 put to an end the long honours tradition of naval sinecure roles in the Royal 
Marines.364 The sinecure roles of the ‘blue colonels’ system would finally be struck down, 
in part, as a fiscal concern.  Reflecting on this moment in his 1845 history of the Royal 
Marines, Lt Paul Nicolas stated:  
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Thus terminated an iniquitous system which, in spite of earnest and respectful 
remonstrance, had continued in force seventy-four years; for however deserving the 
gallant officers of the navy undoubtedly were to the rewards from the nation, it was 
unjustifiable to take this emolument from a corps that was so eminently entitled to 
consideration and recompense from its important services.365  While the system was 
finally discontinued in 1833, the incumbent generals retained their ranks into 
retirement until their death; the last four naval captains who served as colonels did 
so until 1837.366  
Execution of the abolition of sinecure would be recognised with an Order in Council of 
1837, stating ceasing further appointments and for the future distribution of “the amount of 
£2,700 shall be appropriated to the creation of 18 pensions of £150 per annum for officers 
of the rank of captain in the navy, and general officers, or colonels of marines, to be held 
by them in the same way, but to cease on their promotion or appointment to service.”367 
The 1840 Commission and relative status 
Promotion prospects, even with the abolition of sinecure posts, did not much improve for 
senior officers. So far from diaries, letters, and memoirs of marine officers, we can see the 
depths to which this preoccupation weighed upon them. In 1840, a Royal Commission 
was appointed “to ascertain the comparative situation of the officers of each branch 
…service, the object of that inquiry being … to compare the relative ranks of the naval and 
military services with reference to their pay, and the prospects open to them of promotion 
or retirement.”368 The impetus for this investigation stemmed from years of grievances in 
both the army and the navy about promotion rates, career prospects, and commensurate 
pay which had not been examined since the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars.369 
Estimates and costs for the maintenance were a recurring feature of Parliamentary 
proceedings, requiring the vote on the continued expenditures to defend the realm. Many 
of these problems stemmed from the grievances that had been aired for many years, from 
both the army and the navy, though for the navy not quite resolved by the abolition of 
naval sinecure. Each service was examined in detail and the findings were published in 
the Sessional Papers of the House of Lords, 1840, examined reports from commissioners 
into the naval and military promotion and retirement system across the army and the navy.  
Specifically to the Marines, the commission had first directed its attention to the Marines. 
The complaints which the officers of your Majesty's Royal Marine forces preferred were: 
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1st. That the number of field officers allowed to the corps was insufficient:  
2dly. That the promotion was unusually slow:  
3dly. That there was an unequal distribution of brevet rank, and also an unequal 
apportionment of prize money, as compared with corresponding ranks in other 
military corps : and  
4thly. That the captains of Marines were paid at a lower rate than the captains of the 
Army or the Ordnance.370 
Each of these grievances had been compiled over a long reported period, and ten Marine 
Officers representing both the Royal Marine Light Infantry and the Royal Marine artillery 
were interviewed and their statements recorded in the minutes of evidence.371 The 
commission acknowledged the first grievance as admission of fact, but stating that the 
1837 Order in Council which recognised the abolition of naval sinecure had largely 
remedied this. The first grievance also underscored the problem of employment, or under-
employment, of how the Marines were fielded and what role a field officer might play. 
While council acknowledged that the Marines might be deserving of an additional number 
of field officers of higher ranks to allow career progression, the council nevertheless 
concluded that, “The result of this evidence was to confirm us in the opinion that field-
officers were not essentially required for ordinary sea-service, and that the existing 
establishment of the corps furnished sufficient numbers for home duties, or for those 
extraordinary occasions where it might be necessary to employ anybody of Marines 
ashore.”372 Fundamentally, there was a problem with the role and how Marines were 
employed that was yet to be answered.   
The council in their questioning posed a question to two Marine officers, Captain J.I. 
Willes and First Lieutenant James Buchanan serving the artillery: “Had you entered the 
regiment of royal artillery on the same day that you came into the marines, what would 
have been your position in the regiment?”373 Marine officers in the Royal Marines Artillery 
would have been trained at Woolwich with the Royal Artillery, and would have served in 
certain capacities alongside them in similar roles. Willes, who entered the Marines in 
1804, and was by then a Captain of nine years, replied to the Council he would have been 
at least equal to a Brevet Major that was currently serving in the Royal Artillery, who had 
fourteen years less service than he. Willes was also questioned as to what rank he might 
hold in the Royal Engineers had he entered service in that Corps the same day he 
entered the Marines. “Regimental or lieutenant-colonel”, replied Willes.374 Buchanan, 
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having entered service in 1814, stated: “I should have been a first-lieutenant in two years 
from the time of entering the service, and should now be a captain of three years' 
standing, whereas, in my own corps, I am 28 down the first-lieutenants' list.”375 The best 
option for promotion in the army remained primarily through the purchase system, 
although promotion by simple seniority was still possible. Addressing the reported slow 
promotion grievance, the council succinctly concluded with a statement that “we are of 
opinion that the promotions which have followed upon that order, have effected a very 
material improvement in this respect.”376   
The third finding of the 1840 Royal Commission cited the “complaint upon which the 
officers of Marines prayed for inquiry into their condition, was, that there was an unequal 
distribution of brevet rank, and of other distinctions and rewards for service, and an unjust 
apportionment of prize money, in reference to corresponding ranks in other services.”377  
Addressing the third grievance regarding disproportionate prize money and brevet rank, 
underscored a concern voiced by Marines regarding not only tangible reward but also a 
belief that their relative status in the navy, and to an extent the army, was not sufficiently 
recognised. This matter of appropriate honours and distinctions would persist throughout 
the century, as will be shown. To the fourth point, the council sought to address the 
difference in pay of Marine captains to those of the army. The council proposed the origin 
of this from “part of the emoluments of an infantry captain consisted of an annual 
allowance of £20”, which was alleged to have formed a fund to cover the expenses of 
recruiting.378 The council determined to correct this, stating “it is expedient that the pay of 
the captains of Marines, when serving ashore, should be fixed at the same rates as that of 
the captains of infantry of the line.”379   
The sum of these problems affected the relative status of the Corps in relation to the navy 
and the army. The findings of the commission in their examinations and conclusions 
seemed to underscore problems that were known, at least to Marines themselves, but that 
in some cases had no ready solutions. Notably, pay and promotion, or rather the slow rate 
of promotion and the absence of any tangible senior roles for field officers, were 
addressed with some proposed solutions. For more senior officers, there were few if any 
opportunities for operational command. As Colonel John Tatton Brown of this period cited: 
“The Marine have not command of any sort, nor any prospects of anything to stimulate 
them.”380 The Division system did not allow for Royal Marine formations in the field. The 
unresolved problems were in fact part of a greater problem, which was related to the 
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function and role of the Marines in the service of the nation. Aston concluded in his own 
memoirs years later that matters in the early twentieth century remained unchanged: “A 
Marine, as I think I have shown, has no prospects whatever in the Naval Service when he 
gets beyond a certain rank, because, with the best of intentions in the world, the Admiralty 
have no suitable responsible work to give him.”381    
Conclusion 
Later in the century, Sir George Aston cited a dinner party in London while working at the 
Admiralty in the late 1880s, where the relative status of the Royal Marines to other 
services of the period was reflected by one dinner guest: “I was sitting between my host 
and a lady who, not knowing to what Service I belonged, and by way of putting me at 
ease, told me that a nephew of hers had gone into the Marines and ‘Wasn’t it a pity?’ Only 
a severe kick in the ankle from my host stopped my tongue and saved the harmony of the 
evening.”382  
Despite the decision to retain and elevate the Marines to royal regiment status, the Corps 
was largely a marginalised entity within the larger construct of the Royal Navy. Despite 
this, marines since their renewed inception had begun to cultivate their own unique culture 
within their organisation – they had begun to see themselves as a thing apart.  The 
nineteenth century saw the increased professionalism of the military services. For those 
who did enter the Marines, service meant slow promotion, and association with an inferior 
status within the military hierarchy. The paralytic promotion rate of marine officers during 
this period, and the sinecure of appointing naval captains and admirals to ‘blue colonels’ 
and generals of marines respectively, at the expense of promoting marine officers was an 
early grievance, but also embodied a tangible instance of an obstacle to career-minded 
men in military service and those who sought to better themselves in the social hierarchy. 
If the system of sinecure roles in their organisation signified to the Marines the hold the 
Admiralty had on them, ultimately what enabled the Royal Marines to develop and thrive 
was their own sense of a unique identity apart.  
The personal correspondence, private journals, histories written by members of the Corps, 
and published memoirs of Marines across the era reflect a continuous concern on such 
matters. Their views collectively straddle two centuries and saw great changes to the 
Naval Service. As shown, the Royal Marines officers though not of great wealth, could find 
a career of value to society, gain social acceptability, provide themselves and their family 
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some level of economic sustenance, and even in rare cases a vehicle for upward social 



























Chapter 4. “A useful and efficient body of men” 
The marines are a useful and efficient body of men, second to none in the service of 
the State; they are excellent troops, both as artillerymen and infantry, and are at the 
same time capable of performing many of the deck duties of a ship of war. – quoted 
from the House of Commons, “Royal Commission to inquire into best Means of 
manning Navy”, 1859  383 
 
The Royal Marines were able to codify to a great extent their traditions and identity in the 
early nineteenth century, ascending in status to a Royal Regiment in 1802. The century 
which followed the close of the Napoleonic Wars would give the Corps less to celebrate. 
Little change occurred to their actual employment, and the Corps experienced the 
contractions to their service as did the navy and the army. By the mid-nineteenth century, 
when the advent of steam technology was beginning to take its effect on the Royal Navy 
and its future, questions abounded about the continued relevance of the Royal Marines. 
At one time, the Marines enjoyed a certain status within the Royal Navy as the only 
service with fixed term enlistments and other predictable measures to their patterns of life, 
in dockyard barracks, duty at sea and ashore, and a professional system for advancement 
and training. While previously the navy had relied on methods of both enticement and 
impressment to man the fleet, new pathways for professional skills and specialisation in 
occupations from seamanship to gunnery were now on offer with fixed term enlistments. 
For the Marines, the time-honoured role of that of shipboard police force, keeping both 
order and discipline at sea and a thin red line between the officers of the fleet and would-
be mutinous men below decks was now considered redundant. Lacking major 
confrontations at sea, naval warfare became the subject of much theory. Technology 
likewise saw improvements to naval gunnery and reforms to the navy itself. With the rapid 
expansion of the empire, the necessity of seapower, articulated by such thinkers as Alfred 
T. Mahan, was viewed as essential to British dominance at sea and seemed a foregone 
conclusion.384 For Britain to continue to rule the waves, a large fleet of ships was argued 
by some to control the sea lanes were what was important.  
This chapter examines the operational role of the Royal Marines where by the mid-
nineteenth century, naval engagements were no longer the norm as Britain held the 
world’s strongest navy. Instead, colonial conflicts and ‘small wars’ dominated the 
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nineteenth century. Here a solution for the Royal Marines might have been solved by 
utilising their training and martial prowess as ‘soldiers of the sea’ with the naval brigades 
landed ashore for strikes and raids from ships in littoral regions. Culminating with a 
noteworthy example of an obscure battle in the Boer War, this chapter will show why even 
opportunities with the naval brigade increased tensions with the navy up to the time of the 
First World War. The chapter concludes with an appraisal of the Corps struggling to hold 
on to its identity and role in the navy, while also examining opportunities to adapt and 
innovate new missions to be seized upon.  
Significant reorganisations were considered as consequences of technology, the 
experiences of war, and how the military services sought to define their roles in imperial 
defence. The start of the nineteenth century saw Britain as the dominant naval power in 
Europe, and by extension the world. The unequivocal defeat of the French fleet at 
Trafalgar resulted in the Royal Navy remaining virtually unchallenged, with no ascendant 
naval powers immediately in sight. With this new status, invariably the perils remained of a 
change in the status quo, some rising power staking this claim with a larger or more 
capable fleet. While the so-called Pax Britannica of the nineteenth saw conflict, naval 
battles were the exception and therefore naval theory and the employment of naval power 
were much debated. This period has also been largely defined as the pre-dreadnought 
era, of which Arthur J. Marder’s British Naval Policy 1880-1905: The Anatomy of British 
Sea Power,385 inspired a proliferation of work by historians on ship design, navalist writers 
and pressure groups, as well as political and diplomatic influences to the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth century.  
British policy toward shipbuilding was to match in numbers and in capability the two next 
competitors. Following frenetic shipbuilding across the globe, Britain ended the century 
maintaining its self-imposed two-power standard versus Europe’s other naval powers: 
France and Russia. However, the ascendant navies of the United States, Japan, and 
Germany had altered the balance of naval power and directly challenged Britain’s 
supremacy at sea. John Beeler in his analysis of British naval policy in the mid-nineteenth 
century has emphasised the political, economic, and foreign relations contexts which 
framed British naval policy in this period.386 Beeler has cited how while the Royal Navy 
managed to outperform the British army in the Crimean War, the calls for reform  which 
affected the army had repercussions for the navy as well.387 The challenge of the 
technological factors associated with steam ships and the vast number of intervening sea 
lanes which were the arteries of the empire challenged the view of ‘Fortress England’.388  
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At the same time, the very idea that Britain must be a fortress was being challenged, and 
as will be explored in this chapter and the next, some naval thinkers and military 
strategists saw the potential that a strong surface fleet and a mobile seaborne force might 
have in the defence of the nation.   
Andrew Lambert in his most recent work, Seapower States, argues that Britain’s identity 
as a “seapower” experienced a period of erosion in the later 1800s of its naval power due 
to lack of political support at the expense of domestic reforms.389 Accordingly, Don Leggett 
has re-examined technological change in the Royal Navy citing the authority of different 
approaches to ship design in the age of steam.390 Leggett has argued how Britain’s navy 
was supported by vast amounts of public money on ships and dockyards, though not 
always with the greatest interest in design.391 Leggett notes how expenditures on naval 
spending steadily increased between 1831 and 1906, from £5.3 million or 10.21% of the 
public expenditure to £33.3 million or 22.65% respectively.392 Clearly naval expenditures 
continued, but Lambert cites that only towards the end of the century did a wave of 
populist navalism, backed by a high-profile media and political agenda, bring back 
concerns over Britain’s losing its naval edge.393 This, Jan Ruger has argued convincingly, 
was in part responsible for the competitive race of Britain and Germany through the cult of 
the navy in both countries.394 With the navy recognised as central to the identity of Britain 
and as a manifestation of imperial power, strong navies were opportunities to display 
power as well as symbols of national pride. What these authors have demonstrated is the 
navy’s focus in this period on ships and design. Absent from these works and other 
scholarship on the evolving role of the Royal Navy in this period beyond ships and fleets is 
what role the Royal Marines did or might occupy. How these changes would in turn affect 
naval manning was a developing concern and for the Marines, as will be shown, was a 
predicament which increasingly underscored a problem in their purpose and utilisation.  
Marines feature now, as they did then, in the margins of many operational histories, 
especially those of the wars of empire and their unique participation with the naval 
brigades. British power was projected from the sea, despite the absence of sea battles, 
with the navy employed in the littoral regions and colonial wars of its expanding empire. 
The naval brigades, sailors led by naval officers, were landed to conduct punitive missions 
and in many cases to support the land operations of the army.395 These were the 
opportunities for naval officers to distinguish themselves in a time when sea battles were 
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not available and for the navy to demonstrate a wider range of operational uses. The 
formative experiences for many officers of the Royal Navy were in fact in these small 
wars, to which the Royal Navy played an essential role. Admiral Beatty of Jutland fame 
took part in two such campaigns as a younger officer, commanding a Nile river gunboat 
from 1896 to 1898, and the naval brigade of HMS Barfleur during the Boxer Rebellion at 
Tientsin during which he was wounded.396 Historians have largely failed to question the 
paradoxical relationship between the pairings of the marines, trained as a military fighting 
unit on the infantry model, and the navy sailors trained to man ships and led by officers 
schooled in all things nautical, but arguably ‘at sea’ on military matters on land. This 
chapter will include a detailed analysis of this problem revealing how this created real 
tension within the Royal Navy and questions about its operational efficiency. 
The changing navy and the problem of naval manning  
Since the accession of the marines as a Royal Regiment in 1802, the Royal Marines 
found the years that followed the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars just as eventful. 
Corps historian H.E. Blumberg recorded in his history that, “It is customary to speak of the 
period 1815 to the Crimean War 1854 as a period of 40 years' peace, but as we have 
already seen this did not apply to the Corps, and the accounts of the following operations 
will show that the Corps was never really free from active service.”397 The bombardment of 
Sweaborg in the Crimean War, where the Royal Marines Artillery would play an important 
role in the last and largest use of mortars by the Royal Navy, would be another such 
notable action.398 Blumberg thus informed readers of the Corps history that Britain’s 
ventures in both colonial and foreign intervention were occasions for smaller scale and 
limited conflicts, but conflicts nonetheless where marines were very much involved.   
Steam technology and manning of the fleet preoccupied the Royal Navy by the mid-
century. Soon, traditional rivals such as France would put steam ships to sea, adopting a 
technology that no longer required fleets to depend on the tides and winds. While steam 
freed ships from reliance on the wind, it also tied them to coal depots, a fact fraught with 
logistical concerns for a strategy of naval blockade that had worked well in previous 
conflicts, and problems for defence of a global empire.399 In addition, the incidence of 
maintenance, both routine and for major overhauls, increased dramatically for steam 
driven ships, in contrast to their largely self-sufficient sailing ship forebears. Steam 
powered ships would be continually reliant on the coal depot, the dry-dock, and the repair 
yard. By 1870, not only would it cost Britain far more to keep an adequate force at sea, 
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even in peacetime, the logistical and maintenance challenges associated with steam ships 
made it much harder to keep that force at sea.400 
In 1860, a Royal Commission reporting on the defences and national readiness to oppose 
an invasion of the homeland concluded that, “The introduction of steam may operate to 
our disadvantage in diminishing to some extent the value of superior seamanship; the 
efficient blockade of an enemy’s ports has become well-nigh impossible; the practice of 
firing shells horizontally, and the enormous extent to which the power and accuracy of aim 
of artillery have been increased, lead to the conclusion that after an action even a 
victorious fleet would be more seriously crippled and therefore a longer time unfit for 
service.”401 The navy, once regarded as the guardians of England’s shores, were now 
perceived as no longer up to the task. The commission favoured a ‘Fortress England’ 
option to provide for land defences:  
Having carefully weighed the foregoing considerations, we are led to the opinion that 
neither our fleet, our standing army, nor our volunteer forces, nor even the three 
combined, can be relied on as sufficient in themselves for the security of the 
kingdom against foreign invasion. We therefore proceed to consider that part of our 
instructions which directs our attention especially to fortifications.402 
This would include other suggestions for Britain’s security, envisioning a chain of forts, 
defended bases, depots and dockyards, in a virtual chain for the effective deployment of 
the navy for war purposes and continued security of the empire.403 These debates of forts 
versus fleets saw the marines caught up in the wider discussion of naval manning and 
ultimate purpose and allocation of defence resources.   
The next significant change to affect the navy, as well as the marines, were the methods 
and means of manning the fleet. Service in the Royal Navy versus the merchant fleets 
was not traditionally deemed desirable due to the harsh conditions of service. In wartime, 
many sailors were pressed into service for the Royal Navy in which the marines played an 
active role. The role of Marines then was secure under this system as members of the 
impressment parties on land, and on ship to keep order and discipline at sea to quell or 
otherwise prevent would-be mutinies. Immersed in a life at sea, some marines would learn 
some of the basics of seamanship. This helped create the incorrect perception 
perpetuated much later in Rudyard Kipling’s 1896 poem about the Royal Marines, “Soldier 
An’ Sailor Too”, that the multi-talented marine or ‘jolly’ was capable of all tasks as a man 
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straddling the skills of both the Army and the Navy.404 Though written later, it was 
applicable to this period as well. Typical of Kipling, the poem is related from the 
perspective of a soldier with sympathetic rapport by the soldier with the marines: 
They come of our lot, they was brothers to us; they was 
beggars we’d met an’ knew; 
Yes, barrin’ an inch in the chest an’ the arm, they was doubles o’ me an’ you;405 
The poem equally stresses how the marine could be relied upon to support the army when 
required and how the marine, who could apparently manage most any job, did not really fit 
in with the navy. While there is evidence that the Royal Marines enjoyed this publicity by 
one of Britain’s popular contemporary authors, even reprinting the poem in the Corps 
newspaper, The Globe and Laurel, Julian Thompson has cited how the characterisations 
penned by Kipling were inaccurate. The marine was never intended as interchangeable 
with a sailor but always in fact a soldier, however misemployed.406 Using marines, 
however, only partially solved the problem of manning ships, since marines were never 
seriously accepted as an interchangeable replacement for actual sailors capable of 
handling all aspects of sailing ships. Common sailors saw severe restrictions placed upon 
their liberties due to the scarcity of willing volunteers, and to prevent desertion.407 Most of 
all, according to Margarette Lincoln, seamen objected to the practice of cycling crews of 
warships coming in to the dockyards for refit or repairs over to ships readying for sail.408 
Whether enlisted voluntarily or pressed, sailors might expect to serve at sea and in port up 
to a period of five years.409 Upon return to port, ships were paid off and their sailors 
usually set at liberty. The system in place was therefore an unpopular and unreliable 
method for manning the fleet.  
All this would change by the introduction of new terms of service. A ‘Continuous Service 
Act’ was introduced in 1853, which was deemed, “highly important to give the Royal Navy 
a more permanent organization, both as a means of increasing its efficiency and 
discipline, and of substantially promoting the welfare and comfort of the petty officers and 
seamen of the Fleet.”410 Sailors now signed on for a period of ten years, and a new rating 
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of shipwright, improved rating of seamen-gunners with new promotion rates and pay were 
now available.411 The belief was that this would provide incentives and a level of stability 
for sailors, with the idea that those going to sea willingly would get opportunities for better 
advancement in defined career pathways, so that “greater permanency will be given to a 
man’s connexion with the naval service”.412 This had the effect of putting seamen on par 
with marines who now enlisted for a similar period; no longer were the marines unique in 
this. 
So essential was the manning of the navy that in 1858 a Royal Commission was 
appointed to examine the effectiveness of these new methods.413 The conclusions of the 
report would influence the manning of the Navy at a time when, following the Crimean 
War, a need for urgent changes and reforms were recognised to the state of the army and 
navy. One item the Commission sought to address was, “the curious anomaly by which 
the mercantile marine was well supplied, while the Navy was always in want of men.”414  
The Commission nevertheless concluded that the new incentives for sailors enlisting on 
long term contracts were delivering the desired impacts.415 The prevailing viewpoint in the 
navy viewed the marines as a naval reserve, useful for manning ships in times of need. 
The Commission’s conclusions on the manning of the naval reserve included this 
appraisal of the Marines in a single brief paragraph: 
The Marines are a useful and efficient body of men, second to none in the service of 
the State; they are excellent troops, both as artillerymen and infantry, and are at the 
same time capable of performing many of the deck duties of a ship of war. There is, 
however, a limit beyond which they cannot be conveniently increased, for it is 
necessary to their efficiency that they should spend a large portion of their time 
afloat. There is ordinarily a reserve of 6,000 marines in the home ports, ready for 
active service afloat. We think that this force might, with great advantage to the 
State, and without impairing its efficiency, be increased by 5,000 men, who would be 
well fitted to garrison the seaports in time of peace; and when required to serve at 
sea, they could be at once embarked, and their place in the seaports supplied by the 
regular army or the militia.416 
The Royal Navy, it was recognised, was at first slow to face the realities of increasing 
mechanization of ships and fleets. In his cross examination, Rear Admiral Alexander 
Milne, who was soon to be Fourth Sea Lord, served to illustrate to what extent how 
ingrained antiquated ways of thinking still permeated the navy in moving from masts and 
 
411 British Naval Documents, 1204-1960, 708-711. 
412 British Naval Documents, 1204-1960, 712.  
413 HC Deb 18 May 1858 vol 150 cc886-911. 
414 HC Deb 18 May 1858 vol 150 cc896. 
415 RC 1859, vi. 
416 RC 1859, xi. 
99 
 
sails towards steam. Commission panel member William Schaw Lindsay queried whether 
marines might be trained to fight ship’s guns as well as the sailors, and asked Milne what 
objections he might have against substituting marines for sailors. Milne answered: 
“Because you would not have a sufficient number of seamen for evolutions aloft.”417   
Lindsay would be the sole dissenting panel member, frustrated by the findings and 
conclusions, refusing to endorse the findings of the report. Lindsay, drew his objections 
from a long career in the merchant marine fleet and as a ship broker.418 Later elected 
Member of Parliament for Tynemouth and Shields in 1854, Lindsay fought for maritime 
interests and promoted the development of steam power in ships.419 As a chief 
representative of the mercantile marine on the Commission, Lindsay was at odds 
especially with those members anchored in their viewpoints of the Royal Navy. Lindsay 
decried what he believed were relevant overlooked facts vital to Britain, particularly 
regarding the role and importance that steam technology was having in maritime affairs: 
The introduction of steam navigation, and the almost universal application of the 
screw propeller to vessels of war, will produce an entire change in the mode of 
carrying on naval hostilities. The fastest ships having the heaviest guns of the 
longest range, and fully manned by the most efficient gunners, will, in all probability, 
prevail in an action. The effects of steam and improved gunnery tend to place all 
maritime nations more upon an equality as regards the power of dealing destruction. 
The nation which can most promptly and effectually organize and use these 
appliances against an enemy will necessarily be placed in the highest state of 
security, and hold predominant power; and the services of skilled seamen will 
therefore be less in demand than they were under the ancient system of naval 
warfare.420 
Lindsay notably enclosed his own remarks on the marines, stating, “I consider that 15,000 
or 18,000 of the 35,000 additional reserved force to be raised, ought to consist of 
marines.”421 Lindsay stated further that, “the whole of our seaport towns should be 
garrisoned by marines”.422 Lindsay specifically cited the evidence given by former First 
Lord of the Admiralty Sir James Graham as to the utility of marines, as men who were “all 
light infantry men; every man is a gunner, and every male is trained to the more common 
naval operations”, as well as in guarding the principal seaports and dockyards at 
Plymouth, Portsmouth, Chatham, and Woolwich.423 To this effect, Lindsay stated, “Every 
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experienced witness who gave evidence before the Commission bore testimony to the 
value and efficiency of this meritorious body of men, and all concurred in recommending 
that the number should be materially increased.”424 While Lindsay, and the former First 
Lord were certainly advocates for an expansion and better employment of the marines, 
the statements of other witnesses were divided. Furthermore, despite seventy-nine 
witnesses being called from all ranks of the navy, no marine officers were called to give 
evidence.425   
Only earlier that year, another Royal Marines Artillery half-pay Captain, John C.R. 
Colomb, had written similar ideas in a paper of his own to the Royal United Services 
Institute. Colomb was also a naval strategist in his own right, as was his elder brother, 
Vice Admiral Philip Howard Colomb.426 Philip Colomb focused his ideas and views very 
much on the concept of ‘control of the sea’ or as he termed it, ‘command of the sea’.427 
Philip Colomb was firmly in the navalist camp, advocating in his published volumes the 
necessity of maintaining a large fleet and what flexibility this might give for territorial 
attacks, but always maintaining the primacy of securing sea lanes as the overarching 
task.428 John Colomb was also developing his own thesis on the connections as he saw it 
between empire, trade, coal and defence, and was himself a critic of the ‘Fortress 
England’ concept.429 Economic requirements enabled by seaborne trade could be fused 
with strategic concepts, and Colomb saw this as a task for Britain’s navy. Like Lindsay, 
Colomb understood the significance that the new technologies brought, likewise realising 
that modern trade movement and modern trade security, depended on supplies of coal 
essential to the movement of both merchant and war ships.430 Colomb would later sit as 
an elected Member of Parliament, but as a marine, Colomb had a particular bias and was 
preoccupied with what he believed was the ambiguous status the marines found 
themselves in under the Admiralty. Colomb reflected on the more recent efforts by 
Parliament in the 1859 Royal Commission on manning to fail to adequately address an 
improved role for the marines, which in his opinion set the tone for the next quarter 
century: “The first sentence tells nothing definite as to the use and application, the second 
is mysterious, the third is incorrect, the fourth and last has been ignored, and therefore the 
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whole paragraph is valueless for practical purposes now. Thus were the marine forces 
officially launched blindfolded into the future of that reconstructed Navy.”431 
From the minutes of these testimonies, the findings show a distinct split between naval 
officers who were either champions or detractors of the marines, specifically of the Royal 
Marines Artillery. Admiral Sir George Seymour, Commander in Chief in Portsmouth, cited 
the utility of the marines as a reserve force and for the speedy manning of a ship for war, 
stating, “The marine artillery are the finest body of men in the service, or that I know of in 
any service, being the picked men of the corps of marines.”432 Seymour heaped further 
praise on the marines, stating, “I think that the marines are a most valuable body of men. I 
know of no armed force whose history can be quoted for so many years without failure on 
service of any sort.” Seymour nevertheless concluded that, “I should prefer seafaring men 
to be kept, to a dependence even upon the marines.”433 Similarly, Captain George 
Randolph also gave his opinion of seamen being the superior gunners in the fleet: “they 
are more active, and they are better dressed for it.”434 Randolph nevertheless credited the 
marines as a whole stating, “It is impossible to exalt them too much, they are a most 
valuable body,” but concluded that he would prefer seeing the number of seamen 
increased in favour of marines.435 Second Naval Lord, Vice-Admiral Sir Richard Dundas 436 
was less complimentary, stating, “The marine artillery are useful for their own particular 
duties; they have training in the laboratory, they have training in the use of mortars, and 
special training of that sort which is perhaps not necessary for all the seamen, but the 
seamen are generally speaking the best gunners on board a ship”437 Dundas, however, 
recommended that marines might be increased in number as a useful reserve, but should 
remain on ships, suggesting their utility at sea would deteriorate with prolonged 
absence.438 
Rear Admiral Sir Thomas Maitland, speaking from his experience as Commander of HMS 
Excellent and the naval gunnery school,439 suggested that the Marines were wasted by 
the Navy, particularly their gunnery skills: “I consider the marine artillerymen the most 
valuable men in Her Majesty’s service, and also the marines; but still the marine 
artilleryman, I think, is totally thrown away on board ship; for if we can get a seaman 
capable of being captain of a gun, we put him to it, because we do not like to have the 
guns in the navy taken out of our hands; and the consequence is, that a marine 
artilleryman, except when sent ashore with a field-piece, very seldom does his legitimate 
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duty.”440 Rear Admiral Lord Clarence Paget likewise echoed Maitland’s stance, suggesting 
an increase to the Marines, and that the Royal Marine Artillery might garrison the principal 
dockyards.441 “The marine artillery are in fact the elite of the marines”, Paget stated, “they 
are much more expert in gun exercise, they are perfectly fit to be first captains of the 
guns, and they are men of a higher class, and they receive rather more pay.”442 When 
asked about the role of marines on ship, Paget reflected, “Strictly speaking the marines 
are never called upon either to go above the hammock netting or do the duty in a boat.”443 
The marine was not interchangeable with the sailor and was not required to perform or 
learn additional duties. This reality stoked the perception that marines, and especially their 
officers, were not especially at sea.  
The marines could not escape a commonly held view by some in the Admiralty as to their 
utility as a naval reserve force and solution to naval manning problems. In an 1875 lecture 
to the Royal United Services Institute, Captain J.C. Wilson, RN, the Navy’s attention now 
demanded the best employment and welfare for its sailors: “Our seamen, therefore, are 
no longer birds of passage, migrating from the Royal Navy to the Merchant Navy, 
sometimes serving under the English, at others under the American Flag, but a carefully 
picked and expensively reared body of men, a standing force, which must be kept up to a 
certain numerical standard, regulated, not by the immediate requirements of the Navy, but 
by policy of the country.”444 Wilson stated his belief that sailors ought to take the priority 
for berthing on ships in time of peace, marines remaining in barracks to garrison the 
principal naval ports as they had done, with detachments under marine officers prepared 
for embarkation on short notice.445 Wilson, like many others, saw the marines as the 
“expanding medium of our Navy”, useful as a naval reserve to man ships in time of 
national crisis, valued for their “solidity and discipline to the crews.”446 He continued, “In 
peace time, the marines should garrison our principal naval ports, under the command of 
their own general officers; such appears to be their birth right, and would probably be so 
regarded in any other country but England.”447 In the discussion that followed Captain 
Wilson’s lecture, debate continued with some agreement on the continued value as a 
useful reserve of manpower to man the fleet. Some, like Admiral Willes, took the 
opportunity to comment on what was seen as redundancy within the marines: “I do think 
the time has come when we should no longer have marines and marine artillery. I do not 
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see that you want the two corps.”448 The question of an amalgamation was by this point 
being seriously considered by some. 
The greatest point of concern and discussion stemming from Wilson’s lecture was the 
suggestion that marines might be removed from service at sea and time spent on ship 
gaining his “sea legs”. “What is it that constitutes a marine? What converts a soldier into a 
marine?”, were the questions raised in the ensuing discourse.449 They struck at the heart 
of the question of identity, what it was to be a marine. One officer, Commander W. 
Dawson, proposed that: 
But what is it that distinguishes the two portions of the Queen’s sea-service and 
makes Naval Officers so long for the presence of the marine? It is that the marine 
has acquired some quality in the course of training which the blue-jacket does not 
possess. That invaluable quality which we all desiderate, he gets in the intervals of 
service afloat. In the interval of service afloat, whilst he is in reserve, the marine 
receives a course of disciplinary training which revives what he has unlearnt at 
sea.450 
This idea was well established, in that the marines, unlike sailors, had a barracks to go 
back to and a Division where they could return to ground themselves again in marine 
ways. Captain Wilson reckoned that, “keeping as we do a very limited number of ships in 
commission, and seeing how little sea work we are at present able to give our seamen, it 
becomes a matter of the first importance to consider whether, in peace time, marines 
should be embarked in sea going vessels.” 451 While these arguments were made very 
much in the context of solving problems of naval manning and keeping men at sea, these 
statements affirmed an essential component of the marine identity, that service at sea 
made him distinguishable from a soldier in an army regiment.  
Following the findings of the naval manning commission, the government became 
increasingly preoccupied with the findings of the earlier Royal Commission on the 
Defence of the United Kingdom, alarmed over the rapid introduction of steam ships in the 
French navy, and the belief that Britain was vulnerable to invasion by a foreign power. 
Ultimately, this proved a convenient method of promoting the building of cruisers and forts 
to protect the dockyards. The evaluations of any usefulness and possible uses of marines 
by the Navy were of mixed opinions. While the evidence cast the Marines as a “useful 
body”, there was little real discussion of their best employment beyond use as a reserve 
force, or in certain cases for gunnery, or manning of port garrisons. Nor at this stage was 
there any discussion of expanding on their employment service as a naval expeditionary 
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force, which was already occurring in ad hoc fashion. If the marine then was not to learn 
and hold additional duties at sea in running the ships the fleet, a more alarming 
development threatened what remained of the marine role and identity as a soldier at sea 
would be undercut by sailors employed as ad hoc soldiers.  
The Naval Brigades 
Since the Crimean War, a Naval Brigade was a term used to define any detachment of 
seamen, and Royal Marines, drawn from their ships and stations for employment on land 
usually under the orders of an Army Commander.452 Often, large temporary detachments 
of seamen would be formed from crews of ships along with the marine detachments of 
either Royal Marines Light Infantry or Royal Marine Artillery embarked aboard. Seamen 
might also, especially later in the century, be taken from the less technical specialisations, 
such as stokers, and be placed under arms. These ‘brigades’ were formations in name 
only, as their numbers did not match the strengths of actual Army brigades in the field.453 
Rarely did these brigades number a battalion strength.454 The sailors would wear their 
naval uniform, their caps with their respective ribbons denoting the ship or port station 
they served aboard; the Marines were attired as appropriate for their respective service in 
the artillery or light infantry. As this section of the chapter will show, while offering some 
level of continuity from the traditional ‘cutting out’ expeditions for naval landing parties, 
opportunities for real change for the marines as an organised landing force were not 
seized upon.  
If the sailors of the brigades were good seamen, the same could not be said for their role 
as improvised infantrymen. Training was often rudimentary, only basic marksmanship 
having been taught at HMS Excellent and some drilling on the Parade Ground at Whale 
Island.455 As Julian Thompson has noted, one of the unfortunate outcomes of the frequent 
landing of naval brigades in the last half of the nineteenth century, especially against what 
were perceived by many as second class enemies, was a perception in many naval 
officer’s minds “that soldiering was easy and that little training was required.”456 Captains 
of warships were therefore also reluctant to allow their marine detachments to land for 
training in order to practice those infantry skills which they considered beneath the art and 
science of seamanship, and therefore requiring in their view little practice was necessary.  
Ultimately the practice detracted from the readiness and cleanliness of the ship they 
manned.457 This was to have repercussions on the Marines well into the next century.  
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Yet soldiering was also regarded by many Victorian naval officers as a diversion, and for 
lack of any opportunities for fleet action in the sixty years between the Crimean War and 
the First World War, the only active service was on shore through naval brigade actions. 
Fighting ashore was a chance for distinction, as well as gain decorations and a chance at 
promotion. Ample opportunities were provided in Crimea, China, India, and Africa 
throughout the century. Sailors, armed with rifles and bayonets, might even bring ashore 
Gatling guns, 12pdr guns, and 4.7 inch naval guns taken from their ships fitted with 
ingenious improvised mountings which could outgun most field pieces. Yet the temptation 
was there for the sailors, naval officers especially, to act in the part of infantrymen. As will 
be shown, this practice would prove highly dangerous and often fatal to many naval 
officers, and their unfortunate sailors. The debate on marine employment would continue 
in the coming years towards the close of the century. Missing was any focus on what, if 
any, peculiar qualities and talents were unique to the Royal Marines and what role might 
develop that suited these traits.   
‘Small Wars’ and the naval brigades 
The use of naval brigades was highly useful however for the emerging concept for the 
Royal Navy in the types of conflicts which increasingly characterised the nineteenth 
century: those of the so-called ‘limited wars’ or ‘small wars’. The period of the so called 
Pax Britannica, marked by naval dominance of the Royal Navy and the flexibility of naval 
power, was not an era of peace but one punctuated by a multitude of conflicts which take 
on the names for the regions and indigenous peoples the British fought against. In time, 
these conflicts were also defined in certain cases as, ‘limited wars’ or ‘small wars’. The 
term saw increasing popularity and usage by several authors, including the naval 
strategist and historian Julian Corbett.458 Further popularisation of the term in British 
military circles was also due in large part to the writings of Charles E. Callwell, an army 
officer who had gained much experience in many of the campaigns and expeditions of the 
late nineteenth century. Callwell defined small wars of the British empire as follows in his 
book of the same name:  
Small war is a term which has come largely into use largely into use of late years, 
and which is somewhat difficult to define. Practically it may be said to include all 
campaigns other than those where opposing sides consist of regular troops. It 
comprises the expeditions against savages and semi-civilised races by disciplined 
soldiers, campaigns undertaken to suppress rebellious and guerrilla warfare in all 
parts of the world where organized armies are struggling against opponents who will 
 





not meet them in the open field. It thus obviously covers operations very varying in 
their scope and in their conditions.459  
Callwell’s essay, “Lessons to be learned from the campaigns in which British Forces have 
been employed since the year 1865”, on the study of British military campaigns won him a 
prize by the Royal United Services Institute.460 Able to range the seas and despatch its 
own marines and sailors ashore, the Royal Navy had the best option to influence 
operations in littoral regions.  
These sorts of conflicts were ideally suited to the Royal Navy. For example, naval brigade 
debarkations of marines from HMS Shannon and HMS Pearl formed into a provisional 
battalion to assist in the suppression of the Indian Mutiny. The same provisional battalion 
was utilised in China to seize forts, garrison outposts, and protect British citizens in what 
was known as the Second China War or Second Opium War.461 In military campaigns, this 
model for employment of marines from ships in the fleet in ad hoc battalions or brigades, 
often only nominally and varied in size and strength, proved a reliable and flexible option 
for the navy to support the larger army divisions on shore.462 This same model was also 
utilised in the same latter half of the century in Africa, such as the Ashanti War of 1873 
and the Anglo-Egypt War of 1882. In both cases, marines were among the first to land 
ashore and formed part of the naval brigades which assisted in the build-up of troops; they 
would also take part in many of the key battles of these campaigns. The Mediterranean 
Fleet under Admiral Seymour bombarded the port of Alexandria into submission and 
utilised marines to occupy and hold the port. The same occurred at Port Said which was 
the gateway to the Suez Canal. The army was then able to rapidly land and build up his 
forces and march on Cairo. The marines were in every engagement along the way, 
including at Tel El Kebir, Kassassin, and the important seizure of Ismaila which was used 
to capture Cairo when the advance from Alexandria stalled.463 The methods employed by 
the naval brigade were described in the memoirs of Admiral Sir Percy Scott who as a 
young officer led marines and sailors on the Congo River in 1874 on a punitive mission 
against pirates to recover a trading schooner, the Geraldine: 
The method of procedure was simple. On nearing a village the boats carrying the 
guns shelled the place all round as a preliminary to the landing of the marines, who 
formed a cordon and fired into the bush, while the remainder of the brigade 
disembarked. An advance was then made, firing the whole time. The villages were 
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generally found deserted and a search usually revealed some relic of the Geraldine. 
Such operations ended with the destruction of the village and canoes by fire.464   
Scott clearly valued his marines in such expeditions, and cited their value and stoic nature 
in his writings and memoirs, as shown in this anecdote of the same Congo expedition: 
Our broadside fire was twenty-five marines on each side, under the most able officer 
that I have ever met in H.M. Navy, Lieutenant Adolphus Crosbie, R.M.L.I. We were 
always the leading boat in attacking and the last boat on leaving. The marines were 
magnificent. At the boom of a volley from the natives in the bush, which might have 
meant death to them (as they were showing well above the armour-plating), we 
always ducked. The marines, on the other hand, did not move a muscle, but came 
to the present at Crosbie's order as if they were doing position drill.465 
Crosbie was no stranger to such expeditions having gained experience in 1869 at 
Swatow, China in a punitive operation against Chinese pirates employing similar tactics.466 
Scott clearly related what he felt was an essential function for the marines working with 
the navy, and his approval was of value as he would later command the Royal Navy 
gunnery school at HMS Excellent in Portsmouth. Reflecting on his formative experiences 
in Africa, Scott described the action and method of bombardment he employed as akin to 
that of an artillery barrage that came to be commonplace in France in 1917.467 These 
experiences had their roots in the Boer War. The navy had supported the rapid 
deployment of troops to South Africa at the start of the Boer War and by using his 
experience from the gunnery school, Scott recommended the implementation of naval 
guns ashore to make a tangible, but also highly visible contribution by the navy to the war: 
With regard to the South African War, even before it commenced I realised that it 
was purely a soldiers' war. The Boers had no navy to fight, no seaports for us to 
secure, no commerce for us to attack, and the theatre of fighting was too far inland 
for a naval brigade to go. The small number of infantry that we could land would be 
inappreciable, and the only field service guns that we had to land were of the same 
pattern as the Royal Artillery. It, therefore, appeared obvious that it was a war in 
which the Navy could take but a small part. A lucky chance, however, arose. The 
Boers had got long-range mobile guns, and our Army had not. This ill-wind blew 
good to us.468 
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The success of the naval brigade enabled Scott to assert with confidence, “it was their 
homecoming, with its public parades, in which they hauled their guns, and dinners in 
Portsmouth, Windsor, and London, which took a grip in the public’s imagination.”469 The 
significance of this type of employment was the speed by which the navy could respond to 
crises in the region, and the expediency of detaching marines for shore duties in a wide 
range of roles. In this capacity, marines found themselves with the navy or attached to the 
army. Seldom, if ever, did they operate independently but always under command of 
naval or army officers. Furthermore, working with the Royal Navy as part of the ad-hoc 
naval brigades, but as will be shown in this next section, caused their own problems for 
the marines in what was perceived as appropriation of the tasks to which, based on their 
training, most suited the marines. For the marines, however, service with the naval 
brigades only served to highlight the problem of an ill-defined mission and further 
ingrained the idea of redundancy and increased marginalisation. One particular battle 
illustrated this point in ways previous ones could not.  
The battle at Graspan 
Marine General and historian H.E. Blumberg would describe the battle at Graspan as, 
“one of the brightest episodes in the long history of the Corps.”470 But the legacy is in fact 
more complex and reveals a fundamental concern as to the role and function of the 
marines, and in particular how they would operate in concert within the Royal Navy. The 
marines were employed according to established practice: as members of a naval brigade 
under naval officers. The outcome of this battle, however, and the subsequent enquiries 
would illuminate that while the marines were still valued and respected for their military 
prowess, in other respects they were still not utilised to the best extent of their abilities by 
the Admiralty or the War Office.  
The battle of Graspan, also known as Enslin471, featured in the campaign to relieve a 
disastrous situation where the Boer forces had besieged the town of Kimberley early at 
the outbreak of the war. Besides the public embarrassment of having a town under siege, 
the British authorities feared that a Boer capture of the town would considerably increase 
the financial resources available to the Boer republics through access to Kimberley’s 
diamond mines. A task force of 8,000 men organised into three brigades under Lieutenant 
General Lord Methuen landed at Cape Town on 10th November 1899 to force a way north 
from Cape Town to raise the Boer siege of Kimberley. Sailors and marines formed a naval 
brigade dispatched from HMS Doris and HMS Powerful, and were attached to Methuen’s 
forces, which included among other regiments, the Grenadier Guards and those of the 9th 
Brigade. Nominally a brigade, the Naval Brigade under Methuen was essentially a weak 
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109 
 
half-battalion comprised around 365 Royal Navy sailors and officers and Royal Marines 
Light Infantry from the ships company. It was the four 12-pound guns mounted on 
improvised gun carriages from HMS Powerful which the Naval Brigade brought with them 
that would be used to great effect to counter the Boer artillery in the battles to come and in 
the relief of the town.472   
Early actions on the march up revealed the challenges ahead. The terrain was largely 
open veldt, open ground dominated at intervals by jagged kopjes.473 Their adversaries in 
the Boers, were a highly mobile force on their horses and deadly marksmen, who chose 
their ground based on their knowledge of the terrain, and despite being outnumbered, 
used tactics they knew would best blunt any British advantage. Methuen’s division 
marched out from Cape Town, following the railway line north towards Kimberley. At a 
place called Belmont on 22nd November, Methuen found a force of 2,000 Boers waiting for 
him. Determined he could not bypass them, Methuen decided he had to clear the enemy 
from his vital line of communication: the railway. Of the Boer position at Belmont, Arthur 
Conan Doyle would write in his history of the Boer War:  
The force of the Boers was much inferior to our own, some two or three thousand in 
all, but the natural strength of their position made it a difficult one to carry, while it 
could not be left behind us as a menace to our line of communications. A double row 
of steep hills lay across the road to Kimberley, and it is was along the ridges, 
snuggling closely among the boulders, that our enemy was waiting for us. In their 
weeks of preparation they had constructed elaborate shelter pits in which they could 
lie in comparative safety while they swept all the level ground with rifle fire.474  
This description would characterise the sort of terrain the British encountered and the 
tactics employed by the Boers during Methuen’s campaign and many more to come. At 
Belmont, Methuen devised to use the Guards and the 9th Brigade in a direct frontal assault 
on the Boer positions at dawn; the Naval Brigade would be held in reserve. Two cavalry 
squadrons were meant to also move north up the Kimberley road, and essentially around 
to the rear of the Boer position to cut off any escape. As the British infantry advanced, the 
Boers opened a heavy fire on them. The two leading Guards battalions went to ground 
and fired ineffective volleys at the Boer positions, while the rest of the 9th Brigade 
continued their advance. British artillery batteries came up and went into action, 
suppressing the Boer positions to enable the Guards to continue their advance and storm 
the Boer positions. The Boers did not wait for the final bayonet attack but hurried away 
down the far hillside to where their ponies were tethered and rode back to join their 
 
472 The Royal Navy field gun competition, which still survives in some form today, derived from the transportation of the 
naval guns by the Naval Brigade of Powerful and Doris for the relief of Ladysmith.  
473 Afrikaans word with a Dutch origin, meaning a small hill in a generally flat area. The Dutch word ‘kop’ signified head, and 
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compatriots on the next line of kopjes to their rear. By the time the British infantry reached 
the top of the hills the Boers were gone. The inadequate numbers of British cavalry 
precluded any effective pursuit, as the Boers jumped on their ponies and raced away 
bringing the battle to an end. British casualties were 75 officers and soldiers killed and 223 
wounded. Officer casualties were reported as severe, “although care had been taken to 
remove all distinctive marks from their uniforms.”475 Boer casualties were reportedly 81 
killed, with more wounded and some captured.476 
A nearly identical battle unfolded two later at Graspan, only this time it saw the 
participation of the Naval Brigade attack as infantry a Boer force estimated at 2,500 with 
six guns.477 Again the Boers were positioned overlooking the railway on a long ridge of low 
hills rising gradually from the veldt, beyond which was a further hill, the top being a 
precipitous ridge. At dawn on the 25th, the British artillery and two naval guns manned by 
the sailors and marines began a bombardment of the Boer positions. The infantry 
advanced in a frontal attack, according to Methuen’s plan, this time with the Guards in 
reserve and the 9th Brigade leading the assault on the left flank and the much smaller 
Naval Brigade on the British right flank. Advancing in open order across open ground 
towards the elevated Boer positions, exposed to accurate fire, casualties were predictably 
high. Early lessons of the war had taught many of the army officers to remain as 
unobtrusive as possible. When the Boers opened fire, Captain Prothero RN of HMS Doris 
remained standing while his men went to ground; he was soon shot and severely 
wounded. Commander Ethelston of HMS Powerful was similarly hit, but fatally. For the 
Marines, their senior officer, Major Plumbe, was shot and killed in the closing attack up the 
kopje, as was another Marine Officer, Captain Senior.478 Total British losses were twenty 
officers and men killed and 165 wounded. The Naval Brigade suffered 101 casualties from 
their 365 men in the field, nearly a third of their force, including nearly all their officers 
killed or wounded. Boer losses were estimated at over 200 dead and wounded.479   
The resulting victory at Graspan, as well as the astonishing casualty rate, also prompted 
an immediate message from the Queen: “The Queen desires you will convey to the Naval 
Brigade who were present at the action at Graspan her Majesty’s congratulations on their 
gallant conduct, at the same time express the Queen’s regret at the losses sustained by 
the Brigade.”480 Press accounts, which covered the movements and happenings of the 
war closely and to the best detail possible, reported the actions of the Naval Brigade 
generally in a positive light citing their valour. The Hampshire Advertiser reported: 
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It is difficult to single out any one detachment of our men for especial gallantry 
where all have done so well, but assuredly the Naval Brigade comes in the very first 
rank. All reports testify to the splendid service they have rendered, which has more 
than once turned the tide of fortune. The graphic accounts of the fighting at [Enslin], 
which now reach us, show that their courage was put to the severest test.481 
The Times however sceptically noted that “we may well doubt whether it is desirable that 
the personnel of the Navy should be drained away in military operations hundreds of miles 
from the sea”.482 Arthur Conan Doyle later noted the high costs of the actions at both 
Belmont and Graspan: 
The battle of [Enslin] had cost us some two hundred of killed and wounded, and 
beyond the mere fact that we had cleared our way by another stage towards 
Kimberley it is difficult to say what advantage we had from it. We won the kopjes, 
but we lost our men. The Boer killed and wounded were probably less than half of 
our own, and the exhaustion and the weakness of our cavalry forbade us to pursue 
and prevented us from capturing their guns. In three days the men had fought two 
exhausting actions in a waterless country.483 
Methuen had won two minor victories against the Boers, but losing ten percent of his 
original force before even reaching his ultimate objective at Kimberley sickened him.484 
For the Naval Brigade, the staggering losses confined them to duties around employment 
of their guns; they would not participate in further assaults.485 Replacements of sailors and 
marines would not arrive until December. For the Marines, the fallout over this particular 
episode would become a flashpoint for debate over the employment of naval brigades, 
and to an extent the role they served in them.  
Sailors as soldiers 
In Parliament, as news of these events broke, questions arose which could not be 
obfuscated in the reports of heroic deeds, or in mourning of those lost in the field.  Small 
victories were being achieved at great prices with limited immediate results, and the 
methods and tactics welcomed a pause for thought. Reports as to what had taken place at 
Graspan were scarce, only the papers had the details as the official despatches had not 
been released to the House floor. This delay offered an opportunity for some to comment, 
such as the MP for Lancashire, Sir James Duckworth, on what they saw as the 
mishandling of the affair and misuse of the Marines as a prized asset: 
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I do not think the marines have had the encouragement to which they are entitled, or 
that the public really understand what they have to do and are capable of doing. 
They are men prepared to light on land or sea. In South Africa they seem to be 
absorbed in the Naval Brigade, and the reports state that the Naval Brigade have 
done this, that, and the other thing, while little is said or known about the marines. 
This is a long-standing complaint: in fact, I used to hear of it as a youth.486 I have a 
letter from a young fellow at the front in South Africa, who has taken part in four 
engagements with the marines. He writes after the battle of Graspan that— “The 
marines here have been disappointed at the reports of the battle in some of the 
papers. There was nothing but that the bluejackets had been doing this, that, and 
the other thing, and that the bluejackets had charged up the hill. There was not even 
a mention that the marines were there. As a matter of fact, there were only fifty 
bluejackets compared with 220 marines in the firing line.”487 
Absence of any mention of the marines in the papers was an exaggeration, but the 
perception of the marines’ exploits being subsumed within those of the other services was 
already a time-honoured grievance. Official despatches related to the performance of the 
Naval Brigade with Methuen, relayed by Admiral Harris the Commander-in-Chief of the 
Cape of Good Hope Station who had dispatched the naval brigade, were not immediately 
made available in Parliament for further scrutiny beyond the First Lord of the Admiralty, 
George Goschen. Several attempts to bring the matters to the floor faced obstruction.488 
Matters for debate in Parliament was the “the proceedings of naval brigades when acting 
ashore under the orders and as part of the force of a military general.”489 John Colomb 
attacked the Admiralty for sending combat replacements of sailors, instead of marines, 
into the field:   
I particularly raise this question in order to obtain a clear and explicit statement of 
the policy of the Admiralty with regard to these landing parties from ships. There is 
nothing in the regulations as to what are to be the arrangements of the Admiral if he 
has to land a force. The Admiral uses his discretion. This marine force has been 
trained for a special purpose, and my contention is that when war breaks out that 
force should be applied to that special purpose. I am fully and firmly convinced that 
the gallant Admiral at the Cape490 was perfectly right in rendering every assistance 
he could to the Army. But my point is, was that assistance given in such a manner 
as to least and not most impair the efficiency of Her Majesty's ships? Clearly, the 
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forces that can best be spared from the ships are the marine officers and men; and 
equally clearly, the forces which can least be spared are the naval officers and 
seamen. I ask the First Lord specifically why there are no regulations laid down on 
this point; if there are such regulations, did the Admiral follow them? Is it not the 
case that officers and men of the marine force have been kept on board while naval 
officers and seamen have been landed?491 
When Captain Prothero was severely wounded, Commander Ethelston killed and the 
other marine officers killed or wounded, marine Captain Alfred Marchant suddenly found 
himself in command of the Naval Brigade. His command was short lived, as three days 
later, “he was superseded in the command of the brigade by another naval officer knowing 
nothing about land warfare or tactics,”492 as Colomb reminded Parliament.  Colomb sought 
to underscore the fallacy of what he saw as unqualified naval officers leading sailors as 
infantrymen: 
There was a naval officer493 in command of the whole, so-called, naval brigade, a 
gallant gentleman, as bold as a lion and as fearless as they make them, but wholly 
and entirely ignorant of land warfare. Under him was a major of marine infantry, who 
had passed his examination at Aldershot or elsewhere for his lieutenant-colonelcy, 
and knowing how to command three arms of the service.494 The young marine 
artillery officer and his gunners, with all their artillery training, were used, in 
accordance with Admiralty custom, as infantry, and the officer and most of his 
gunners were shot storming the position as infantry.495 
Colomb denounced the handling of the battle at Graspan and decried the staggering 
losses of men, with the navy having lost senior officers as well as the Royal Marines, and 
in particular, the poor leadership of the naval officers “ignorant of land warfare”496: 
[You] have this naval officer with no military, and very scanty naval, training, landed 
on shore, to the great detriment of his ship, and sent to the front as the superior of 
officers trained for military work, while the officers trained for military work are really 
left out of the chance of command altogether. This is a matter concerning the lives 
of men and the efficiency of ships and of the whole service, and I extremely regret 
that, knowing what I do, I am forced into the unpleasant position of having 
continually to bring the misapplication of this force forward until there are proper 
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regulations made in the interest of the public service, and not in favour of any 
particular class of officers.497 
Graspan is also useful to reveal the real tensions that were commonplace between the 
army and the navy. Traditionally, despatches post-battle were published in the London 
Gazette by the Commanding Officer in the field. The events in Africa were complicated by 
the fact that Methuen and the naval brigade had different higher reporting chains in the 
War Office and Admiralty respectively. Methuen’s despatches on the events at Belmont 
and Graspan were published shortly afterwards in January, but the naval despatches 
submitted by the Cape Town station for the same events were not published until late 
March, and initially suppressed while the War Office and the Admiralty worked to avoid 
the publication of differing versions of the same event.498 Goschen would claim “the ‘naval 
despatches’ papers had been mislaid somewhere.”499 In fact, from the time the events 
were being reported by Methuen through his chain of command, and the naval brigade 
through Admiralty, the Admiralty’s report was immediately withheld with objections from 
the War Office. The propriety of publishing potentially differing reports was immediately 
highlighted, as was the appropriated relationship between naval forces operating with or 
as part of army forces. The compromise arrived at was for, “In cases where a Naval 
Brigade is part of a military force, the Naval officer in command will report in duplicate to 
the General Officer Commanding & to the Naval Commander-in-Chief.”  This allowed for 
reviewer in the War Office the opportunity for “suggesting any alterations or omissions 
which may occur to him”, and “if necessary, revise the report to whatever extent may 
seem necessary and forward it to the Admiralty by whom it will be published after 
consultation with the War Office should there be any difference of opinion as to the 
publication of any part of it.”500 Much later, a Royal Commission would examine the 
conduct of the war in greater detail. As the participation of the marines was 
overwhelmingly slight in the war, a commentary on the suitability and readiness of 
marines “to take part small expeditions in different parts of the world near the sea coast”, 
by Admiral Sir Robert Harris, the man who had dispatched the naval brigade with great 
speed to Cape Town to assist Lord Methuen in the relief of Kimberley, citing “they could 
easily be landed from the ships” as “they are always available.”501 
Finally, Graspan highlights again how the common Corps grievance of inadequate 
recognition of their deeds continued at the start of the new century. Graspan was denied 
as a medal clasp to the South Africa Medal, the campaign medal minted to record the 
 
497 HC Deb 01 March 1900 vol 79 cc1467. 
498 Lord Methuen’s despatches were published in the London Gazette, Friday 26 January 1900, no. 27157; the Naval 
despatches were delayed in publication and did not appear until 30th March 1900, in the London Gazette, Friday, March 30, 
1900, no. 27178.  
499 WO 32/7945, Goschen to Lansdowne, 5 June 1900. 
500 WO 32/7945, “Boer War: Question of publication of dispatches of officers commanding Naval Brigades at battles of 
Colenso and Graspan: memorandum by Major General Sir Coleridge Grove; reports of actions.” 
501 RC 1908, 386.  
115 
 
military deeds of the war. Initial enthusiasm, as early as 1899, around the creation of a 
South Africa Medal and its corresponding clasps was reigned in by Lord Roberts who 
sought a stricter qualification process for the inclusion of battle clasps for British victories.  
As the war progressed, each battle event was reviewed and evaluated on its own merits 
for its impact and contribution. Despite Graspan being considered a victory in Methuen’s 
campaign, and its similarities in many respects to the battle of Belmont, Belmont was 
given a clasp while Graspan would not.502  In Parliament, the Secretary of State for War 
reported to the enquiring Member of Parliament for Portsmouth that: 
I am afraid that it will not be possible to issue a clasp for Graspan. It has been 
decided to limit the grant of clasps to the chief actions of the war. If a clasp were 
granted for Graspan, it would be necessary to issue others for several actions of 
similar importance.503 
The margins of the South African Medal decision book at the National Archives, records 
on 2 January 1902, “Clasp for Graspan: - Admiralty proposal negative by the King”, 
signifying by the time of this issue being presented again in Parliament the clasp had 
already been denied in keeping with Lord Robert’s original decision.504 Thus, the Marines 
lost the distinction of a clasp for the South Africa Medal for the principal action of the war 
they might claim for themselves. Reflecting on the role of the Corps in Africa, the Corps 
historian Cyril Field stated:  
…although the Corps was so poorly represented in point of numbers in what turned 
out to be the biggest war in which we had engaged for many decades, yet its few 
representatives upheld its reputation to the very utmost, especially at Graspan, and 
no record of the services of the Corps would be complete which did not give some 
account of their work in this momentous campaign.505 
Despite this, the legacy was more complicated. On the one hand, the Corps could be 
rightfully proud of how they had carried the day and conducted themselves.  At the same 
time, their deeds were overshadowed by their role working with and as part of the navy, 
whose own leadership and conduct caused severe doubt as to what they were doing there 
charging with rifles, and not manning their guns as had been their purpose.  In the port 
towns inhabited by the Marines, the citizenry were happy at least to put on display the 
monuments which honoured the Corps’ achievements which in part reflected the links of 
their community to celebrated martial deeds. The event was commemorated with the 
Graspan Memorial in London along with the events in China at the Peking Legation the 
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following year, although the significance of Graspan as an important battle for the Corps 
was further obscured in short time by those of the First World War.   
Conclusion 
For the Marines, the new century began with no real changes to their existing purpose 
and no emerging prospects for better use or employment. According to some observers, 
despite the transition to steam, naval culture had changed little. On first going to sea in 
1903, then Marine Lieutenant Frederick Jerram observed, “my introduction to the sea, 
although to a nearly new cruiser506 was far more Nelsonic than modern.”507 To Jerram, 
sailors at the threshold of the modern era could still evoke the bygone image of ‘jack tar’: 
An A.B. still was an A.B. More often than not bearded and they looked and were real 
sailormen. A few mornings after I joined I watched the [Bos’un’s] party put a long 
splice in a 6 ½ inch wire. Sail or pulling was the way you got ashore, and in the 
Channel Fleet only one steamboat was allowed.508 
Jerram further summarised his impressions of the state of the navy at the turn of the new 
century as follows: 
The Navy in general was a survivor of sail. Every officer and man was sail trained. 
No seaman ever dreamed of wearing boots on board, and [seaboots], leather, were 
the [perquisate] of officers and warrant officers. Most small Cruisers carried at least 
fore and aft sail; there were half dozen men o’ war Brigs at Plymouth and more at 
Portland and it was a fine sight to see them, make sail and put to sea. Yards were 
still fitted with jackstays for sails, and even the lower booms gave notice of their 
origin in the eye for the lower [stun’s’l] tack block. There was no electric lights in 
harbours, the mess decks and flats being lit by brass candle lamps, and the food 
was pure old Navy. The men were on salt pork, beef and biscuit immediately on 
going to sea, and the wardroom after three days. No jam or fancy food and [tabacco] 
purely leaf. It is not an idle yarn that many of the older A.B.’s509 fell in and 
complained when jam was later issued. They thought the Navy was going soft.510 
The navy of course had changed. Steam was the prevailing mode of propulsion and naval 
gunnery had improved in both lethality and range, preventing the likelihood of close fleet 
actions once the norm. Regardless of any actual or perceived lack of soldiering skills, 
sailors and naval officers justified to themselves their utility on land as well in the naval 
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brigades. The domain of the marines on ship increasingly eroded and marginalised, all 
these proved threatening to the future of the Royal Marines.  
While the commissions may have claimed the Marines as useful, there was an increased 
recognition that better uses for them might be found. While some were prepared to 
advocate their complete dissolution, those who advocated their retention could offer few 
compelling or innovative solutions. The Royal Commissions on naval manning and 
defence, discussions and debates as to the role of marines within the navy did little to 
advance or improve the status of the marines.  By the end of the nineteenth century, 
despite the continued service of the marines in many of the far-flung corners of the globe 
and empire, most of their functions at sea had ceased to exist.  
A lack of understanding of the Marines by some, or indeed imagination on what they might 
do based on the previous accomplishments and needs of the nation under arms was also 
evident. While the Admiralty might have been the more culpable in this, the marines 
themselves at this point were unable to adequately influence or articulate viable changes 
for their own better employment. Reorganisation was perhaps one answer, but by the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century and the opening years of the twentieth century, the 
Marines were still organised in their dockyard Divisions with detachments assigned to 
serve at sea. Despite a presumed heritage of operating in the seaborne environment, the 
Royal Marines were not the experts on amphibious operations and could not deliver that 
capability. The Marines lacked the command structure and organization of their forces to 
suit the task, as well as special equipment, the training, or doctrine to consult.511 Save for 
past experiences of mobilising ad hoc battalions in times of need, no standing force within 
the Corps’ structure was prepared to assume such an expeditionary role. The experience 
of naval brigades, as shown here, served to only heighten these tensions as the marines 
who saw themselves as the trained professional soldiers deferring to naval officers in an 
amateur capacity on land. The debates as to the future of the marines in the last quarter 
of the nineteenth century failed to conclusively advance a role for the Royal Marines. The 
fact that debates about their role and future were taking place should have been a cause 
for considerable alarm to them. While Marines could reflect on the long and faithful service 
of their Corps, no clear consensus could be reached on what marines ought to do or what 
they might do. As shown, even on the battlefield as at Graspan, the army and the navy 
continued to debate and lobby for funding for their respective services and prized status of 
the most useful service to the nation; the marines never occupied such a role or status.  
What solutions then were being proposed and were any viable ones proposed from the 
ranks of the marines themselves? If so, why did these not come to fruition? One reason 
shown here was the absence of any influential voice in government or the Admiralty that 
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could best articulate a better usage in the national interest. While royal patrons helped 
avoid complete disbandment, other would be champions like Lindsay or Colomb lacked 
the necessary influence to force real changes. In the next chapter some of these other 





























Chapter 5. “Shall we Retain the Marines?” 
Amidst the vast changes in war and warfare that have taken place during the last 
quarter of a century, the question has often arisen whether the Royal Marines shall 
be retained as a part of the armed forces of England. Are they an antiquated and 
useless force? Must they disappear with Brown Bess, smooth-bores, and three-
deckers? This threat of disestablishment, ever impending, can have but a bad effect, 
not only on the Royal Marines themselves, but also on the Royal Navy, of which 
they are at present an important branch. It is surely time now that some decision 
should be arrived at: first, whether they should continue to exist; next if they are to 
exist, whether their services are now employed to the best advantage. – General Sir 
G.A. Schomberg, Royal Marines Artillery, 1883512 
In the twenty-five years from 1889 and the outbreak of the First World War, naval history 
developed as both a serious scholarly and popular study offering opportunity for modern 
scientific study to offer critical insights.513 Those uncovering the principles for naval 
warfare included Alfred Thayer Mahan, and the Colomb brothers.514 These and others 
pondered the options for Britain’s use of sea power, citing its renewed interest. The 
overstretched capacity of the British army to quell mutinies and disturbances in colonial 
territories or defend British trade or political interests saw the increased use of the navy’s 
flexible option: the naval brigades. Opinions were soon divided as to how warfare was 
evolving, which included navalists focused on fleets and decisive battles at sea. For the 
Royal Navy, the uncomfortable truth was that despite plans or desires for ‘Mahanian’ 
struggles on the high seas, action with the enemy for its sailors was more likely to be 
found fighting on land side-by-side with the marines, and on occasion with the Army, in 
the littoral regions and coastal waters, rivers, and further inland. The war in South Africa, 
predominantly a land war, had brought the Royal Navy and the Royal Marines only limited 
recognition for their role in bringing up naval guns to relieve besieged towns. In contrast, 
their home communities celebrated them as heroes worthy of commemoration.515 The 
collective experiences of the naval brigades did, however, highlight another example of 
how a naval expeditionary force might quickly be inserted for land operations. 
Coordinating these with efforts on land were more problematic with changes underway in 
the navy, and by the 1880s a renewed British interest in naval affairs. During this period, 
however, the Royal Navy begrudgingly or from lack of imagination, did not give up on the 
idea that the marines were a part of the fabric of ships at sea – marines manned guns, 
and could go ashore when needed. The question posed by many, was whether it was 
either time to dissolve the Marines once and for all or instead find them a new role. 
 
512 G.A. Schomberg, RMA, “Shall We Retain the Marines?”, The Nineteenth Century: a monthly review, May 1883, in March 
1877 – December 1900, 13, no. 75, 795. 
513 Harding, Modern Naval History, 5.  
514 As previously noted, the works of Alfred Thayer Mahan had a profound impact on how naval strategists and navies 
understood the implementation of naval power using large fleets. See, A.T. Mahan, The Influence of Seapower upon 
History, 1660-1763; and A.T. Mahan, Sea Power in its relation to the War of 1812, Vols. I, II. 
515 Brad Beaven, Visions of Empire, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2012) 70-90.    
120 
 
So far, this thesis has argued that the period of 1827 to 1927 was among the most difficult 
for the Corps. This chapter examines how the Royal Marines and others envisioned a new 
role. Tracing progress through the last half of the nineteenth century up to the First World 
War, this chapter will reveal how some innovative thoughts came into conflict with the 
realities of Admiralty administration. This chapter argues that the Royal Marines failed to 
seize an opportunity to innovate. Constrained in part by the navalist thinking in the Royal 
Navy which favoured fleets and ships, opportunities to better define the link between 
operations at sea with operations ashore were overlooked. As shown in the previous 
chapter, the experience of the naval brigades might have informed new opportunities for 
the Marines to seize upon a role within the navy to deliver such an operational capability 
and mission. While today, the Royal Marines are regarded as experts in amphibious 
warfare, it will be shown here that when asked the Marines were not well organised to 
deliver such a capability for the nation.516 During this period, its status was no longer 
assured, and it was forced to conduct serious contemplation of what its purpose and 
future existence might be when more traditional purposes ceased to exist. Britt Zerbe has 
examined both the operational doctrine and identity of the Royal Marines in its earliest 
years, arguing that “the creation of an operational doctrine and identity”, was key to the 
success of the marines in this period.517 Specifically, Zerbe’s argument establishes this 
period between the Corps’ inception up to 1802:   
[the Marines] developed the purpose and training regime to solidify their very 
existence. This operational doctrine was never to be placed in one document nor 
done by a single person. Instead the doctrine was an amalgamation of ideas, 
published materials, training strategies and combat experiences throughout this 
period. The system shows over this period in a growing development of an 
overarching doctrine for action on land and at sea. Marines possessed an incredible 
amount of operational flexibility for the eighteenth-century military institution. In 
battles or campaigns marines could be formed into special battalions for key land 
operations or the units on various naval ships could be used in a variety of mixed 
sized force operations. They were used as a mobile reserve force that could attack 
strategic areas or work as a tactical diversion before the main strike on another 
area. Ultimately, this flexibility and multi-dimensional aspects of their operational 
doctrine enhanced the Marines’ own sense of their amphibious military identity.518   
What constitutes doctrine? Arguably, a history of common practice, a catalogue of 
previous experiences, contemporary reflection and published writings on the subject of 
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amphibious warfare constituted a body of work available for reference in the planning and 
execution of these operational tasks. Zerbe argues the early amphibious doctrine was, 
essentially, not codified but instead assimilated in best practices.519 The Marines had 
indeed served historically with the navy ashore in ‘cutting out’ operations and later with the 
naval brigades, however, this role would come to define their operational function as will 
be shown. As will be explained, despite their training as soldiers and knowledge of both 
land and seaborne operations, they were not properly organised or equipped for these 
missions. The ideas, strategies and experiences detailed by Zerbe were in conflict with 
the later experience of the naval brigades who once ashore, were not able to operate as 
an independent landing force and were always to be found under the direct command of 
either navy or army officers. While the Marines had the latitude to define aspects of their 
own unique culture and identity, the more important matters of operational role and 
mission remained in the hands of the Admiralty. Later as some officers in their ranks 
sought to influence and innovate the creation of a more active role for the Marines, 
adoption of these proposed changes confronted fiscal realities and navalist doctrine 
focused instead on fleets and ships. This chapter will show that for much of the nineteenth 
and early twentieth century, the Royal Marines struggled to guide or influence the 
development of Britain’s amphibious doctrine; the role they would actively play in this 
mission remained very much in doubt.  
Early examples of British amphibious operations were not left unstudied in this period. 
Joint operations, understood simply in this period as the army and navy working together 
towards a common aim, was not unknown or unstudied. Achieving it was a different 
matter. These problems concerned what was understood even then as amphibious 
operations. Richard Harding has argued that, unlike the amphibious operations which 
dominated the twentieth century, the act of landing forces ashore was less significant to 
the success of overall operations in the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries. Reasons for 
this include the fact that Britain seldom faced a significant naval threat, enjoyed the 
benefits of ports and supplies from its colonies and in certain cases, such as in India and 
America, could rely on locally raised forces.520  
Richard Harding has also refocused our attention to the significance of amphibious 
operations in relation to seapower and the projection of power from the sea. For Britain, 
Harding has cited how our understanding of the role and importance of amphibious 
operations in British history has been obscured in part by the navalist debates of the 
1890s and continental strategy of 1914-1918.521 Harding has argued that British warfare in 
the Baltic, Levant, American colonies and India was by necessity essentially amphibious 
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not blue water – as there were few key set battles at sea. The battlefleet could not 
account for the success of the expeditionary force once landed, but without the support 
and covering warships commanders would not attempt landings on the enemy 
homelands.522 John Beeler has argued in particular how the mid-nineteenth century 
invasion scares which had repeatedly led to irresponsible spending on fortifications, as 
well as the fleet and the army.523 Beeler critiques, with few exceptions, those historians of 
the late-nineteenth century British navy who have uncritically accepted the theories of the 
“blue water school” of naval power perpetuated by Mahan, but also British advocates such 
as the previously cited Philip Colomb, John Fisher, and Alexander Milne.524 These 
influential persons were among those who advocated a British navy in excess of the “two-
power standard” governing the size of the fleet at home and abroad, further stretching the 
British economy and further frustrating politicians.525 Consequently, the navalist outlook 
beyond shipbuilding at this time left little room for the introduction or innovation within the 
navy for consideration of other stratagems, such as operations in the littoral and closer 
cooperation between the army and the navy; a precursor to combined operations.  
“Shall we retain the Marines?” 
In 1879 the journal of Charles Dickens Jr., All Year Round, gave a detailed history of the 
Corps with a flattering portrayal.526 The article recounted the Corps’ notable service, but 
also alluded to its status of relative inferiority to the other services and even its being 
“raised with the object of forming a nursery to man the fleet”, which was will be shown in 
the next part of this thesis, while an unhelpful characterisation it was nevertheless 
accurate to the navy’s use of the marines at this time.527 The article likewise highlighted 
the abuse by the navy of sinecure roles within the Marines held by navy officers, their 
inferior status when serving with the army on land.528 While commenting on the “more 
permanent appearance” of the Marines in their seaport establishments,529 the article 
commented on the developing arguments and theories surrounding their apparent demise 
and consignment as relics of Britain’s nautical past:  
The Royal Marines will, in all probability, lose in a short time their amphibious 
character. Now that ironclads have taken the place of stately three-deckers, what 
becomes of the Marine, except for dockyard service and siege operations? There is 
no room for him on the deck of the Inflexible, or other monsters "backed," not like a 
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whale, but a tortoise. His musketry will never be needed in ships carrying cannon 
ranging from thirty-five to a hundred tons, and playing at long shots with their 
tremendously heavy metal.530 
This statement framed for a reading audience the challenges faced by the Marines in 
adapting to the changing times. Suggesting the Marines had outlived their utility within the 
Royal Navy, the article ominously, though regretfully, concluded the Marines might see 
their eventual absorption into the army:  
Perhaps the Marines may live to see their infantry and artillery added to the line and 
the regular batteries, but whenever this moment may come a twinge of regret will be 
felt at the disappearance from among England's battalions of the motto, "Per mare, 
per Terram," under which so many gallant deeds have been done.531 
In May 1883, General George Augustus Schomberg, retired from a long career in the 
Royal Marines Artillery, having achieved the pinnacle rank of his Corps as Deputy 
Adjutant General,532 penned an article hoping to highlight the precarious future of the 
Royal Marines. The question he hoped to entice the public, military planners, and 
government purse holders alike to ponder was “whether the Royal Marines shall be 
retained as part of the armed force of England”.533 The question pre-occupied Schomberg, 
he had given similar thoughts and arguments to an essay read at the Royal United 
Services Institute in 1871534. Schomberg believed the question before the navy of the 
continued usefulness of the Marines was being ignored and needed resolution.535 
As shown in the last chapter, utilising marines as a military reserve for use aboard the 
navy’s ships was a well-established practice. To support the continuation of this practice, 
one observer stated that in the case of “a sudden war”, ships with full complements of 
marines had at their disposal “a floating army”, manned with complements of “the finest 
soldiers in the world, on the spot and at once available.”536 At the outbreak of a war, 
Schomberg stated, “the Marines are now the first reserve of the Navy, and, with the 
Coastguard, form the only reserve to be depended on to embark by telegraph at a sudden 
outbreak of war.”537 Schomberg alerted his readers to the fact that the navy had changed, 
that “the ships are now mere fighting machines, in which most of the heavy labour is 
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performed by machinery, not by manual labour. Fleets will be manoeuvred in action under 
steam, not under sail.”538 As to manning, Schomberg suggested that improved mobility 
and the coal needed to feed it, as well as the improved lethality of modern guns, had seen 
that “the stoker and the gunner must take the place of many sailors”.539  
Schomberg could also not withhold comment on the naval brigades. For Schomberg, the 
increased popularity among some naval officers and seamen participating in raids and 
other military actions as Schomberg saw best befitting soldiers was unnecessary: “The 
sailor, perhaps jealous for his estimation in public opinion, and for his power – a needless 
jealousy – has lately taken on himself the duties of the marine soldier, in addition to his 
other duties.”540 As these actions occurred with greater frequency since the Crimean War, 
Schomberg believed there were good grounds for such practices as detrimental to the 
best uses of naval officers, but also beyond their grasp:  
The naval officer should be a perfect navigator, a good artilleryman, torpedoist, and 
electrician, a steam engineer, a military engineer, with a knowledge of international 
law, and of modern language or two.  Besides all this, he often now aspires to be an 
infantry and artillery leader on land.  Can the average officer compass all this?  Is it 
for the advantage of the State he should attempt it?541 
Like others before, Schomberg was preoccupied with what role the marines might fill, now 
that many of their previous roles were becoming largely anachronistic, and further 
threatened by the navy stepping into roles believed to be best suited to marine training 
and expertise.  
Schomberg saw solutions, like others before him, in a role for the marines in protecting far 
flung outposts, including coal depots. “We shall also at some future time, - it is so hoped, 
when not too late, - fortify our coaling depots in the Atlantic, Pacific, Indian and China 
waters. Who are to form the garrison of these posts?”, mused Schomberg.542 He also saw 
a role for the marines as an auxiliary to the army, as it was already to the navy, a part it 
had already played in campaigns in Spain, Syria, China, India, Africa, and Egypt.543 
Finally, Schomberg saw the marines as a colonial auxiliary to reinforce military forces in 
the far corners of the empire so that the army line regiments and artillery units might be 
“relieved of a portion of the burden of foreign service, which weighs heavily upon them, 
and, with the ever-recurring interruption of our small wars, renders the formation of a 
reserve for the army slow and difficult.”544   
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John Colomb, the MP who much later would excoriate the navy on the mishandling of 
Graspan, summed up the problem of how the Royal Marines were considered amidst the 
services as, “they cannot therefore be thought - as a distinct branch of Her Majesty’s 
Service – too insignificant to be worthy of particular examination from a national point of 
view.”545  As to their current uses, Colomb believed, “the present use and application of 
marine forces, present a picture of confused anomalies and inconsistencies.”546 Colomb 
characterised the stagnation and uselessness of the current employment practice of Royal 
Marines Artillery officers in particular as follows: “When afloat the Marine Artillery Officer 
has no distinctive general artillery duties in the fleet. Their superior education and practical 
artillery knowledge, acquired at the expense of the State in order to fit them for duty as 
naval artillerists, are for general and naval purposes neither used nor applied.”547 In this 
statement, Colomb echoed the many personal observations of many a Marine Officer on 
the poor employment of their Corps.  
Working with the navy, Colomb concluded the marine officer was the natural leader when 
men went ashore.548 As to other uses, Colomb, like Schomberg, earlier that year had 
advocated the use of the Marines as a colonial auxiliary.549  Besides utility as a reserve 
force for the navy, a fighting force of trained artillery men and soldiers aboard armed 
merchant steamers, as well as the “nucleus” for local Colonial forces garrisoning naval 
bases in the British colonies, Colomb believed another use of the marines might be best 
found as follows: “To provide organized bodies of troops for attack and defence of minor 
sea positions, free and untrammelled by a complicated army system, ill adapted to the 
military necessities of naval operations.”550 Essentially Colomb envisioned a situation 
where necessity might dictate the use of a naval expeditionary force, independent of the 
army, that might be used to strike the enemy on land. “It is hardly necessary to enlarge 
upon the necessity for Admirals having at their disposal a sufficiency of movable military 
force to seize and hold temporary positions during extended naval operations,” stated 
Colomb. The task organization of the army, Colomb believed, was not suited to operations 
from the sea.551 The alternative then, while requiring reorganisation, might be the Royal 
Marines as their location at the dockyards might prove an advantage for rapid 
deployment. Colomb and Schomberg were not alone in these discussions.  
In his 1882 prize essay submission to the Royal United Services Institution, Royal Navy 
Captain Cyprian A. G. Bridge, examined the problems of inefficient manpower resourcing. 
Bridge cited the problem of retaining a significant force of the navy’s officers on half-pay, 
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suggesting it was an “extravagance” the country could ill afford of “paying one man to do 
nothing, and another man to what the former could perform perfectly well.”552 He 
commented further on another anomaly as he termed it, “in which marines are invariably 
sent to sea, whilst considerable numbers of seamen are learning to be [unseamanlike] in 
harbour ships,” stating further, “It is doubtful if keeping marines afloat at all serves any 
useful purpose in these days.” 553 He suggested another use inspired in part by a practice 
of the French navy: “The proper employment of the corps, which all must admit is simply 
unequalled by any other body of soldiers, is unquestionably that which France, viz., to 
garrison the naval ports and strategic insular Colonies.”554 Similar to Colomb and 
Schomberg, Bridge recommended that beyond the British Isles, Malta, Bermuda, St 
Helena, the Falkland Islands, Hong Kong, and the Fijian islands might all be garrisoned by 
marines in favour of army soldiers.555   
In 1892, the Royal United Services Institution awarded their Naval Prize Essay to Royal 
Navy Captain Robert W. Craigie.556 Craigie’s ideas were in part rooted in naval 
chauvinism, but in other ways were quite progressive. Craigie advocated a strong surface 
fleet to “sweep” the high seas and patrol the vital sea lanes which were the arteries of the 
empire. Fixed defences at key ports and coaling stations at home and abroad would be 
manned by sailors, and some marines, under naval officers where the army might not be 
able to break up its line regiments. Traditionally, fixed defences would have been manned 
exclusively by the army and sparring over the relevance of fleets versus forts in the 
nation’s defence often erupted between the Admiralty and the War Office. In at least one 
progressive measure, Craigie advocated the services be united under one ministry and a 
Minister for War; something which would not materialise in fact until after the First World 
War.557 Discussion ensued following Craigie’s, and other submissions for the Naval Prize 
Essay. The solutions proposed by Craigie for the utilisation of the marines did not satisfy 
Marine Major Thomas Field Dunscomb Bridge.558 Bridge advocated a more imaginative 
role for the marines, but his comment emphasised a widely held conviction among many 
of his officer peers that the Royal Marines were poorly utilised by the Admiralty, and worse 
still, undervalued: “The proudest boast of the Marines is that they are an integral part of 
the Navy: they are sister Services, but the role of Cinderella is not the role many care to 
 
552 Colomb, “The Use and Application of Marine Forces, 648. 
553 Captain Cyprian A. G. Bridge, RN , “Suggestions for Improving the efficiency of the Personnel of the Navy and its 
Reserves”, Royal United Services Institution Journal, Jan 27 1882 Vol 26, No 117, 648. 
554 Bridge, “Suggestions for Improving the efficiency of the Personnel of the Navy and its Reserves”, 648. 
555 Bridge, 648. 
556 Captain Robert W. Craigie, RN., “Maritime Supremacy Being Essential For The General Protection Of The British Empire 
And Its Commerce, To What Extent, If Any, Should Our Naval Force Be Supplemented By Fixed Defences At Home And 
Abroad, And To Whom Should Be Confided?”, Royal United Services Institution Journal, 1892, Vol. 36, Issue 173, 391-415.   
557 Craigie, “Maritime Supremacy”, 410. 
558 Major Thomas Bridge at this time was a Royal Marines Officer serving with the Royal Marines Light Infantry at Chatham. 
He would later serve as Aide de Camp to both Queen Victoria and to King Edward VII. He would retire in September 1905 
from his last post as Colonel Commandant of the Royal Marine Training Depot at Deal and placed on the retired list in the 
honorary rank of Major General, see The London Gazette, 29 September 1905, 27840, p. 6565. 
127 
 
play.”559 Colonel Moody of the RMLI voiced his belief that Craigie’s suggestions left the 
marines with little to do and that an opportunity was being lost by not using the marines in 
safeguarding one of the nation’s essential supply chains, namely, the coaling stations 
essential to the Royal Navy: 
Both branches, the seamen and Marines are highly trained; but I maintain that the 
country does not get its full value of the Marines. This corps is capable of 
economical and rapid extension. It is cheap and very efficient; it can be largely 
increased without in the smallest degree impairing its efficiency as a naval force. At 
coaling stations, there being a nucleus, the force could take their turn for sea in the 
ships on the station, being relieved by a similar number afloat.560 
Moody proposed a garrison role for guarding coaling stations but keeping a force in 
readiness for augmentation or relief of a marine force already at sea. Continuing, he 
reflected on the precarious nature of the Corps’ future: 
Thus, by placing the coaling stations under naval control, and employing the Royal 
Marines to man them, you will increase the efficiency of the corps, which will then 
have a future, as at present I am tempted to fear they have not, and last, but not 
least, the pocket of the country will be spared.561   
In appealing to an economic argument, Moody endeavoured to elicit some sympathy, if 
not regard, for the apparent frugal nature of the Corps as an economy of force to the 
nation:  
In conclusion, I would say, think on these facts, and do not overlook this branch of 
the Service, but let the corps, which is proud of its connection with our naval history 
of the past, have a more pronounced share in the naval history of the future, a share 
for which they have honestly striven to qualify themselves by steady discipline and 
patient perseverance, turning their hand to anything required, and keeping well 
abreast of the professional changes of the past half century, that they may be well 
able when the struggle comes to bear their part in the defence of this great 
Empire.562 
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The arguments made by Colonel Moody along economic lines were also supported by 
John Colomb. Colomb, in another essay, framed his argument around what he saw as the 
fiscal gaffe of the Admiralty on poorly employed but expensively trained marines: 
The Admiralty spends the public money in giving the officers of this great service 
scientific education and elaborate training second to none of corresponding arms of 
the Army, and to the non-commissioned officers, gunners, and privates, the most 
careful and perfect military teaching.  Superadded to all this the marine infantry are 
instructed in naval gunnery, while the marine artillery are worked up, at great cost of 
money and time, to the highest pitch of perfection and skill in the use and practice of 
naval ordnance as well as land artillery.563   
Colomb sought to underscore the folly of having trained these officers, only to have them 
unused: “Having got the officers and men, the Admiralty then train them at great 
cost…and when thus in possession of magnificent and expensively trained corps of 
artillery and infantry, the next step is to suppress the officers and waste the whole 
service.”564 
What was not being defined clearly by any of these authors, despite the apparent 
necessity, was the need for some form of combined operations. As already noted, some 
military professionals and strategic thinkers by the late nineteenth century were, firstly, 
envisioning the need for the army and the navy to work better together, and secondly, 
some delineation as to the roles and responsibilities; the latter especially, was to be a 
difficult process to sort out. For Colomb, however, of principal concern was the matters 
arising from a landed force of marines in operations with the army: 
When, however, Marine Artillery or Infantry Officers are landed as part of a naval 
force for fighting on shore they are under the Navy Discipline Act and the command, 
direction, and control of naval Officers. So that Officers, carefully and specially 
trained by the State for military operations on the land, are placed in the face of an 
enemy under the guidance and direction of Officers carefully and specially trained 
for naval operations on the water.565 
This important problem highlighted by Colomb would preoccupy strategists and planners 
alike. Schomberg also reflected on the roles and responsibilities of the services in 
combined operations, but accepted the challenge would be great:  
[The] position and responsibility of officers and men while serving afloat should be 
laid down for the guidance and discipline of landing parties from ships, whether 
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Marine of Naval Brigade. But the above proposal appears, to one who has given 
much thought to the case, to be the only remedy for a great difficulty.566 
Philip Colomb reflected on what had to take place for the betterment of the defence of the 
nation: 
I think the first thing we may note is; the recognition that the defence of this Empire 
is naval and military; that it is not, as it used to be said, that the Army is to be left 
alone to defend the ports and forts, and so on, and that the Navy is to do something 
else not defined. I think it is now better understood that the two Services work 
together; did work in the past, and will work in the future.567 
This also required a consideration as to how warfare itself or the nature of conflicts was in 
a state of change. For naval thinkers, much attention was given to the writings of Mahan 
on matters such as ‘sea communications’, which Mahan concluded: “were the most 
important single element in national power and strategy. The ability to insure one’s own 
communications and to interrupt an adversary’s is at the root of national power, and is the 
prerogative of the sea powers.”568 The purpose of naval strategy, according to Mahan, 
was to gain control of the sea and the destruction of the enemy fleet was the first task of a 
navy in war. Once the enemy fleet was destroyed, a victorious navy could then exploit its 
resulting control of the sea for any further purpose desired.569 Consequently, Mahan’s 
emphasis on the destruction of the enemy’s fleet and control of the sea lanes meant that 
other forms of naval warfare, such as commerce raiding, were neglected. The Royal Navy 
therefore was preparing for the next Trafalgar. Mahan’s focus on concepts such as the 
decisive sea battle, based in large part on his own conclusions and analysis of the earlier 
success of the Royal Navy, influenced many of the world’s major navies to expect and to 
plan for such an eventuality. Ironically, it was precisely the other aspects of naval warfare, 
such as war in the littoral regions, in which the Royal Navy was most engaged, 
demonstrated in part by their expanded use of the naval brigades.570 Yet by the time of 
Mahan’s writings, Great Britain with such a large empire was now losing the ability to 
protect all her maritime and colonial interests with a fleet concentrated in European 
waters.571 
The evidence presented so far demonstrate real discussions were taking place on for an 
updated role for the Corps, but it is argued here that these lacked real invention and 
innovation to promote real change. The proposals of mooring Marines in remote coaling 
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stations and outposts across the empire were consigning the Marines to static defensive 
roles instead of a role where a strike from the sea might be permitted. What the Marines 
needed was a fresh role or indeed an improvement to an existing one which underscored 
a unique quality or capability which they provided. Fortunately, these came to light at last 
at the end of the century. Problematically, however, the Marines still faced a real 
challenge in convincing the Admiralty this was needed. 
Strike from the sea 
The naval brigades offered some demonstrable advantages to the navy having a flexible 
option for placing its own troops ashore. This idea of linking naval operations with those 
ashore was not new, but gained increased prominence by the late nineteenth century. 
Julian Corbett, a strategist and naval author, crucially advanced the view in his book 
Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, that navies could instead focus in assisting land 
warfare if amphibious forces were increased.572 Corbett was one of the first naval theorists 
in his writings to stress the importance of integrating land and sea forces in a national 
strategy. Using Clausewitz’ idea of limited aims or objectives, Corbett in Some Principles 
of Maritime Strategy, cited disenchantment with decisive battles, preferring a concept of 
geographically shifting and limited sea control.573 For Corbett, the issue involved 
controlling vital areas of the sea, as opposed to commanding the vast ocean. Corbett 
praised inter-service cooperation and amphibious operations, believing that elements of 
military power should work together. Corbett viewed naval strategy as determining a 
fleet’s movements in an overall maritime strategy that included land forces. As Andrew 
Lambert has elucidated in his analysis of Corbett’s works for consideration in the modern 
era, Corbett believed Britain was first and foremost a seapower which needed a maritime 
strategy led by the navy.574 He cautioned against unaided naval pressure - stating that 
purely naval action could only work through a process of exhaustion where naval action 
alone would be unable to decide a military contest, even resulting in an inconclusive 
political settlement where each side saw itself as the victor.575 Strategy for war had to 
include a combined military and maritime strategy where the mutual relations between the 
army and the navy were paramount. The operational application of Corbett’s theory 
encompassed the Clausewitz theory of war with a maritime focus - making a distinction 
between naval and maritime strategy: 
Possessions that lie overseas or at the extremities of vast areas of imperfectly 
settled territory are in an entirely different category from those limited objects which 
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Clausewitz contemplated. History shows that . . . they can be isolated by naval 
action sufficiently to set up the conditions of true limited war.576 
Corbett stressed here the importance of doctrinal cohesion between army and navy was 
essential. Obsession with Mahan and the decisive battle was not desirable for the navy, 
the army’s pining for a mass of men for land confrontation was equally untenable; 
regrettably, both were sought in the First World War. For Corbett, naval warfare 
represented a spectrum that was offensive and defensive, limited, and unlimited in nature 
from blockade to war of extermination. He concluded that limited war was therefore the 
essence of maritime strategy. This sort of strategic thinking had enabled Great Britain, a 
maritime nation with a traditionally small army acting in conjunction with a powerful fleet, 
to become a truly global empire. Corbett’s emphasis on limited war and the importance of 
what was now being referred to as ‘combined operations’.577 Two Royal Marine officers 
were distinguishable for their vision of a better role for the Corps indelibly linked to 
amphibious warfare and defined it in writing.   
Two innovators: Hankey and Aston 
George Aston of the Royal Marines Artillery, whose observations on life in the Marines 
has been previously cited, had intellectual interests formed in part by an unusual military 
career. As a young officer, he had served with the Royal Marines battalion during the 
1884 expedition to the Sudan and seen combat.578 During the South African War he 
worked mainly in logistics, and then later as a divisional intelligence officer until his health 
failed and he was sent home.579 Putting aside these operational experiences, Aston’s 
career was mainly a succession of staff and teaching posts at the Royal Naval College at 
Greenwich, training marine officers including the young Maurice Hankey.580 Hankey would 
describe Aston as, “a very inspiring person”, who in turn, “pitched loyalty to the Service 
tremendously high – which he got right home to me.”581 At the college, both naval officers 
and army officers In order to put their rather mundane syllabus in a wider context, Aston 
included lectures on the nature of the British Empire and its defence problems.582 Among 
his students was Maurice Hankey.  
In chapter two it was shown how the modern day Royal Marines have renewed an 
emphasis in their present day mission on littoral strike. The originator of this concept was 
in a fact a Royal Marine who wrote extensively on the subject. Better known for his later 
role in the wartime cabinet of the 1940s and as a member of the Committee for Imperial 
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Defence during the First World War, Maurice Hankey began his career as Royal Marines 
Artillery Officer, first training at Greenwich in August 1895.583 As a young officer, Hankey 
was noteworthy among his peers for his ability to coalesce and articulate in writing his 
thoughts on the proper employment of his Corps. In 1899, Hankey went to sea aboard 
HMS Ramillies, leading the marine detachment, and would experience some of the friction 
between the navy and marines and particularly the officers. He deplored “the excessive 
importance attached to ‘spit and polish’”, and the inactivity of the life and few duties a 
Marine officer held on ship.584 Hankey, “burning with professional zeal”, resolutely devoted 
as much time to as he could learning aspects of the navy and the various occupations to 
be found at sea from engineering to gunnery.585 It was also from this time that Hankey 
began to write and reflect on “warfare in the littoral”, studying historical examples on what 
role naval forces might play in the projection of military power from the sea, periodically 
adding to these writings at intervals until 1908.586 Hankey’s biographer, Stephen Roskill, 
later suggested that the sum of Hankey’s writings on littoral warfare amounted to a 
proposal some forty years before their incarnation, for the navy’s adoption of a version of 
the Royal Marines Commandos.587 Hankey’s ideas, uncannily prescient, had the early 
signs of real innovation in terms of a new opportunity for the Royal Marines. Aston would 
likewise write at length on amphibious warfare, believing opportunities for success in war 
lay in the coordination of army and naval forces. Despite their mutual interests on defining 
a better Corps mission, their views would in fact clash over the idea of maintaining a 
separate Corps identity.  
Hankey, like Aston, envisioned better cooperation between the navy and the army, and 
saw the future of the navy also in littoral strike, stating, “the Navy will be called upon to 
undertake operations upon the enemy’s coastline.”588 Using early historical examples, of 
which some were learned in Aston’s classroom, Hankey cited the importance of advanced 
bases from which navies might operate from. Reflecting on more recent examples, 
Hankey considered the role of the US Marines at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, working with 
the US Navy in the Spanish American War in Cuba in 1898. By seizing and using 
advanced bases for actions against the Spanish, Hankey concluded that “without an 
advanced based at Guantanamo the United States could never have sustained their fleet 
concentrated and efficient off Santiago de Cuba”.589 Practical uses of such landing 
operations, according to Hankey, were in “littoral warfare more particularly in relation to 
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the action of a field army”.590 The specific purpose being, “to dislodge a hostile fleet from a 
defended port in which it had taken refuge”, such as the work of US Marines on land 
working in support of the US fleet at Santiago Bay in Cuba. Hankey cited how the US 
Navy regularly utilised marines from their fleet to accomplish this objective, as the Spanish 
forces had first to be ejected: “Thus the United States were obliged to employ a 
considerable force of Marines to expel the Spanish riflemen from positions from which 
they could harass the ships lying in Guantanamo Bay, and subsequently a permanent 
garrison had to be maintained there.”591 Other aims for the use of such landing forces, 
Hankey claimed, included “to capture any possession required for the use of the fleet, or 
as an asset at the termination of the war,” and “to cooperate with allies or make a 
diversion in their favour, of which the Peninsula War is an example”.592 Hankey also cited 
the examples of the Japanese use of Elliott islands against the Russians for similar 
purposes in the Russo-Japanese War: 
[It] will be easily seen that the work required from the officers & men will be very 
arduous, & exacting but I am certain there would be no lack of volunteers to join a 
force of this description, the fact of belonging to a [“Corps de’lite”] such as this would 
be [&] feeling that we were assisting our comrades of the Naval Executive, would 
make every individual in the force work up to the limits of his capacity, & such a 
body of men would be invaluable to any country in its hour of need.593 
Hankey was building a strong case for a better use of the Royal Marines, reorganised, 
refocused, and still nested in the Royal Navy, but with a clearer aim and mission. These 
early writings in part formed the substance of a paper Hankey submitted in 1904 to the 
Royal Marines Headquarters he titled, “Paper On Royal Marine Advanced Naval Base”, 
where it was duly reviewed by the Deputy Adjutant General.594 Hankey’s concept of a 
“Mobile Naval Base” would later be implemented much later in 1920, but at this time it was 
noted merely as “a good suggestion” by senior officers.595 The document included detailed 
equipment lists, a proposed organisational structure, and his thoughts on what the forces 
would require in the way of readiness, as well as the intense regime of training. The 
concepts were not adopted, and it is not recorded what either the Admiralty or Royal 
Marines Headquarters made of these ideas, but as will be shown in the next chapter the 
concept was again examined following the First World War.  
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This paper was developed further into, “A Suggested Improvement in the Composition of 
the Military Forces of Great Britain”, as a continuation of his thoughts on littoral warfare 
and what the appropriate military or naval force might be for the task:  
In reviewing the constitution of the military forces nothing is more striking from a 
naval point of view than the absence in them of any body of men which can be 
despatched at a moment’s notice and without attracting public attention for an 
enterprise across the sea such as the occupation of a flying advanced naval base. 
Yet in devising plans for a naval action the need of such a force is constantly felt.596 
Properly organised and equipped, Hankey believed the Royal Marines to be the best force 
suited to the task: 
The solution of the question appears to lie in an expansion of the Royal Marines to 
fill this gap in our military organization. The Marines by their present organization 
and training, no less than by their traditions, are peculiarly qualified to fill this role.  
The whole organization of their barracks is based on the principle that they must be 
ready for instant mobilization, and frequent surprise tests have proved the perfection 
of their arrangements in this respect.597 
Hankey suggested marines might even be embarked to “defend a flying base such as 
Scapa Flow”, which would take place.598 A battalion from each Division could be held in 
readiness at “[RM] barracks at Devonport, Chatham, and Gosport, respectively, and the 
artillery portion of the force would be furnished from the [RMA] barracks at Eastney.”599 In 
order to rehearse and trial such an eventually, Hankey proposed marines take part in 
army manoeuvres, citing the fact that marine officers “are already trained for military as 
well as for naval service.”600 Citing the recent example of Japanese naval rifle companies 
in the Russo Japanese War, “a brigade of Marines”, Hankey suggested, “might be very 
useful to the army as a covering force in the event of a landing on a hostile coast”, or even 
he suggested, “any emergency requiring the early presence of troops, such as trouble in 
Egypt or China, or Crete, or any part of the British Empire.”601 All this, Hankey stated, 
“would be gained without diminishing the military forces by a single man.”602 Years later, 
the concept of a ‘Flying Corps’ or a ‘flying column’ proposed by Hankey of marines 
organised for rapid mobilisation from Britain’s dockyards was backed by Prince Louis of 
Battenburg, then Second Sea Lord, in 1912. By adding additional marine troops from the 
reserves to the existing ships detachments, a “mobile force” of some 350 marines, with 
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artillery, was deployed to Scapa Flow as a test of concept. The designed purpose was for 
“serving and holding an advanced base for the Fleet either in British, neutral, or hostile 
territory”603 Objections, however, from the Navy ranks revolved on the training of the 
detachment, but most of all by the fleet on their giving up marines from their ships for 
training duties ashore, which tied the fleet to a base on shore. Unable to unravel these 
administrative concerns, adoption of the procedure was shelved until just before the 
outbreak of the war.   
Meanwhile, Aston’s ambition was to foster a greater cooperation between the army and 
the navy. In 1904, while at Greenwich, Aston would comment on the poor relations of his 
inter-service colleagues, observing that his naval colleagues ‘laboured under the delusion 
that [army officers] had little to do, and devoted most of their time to sport’.604  Aston’s 
solution was to provide a series of ‘staff rides’, in order to acquaint officers with the 
complexities of conducting landings on unopposed shores.605 The assumptions at this 
time were that any landing would be unopposed due to the volume and strength of 
modern firepower; an assumption that would prove fatal in later years at places such as 
Gallipoli. The college exercises seem to have followed what would later become 
formalised in the Manual of Combined Naval and Military Operations, in that they 
envisaged a small ‘covering force’ being landed overnight to allow the main 
disembarkation at dawn, followed by the build-up of a secure beachhead. Little attention 
seems to have been paid to subsequent operations such as penetration further inland or 
the redeployment of forces by sea. This omission presaged problems at Gallipoli, where 
the military commanders had been criticised for not driving forward to seize landward 
features or for lacking imagination in not carrying out fresh landings.606 For Aston, apart 
from acquainting army and naval officers with amphibious operations, the main benefit 
seems to have been the interaction between the two sides, both socially as well as 
professionally.607 Here a just criticism can be levelled at Aston’s ideas which did not serve 
to properly define the complex realities of inter-service relations. His belief that the 
empathetic bridging of service cultures through time spent together and mutual respect, 
might in turn somehow transcend the greater challenges of what could be defined as joint 
operations was a flaw in his philosophy.608 The next logical steps, perhaps, would have 
been a creation of a unified command structure or further delineating the relations 
between the naval commanders of the naval ‘sea lift’ and the landing forces. The output of 
Aston’s works and thought on this doctrinal evolution was his Letters on Amphibious 
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Wars.609 Aston implored his readers, “not to confine your reading to the fascinating study 
of the strategic employment of mammoth armies in purely land warfare, but to turn your 
attention also to amphibious wars, in which the attacking force moved by sea.”610 
To this, Hankey suggested the ideal attacking force from the sea was not to be found with 
the British army expeditionary force or ‘BEF’: “Our military striking force is stationed at 
Aldershot, where it never even sees the ocean. Some considerable period must elapse 
before it can be mobilised, moved to a seaport, and embarked, and this cannot be done 
without the knowledge of the whole world.”611 Based in the dockyards, Hankey argued, the 
Royal Marines, once suitably organised and equipped, were the ideal choice: “It is 
submitted that a portion of the Royal Marines should be organised so as to provide the 
first detachment of our national striking force. The marines by their organisation and 
training no less than by their traditions are peculiarly qualified to undertake this 
responsibility.”612 Hankey believed that under certain conditions a naval landing force 
might be the best option to make a landing against an opposition force and create 
conditions for “assisting the landing of an army”.613 Hankey sought to specify the 
conditions in which an eventual landing might take place, that it should, “conform to the 
general plan of campaign”, and be, “so far removed from the enemy’s centres of activity 
as to render serious opposition to the disembarkation unlikely”.614 This was in keeping with 
the commonly held beliefs of avoiding an opposed landing where, “as a rule no landing 
should be carried out if there is any risk of interference by the enemy’s naval forces or 
within the range of permanent of movable artillery”.615  
While none of Hankey’s writings were ever published, his observations were instead 
incorporated into his briefs and statements in his work on committees and cabinet 
meetings. For example, a 1908 paper of Hankey’s on the “Organisation of an 
Expeditionary Force”, was reviewed by First Sea Lord Jackie Fisher when Hankey served 
as his aide in 1912, and again years later when Hankey served with the wartime cabinet in 
November 1914.616 As a result, Hankey did have the opportunity to demonstrate his views 
on the topic of littoral warfare and how these might impact both the organisational 
construct of the Royal Marines, even at the expense of the Marines themselves.  
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The Fisher-Selborne Scheme 
The year 1902 saw the inauguration of John ‘Jackie’ Fisher's reforms of the Navy when as 
Second Sea Lord he began to deal with the personnel. Fisher’s first significant policy 
which would affect the marines was known as the Selborne Scheme. In 1904 as First Sea 
Lord, Fisher would embark on an ultimately unsuccessful campaign which among other 
things sought the reform of naval officer selection and training which was to include the 
Marines. Firstly, it lowered the entry age for officer cadets and entered them by 
nomination and interview as opposed to competitive examination. This development 
alarmed many once discovered, believing that the Lords of the Admiralty now retained a 
gross amount of patronage over accession of applicants to the navy.617 Second, and most 
harmful to the Royal Marines, it proposed common entry and training for Executive, 
Engineering and Royal Marine officers, all educated together in all three disciplines at the 
Osborne and Dartmouth schools and on Royal Navy ships at sea, until separation upon 
specialization after seven years. The funnelling of naval cadets into a ‘marine option’ for 
training as officers, ultimately threatened the officer fabric of the marines; officers would in 
essence be naval officers first, not marines. By this proposal to modify entrants for naval 
commissions, boys were entered for training as officers at the Royal Naval College, 
Osborne on the Isle of Wight at the age of 13, for all the three branches of the Navy 
designated as Executive, Engineering, and Marine.  After a common training at Osborne, 
Dartmouth, and at sea, they were to become specialists in one of the three branches.  In 
other ways, however, the scheme was of perhaps more benefit in breaking down, among 
other things, class barriers within the Royal Navy.618 
The scheme was met with criticism from many corners. In Parliament, it was debated, and 
considered by some as, “as the death sentence of the naval officer as he exists at 
present”.619 Colonel Henry Bowles, MP for Enfield, summarised his thoughts on the 
fallacies of the scheme:  
The functions of the naval officer, the marine officer, and the engineer officer are 
diverse, and are daily becoming more diverse, and therefore their training should be 
diverse. There must be day by day more, and not less, specialisation, earlier and not 
later specialisation. But here is a scheme which generalises everybody, as though 
they were all to perform the same functions. The naval officer as he at present exists 
is admirable, but for that naval officer, who is a specialised seaman, engineer and 
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man of science, you propose to substitute a hybrid, interchangeable popinjay, a 
jack-of-all-trades and master of none.620 
In this session of Parliament, the appointment through this scheme for both engineer and 
marine officers was stopped with a vote in the Commons.621 A commission was 
established to query the impact of the scheme at length and in July 1905, Hankey was 
called before the Douglas Committee to give evidence as an officer of the Royal 
Marines.622 Under examination, Hankey was able to include his views on littoral warfare as 
well that of the complete integration of Royal Marine officers into the navy.623 Complete 
integration for Marine officers meant not only watch duties on ship, but that they would no 
longer be simply officers in charge of marines but in all things a naval officer to include 
uniforms.624 Colonel George Aston, the sole Marine officer on the panel, questioned 
Hankey further on the ramifications of total integration, “that to officer the Marines with 
Naval Officers would lead to the absorption of the whole Marine Personnel into the Navy.” 
Hankey affirmed this was his belief, officers and men would be designated for this mode 
of warfare much as any other specialisation in the navy, to which Hankey added, “I do not 
think it matters in the slightest what sort of coat a man wears; his training would be the 
same, and whether he wears a blue coat or a red coat or a sailor’s coat, I do not think it 
matters at all.”625 Hankey advocated the complete shedding of the Royal Marines identity, 
effectively the transformation of the Corps into a designated specialisation of the navy: 
amphibious warfare. For Hankey, that the navy adopted and retained a specialised 
organic function for his vision of littoral warfare was what mattered most, the survival of 
the Corps was, he stated, “more or less immaterial.”626 Hankey’s views in this sense, the 
abolition of the Corps to which he himself belonged, were extremely rare among Marine 
officers. Aston, in contrast, provided a written statement to the panel’s conclusions, “that 
the best officers entered through Osborne will wish to specialise in this direction; and it is 
questionable whether any will volunteer at all. The Royal Marine’s will thus speedily 
deteriorate, and will probably pass away.”627 Where Hankey saw opportunity at the 
expense of the loss of Corps identity, Aston could only denounce what he saw as the 
virtual extinction of his service. 
Many more of the intended reforms of the scheme would be reversed over time but near 
term consequences of this disruption to new officer training had more immediate effects. 
Despite avoiding permanent changes to their officer training, the alteration of training 
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schemes for new Marines officers entering between 1902 and 1907 resulted in only three 
new Marine Officers obtained under the new scheme, of which two were returned to the 
Navy. In February 1907, the Marines had successfully petitioned their Captain-General, 
the Prince of Wales, for exemption from the scheme and to have them removed from it. 
Prince George stated, “that the new Admiralty scheme as regards the future of the Marine 
Officers will destroy the Military character of the Corps generally, which, I believe, is an 
essential for both discipline and efficiency.”628 In a memorandum to Fisher the Prince 
stated, “I feel very proud of being Colonel-In-Chief of the Royal Marine, which Corps is 
universally considered the finest body of fighting men we have. It is impossible for me to 
concur in a proposal which I conscientiously believe will prove detrimental in every way to 
their discipline, efficiency, utility and general well-being.”629 Damage was done all the 
same. New artillery officers, previously attending Woolwich, ceased training there 
altogether after 1907. A further five new officers transferred from Sandhurst and Woolwich 
over the next five years to the Corps. With these disruptions causing the flow of new 
officers to a trickle, the attainment of new officers became increasingly more urgent, it was 
decided to allow ‘Direct Entry into the Corps’, and the Order-in-Council of 9 August 1911 
was published which dictated that officers for the Corps could enter immediately upon a 
successful direct examination.630 As new First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill 
assigned some blame to the Corps, “because no foresight had been given” between the 
crucial years of 1886 and 1906 which may have curtailed these problems.631 The damage 
to the Corps, at least in the near term, was done. Only one batch of officers completed a 
full course, as owing to the First World War from 1914 to 1918, all training had to be 
suspended or modified and the Corps entered the war short of over forty officers.632  
In later years, Hankey was modest as to what extent his ideas may have influenced the 
course of British decisions in the planning and phases of the First World War. Arthur J. 
Marder, in his research for his multi-volume From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, 
contacted Hankey on his involvement. Hankey expressed concern to Marder about 
publication of letters relating to 1911 discussions of sending expeditionary forces to 
France: “There was a wide difference of opinion between the Admiralty and the War 
Office, and within the Cabinet itself, on whether or not, if we were drawn into a war, the 
Expeditionary Force should be sent to France”.633 In fact, by November 1911 Hankey had 
already penned his thoughts on the sending of the BEF to France at the start of hostilities, 
which he believed would be anything but rapid or useful in stemming an attack from 
Germany. Hankey argued against sending the BEF to France, “unless the British 
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Expeditionary Force can be placed at the right place and at the right time it will not be of 
much value.”634 Hankey cited the realities of the Germans having 84 divisions and the 
French 66 to oppose them; the BEF with a mere six divisions would be a token force.635 
The Royal Marines, however, would in fact take part in an early expeditionary role to 
Belgium, one which the Corps was not prepared for but was led nevertheless by Hankey’s 
early mentor, George Grey Aston. This will be detailed in the next and last chapter.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that the Royal Marines were neither the stewards nor successful 
innovators behind anything resembling a doctrine for amphibious warfare in the nineteenth 
century. While some historians have used historical examples of Marines participating in 
campaigns where amphibious operations were featured to illustrate their mastery or 
prowess of the subject, the evidence shows exactly the opposite: the Marines could 
neither influence the development of such a doctrine independently, nor did the will to do 
so truly manifest itself. Obstructions to this were grounded in the stark realities in part with 
fiscal constraints imposed on the Admiralty, but also the dominant navalist preference for 
fleets and ships to maintain parity with would be antagonists. Without any members of 
influence in the Admiralty ranks, calls for real innovation and changes in their operational 
role remained unadopted.  
Early ideas for changes, such as those from Schomberg, offered no real departure from 
traditional roles by either seeking to maintain a balance or improvement to a status quo, 
what was needed was a mission which could make the Corps distinguishable. They did 
provoke the further debate as to whether the Royal Marines were still necessary. Aston 
understood a need for better cooperation between the services and that this meant further 
understanding and study of amphibious warfare. His ideas however to did not carry the 
conviction or the vision for real change, advocating instead a need to “think amphibiously” 
and imploring the services to seek mutual empathy and understanding. Hankey was 
perhaps more of a visionary who saw a different future for the Corps in littoral warfare and 
strike, but controversially felt the Corps could be sacrificed by the navy if it was necessary 
to maintain and develop the capability. His ideas, and those of Aston’s were not 
implemented and the first reason was that the navy was still preoccupied with the 
business of manning, modernisation, and building ships for what was expected to be 
another great conflict. New ideas, especially concerning another use for the Marines was 
not a priority. A second reason specific to Hankey’s own ideas on the training and 
integration of marines, and particularly officers, were so strong that they divided opinions 
in the Corps and navy alike as shown in the Douglas Committee minutes. One of these 
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officers was none other than George Aston, and each took opposing views over a reform 
scheme which struck to the heart of both the existence and identity of the Royal Marines. 
These were not missed opportunities as these were not ever presented as such. The 
ideas might have provoked serious questions, but no real actions were taken. No real 
consideration of these ideas ever took place in the Corps, it was still far too parochial an 
institution and did not have the flexibility of an independent organisation free to trial new 
ideas; it was firmly under the thumb of the Royal Navy. The First World War would shatter 
this. It would be up to the officers who experienced it to find new ways to better utilise the 

























Chapter 6. Towards an uncertain amphibious future, 1914-1927 
The institutional expertise the United Kingdom possesses in amphibious warfare has 
been hard won, and continues to be maintained today in UK Armed Forces by a 
group of specialists, mainly found in the Royal Marines and in the Royal Navy’s 
amphibious fleet. Dispensing with a unique cadre of military expertise from across 
the three Services, or reducing it to the level where it cannot be deployed on a 
strategically meaningful scale, would be an irreparable act of folly. – Quoted from 
“Sunset for the Royal Marines?”, HC Defence Committee, HC 622, 4 February 
2018636 
Contemporary British expertise in amphibious warfare is extensive and has been shaped 
by long experience. Built over many centuries, it is the product of an island nation and 
leading naval power whose geographical and geopolitical realities, inspired a foreign 
policy of global expansion and the need to defend its colonial possessions and interests 
by deploying its forces from the sea. The history of British amphibious warfare also 
demonstrates its dangers and complexities. For every success, there have been serious 
reverses illustrating the unique risks associated with amphibious operations. Richard 
Harding reminds us that assault landings in the face of an entrenched or alerted enemy, 
common to the twentieth century, were dangerous and rare. The increased popularity of 
amphibious landing in the eighteenth century grew from the successes and failures of 
General Wolfe at Louisbourg in 1758 and his capture of Quebec in 1759, the latter seeing 
his death on the Plains of Abraham.637 Colin White reminds us that the injuries suffered by 
Lord Nelson to his right eye and right arm occurred not in sea battles but in amphibious 
operations, with the latter injury occurring during the failed assault on Spanish held Santa 
Cruz de Tenerife in 1797 during the French Revolutionary Wars.638 In this period, 
amphibious operations between the army and the navy were understood largely in the 
context of the movement of forces to and from ships to designated landing places which 
were almost always unopposed by the enemy. By the twentieth century, as weaponry 
evolved, anti-access and area denial devices such as sea mines and longer ranged shore 
gun batteries provided defending forces with improved methods to oppose landings. 
Reflecting on this, the question then as it pertains to this study is what role did the Royal 
Marines have in the practice of amphibious warfare and was this compatible with their 
culture and identity?  If today the Royal Marines are recognised as amphibious experts, 
was this opportunity developed by them or was it thrust upon them? This chapter argues it 
did not occur in the early twentieth century.  
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Britt Zerbe has argued that by the conclusion of the eighteenth century the Marines 
served as an important link between the army and the navy, “because of the amphibious 
nature of the Marines, they could provide the ever increasingly important operational 
bridge for these two organisations upon sea and land”.639 Evidence presented later here 
will show this was not the case. Not only did the Royal Marines not endorse this 
statement, but would also later definitively conclude that their role was not to serve as a 
link or bridge between the services. Further to this counter argument, Allan Millett has 
argued that amphibious warfare development in Britain lacked both the organisational 
commitment of the services or “tangible institutional memory” with which the Royal 
Marines might have assisted with both.640 The Marines failed, Millett argues, to seize the 
opportunity to champion amphibious operations in the post-war period, or significantly 
influence the discussion of combined operations in a tangible way. As will be shown, the 
traumatic events of a forced amalgamation and coming to terms with a new Corps identity 
proved a more urgent necessity, an unfortunate distraction to the equally pressing matter 
of defining their role in a period of fiscal austerity. The First World War and the lessons 
derived were a battlefield on which many grappled over the legacy and memory, and still 
today. In particular, historians have sought to correct the idea that Britain discarded 
amphibious doctrine in the interwar period. Ian Speller, who has written extensively on 
amphibious warfare and British defence in the twentieth century, expanded further on 
Millett’s argument. Speller has suggested that following the First World War the Royal 
Marines were left in a state of further ambiguity about their role and mission. Speller 
argues that the concentration on the inter-service nature of amphibious warfare, and the 
continued demand by the Admiralty for employment of Marines in conventional military 
duties ashore, denied them the opportunity to develop a distinct role. This, states Speller, 
fundamentally threatened the Marines with further reduction of expenditure, amalgamation 
with the Army, or complete disbandment.641   
The first part of this chapter will examine the early failed deployments of the Marine 
Brigade, the experience of the Corps within the Naval Division, and other key events 
which inspired new thinking. The Corps found itself conflictingly subordinated throughout 
the war under both the army and the navy, and saw the record of their deeds mostly 
obfuscated and subsumed in the narratives of the grand campaigns and battles. It will be 
argued these factors further complicated the Corp’s post-war status. Examined next in this 
chapter is the uncertain footing the Corps found itself on following the First World War. 
These will be examined in two post-war events, firstly a forced amalgamation of its 
components which disrupted Corps identity. Secondly, what was to be the last serious 
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opportunity to innovate change to the existing structure and mission of the Corps in the 
interwar period before a radical transformation was to take place. This transformation 
during the Second World War would mark the Corps organisational transformation to the 
Commandos which was to change the identity of the Corps.  
The role of the Royal Marines in the First World War has been largely overlooked or 
subsumed in grander narratives of campaigns, both in the early years and by more recent 
historians. Paul M. Kennedy’s analysis of Mahan's The Influence of Sea Power upon 
History was the first review of Britain’s depreciating role as both a naval and imperial 
power.642 Kennedy accurately characterised the era of shipbuilding in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries as the end of inexpensive shipbuilding, which would test the 
limits of Britain’s economy, ultimately ceding to the industrial land empires of the United 
States and Russia.643 Specific to the concerns of this chapter, Kennedy accurately 
portrayed the First World War as an inter-service dispute between the British Admiralty 
and the War Office for status as the guarantor of victory. The failure of the 1915 
Dardanelles campaign, Kennedy stated, would reinforce views of those insisting that any 
diversion of troops from the Western Front weakened the Allied war effort.644 The Royal 
Marines would fight on both these fronts.  
While the Royal Marines may have been left gasping for life after the war, it is inaccurate 
to say the British defence community was left paralyzed from the experience of the First 
World War. As Kenneth Clifford has stated, “many British writers after WWII simply 
summed up the interwar period and combined operations development to the effect that 
little was accomplished,” an assumption that little was being done about amphibious 
doctrine, “to say nothing was done is not accurate”.645 Britain was not, as some have 
claimed, scarred by disasters like Galipolli. Serious development of landing crafts 
occurred in this period. Efforts to establish harmony over amphibious operations through a 
codified doctrine was also attempted. Richard Harding has mapped the extensive amount 
of work done by both the army and the navy in reconciling their operational relationships 
over a series of military exercises, efforts to establish joint doctrine, and investment in 
amphibious vehicle platforms throughout the 1920s, immediately following the war.646 
Harding has shown that there was much more reflection on what was learned rather than 
neglect, though enthusiasm was hampered by the reality of fiscal austerity. Britain would 
need to wait until the 1930s and the threat of another great conflict, and was arguably still 
poorly prepared.647 Matthew Heaslip can be included among those historians more 
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recently working to dispel the myth of the “Gallipoli Curse”.648 Heaslip argues that rather 
than fearing the ghosts of the recent past, Britain analysed its lessons and embarked on a 
series of exercises which matched in magnitude those of the US Marine Corps who were 
busy testing their concept of Fleet Landing Exercises in the Americas.649 These lessons, 
however, did little to influence the composition or the structure of the Royal Marines, and 
did not result in their being designated as Britain’s preferred amphibious force.  
The Royal Marines in the First World War – complete sublimation, near annihilation  
Writing years later, the Corps historian Cyril Field would reflect bitterly on the complicated 
marine legacy of participation as part of the Naval Division: 
In the recent Great War – in which, by the way, the heroic deeds of the Royal 
Marines eclipsed anything I have been able to record in this work – whole battalions 
of them were somewhat lost to sight by being embodied in a so called “Naval 
Brigade”, the other battalions of which, far from being composed of seamen 
belonging to the Navy proper, were made up of men who, for the most part, 
excellent soldiers as they proved had never set foot upon the deck of a man-of-war. 
Such overshadowing is not inducive to the fostering of esprit de corps, for it is the 
history and traditions of past glories which inspire that feeling, so invaluable to a 
Regiment, so great a support in the hour of peril, so animating in the crisis of battle, 
which adds to the soldier’s zeal for personal distinction the nobler aim of increasing 
the laurels of his Corps.650 
The experience of the Royal Marines in the First World War was one of significant 
involvement, but as will be shown the years following the war reflected missed 
opportunities. The failures to anticipate these opportunities, as well as the planning 
decisions prior to and the early phases of the war, were widely critiqued in its aftermath.  
“Worse than all,” stated George Aston in a 1926 paper encouraging reform of the 
Committee of Imperial Defence, “there was no properly considered and co-ordinated plan 
for using our mobile sea and land forces in the event of war with any specified enemy.”651  
British military planners in this period were otherwise preoccupied with the expectation of 
a continental war in Europe, most likely with Germany. Yet war on the continent was 
viewed by the Royal Navy as primarily the army’s problem; fleet modernisation took 
priority. At the outbreak of the First World War, according to plan the British Expeditionary 
Force or B.E.F., consisting of four infantry divisions and a cavalry division were 
dispatched to France in August 1914. By late August, two more infantry divisions joined 
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them but by this time the BEF had retreated from Mons to the east of Paris where it took 
part in the Battle of the Marne. Since Britain had now committed itself to a land war, it was 
vastly undermanned and resourced and needed troops fast. Two solutions were quickly 
proposed by the Admiralty: mobilisation of the Naval Division, and more urgently, the 
deployment for the first time of a Marine Brigade 
The Naval Division 
While recovering in hospital at Plymouth from a bout of enteric fever, Major Jerram 
learned in December 1914 that he had been assigned to the Naval Division as a Staff 
Captain of the Marine Brigade.652 Jerram, who would later serve at Gallipoli and later in 
France with the Marine Brigade of the Division, recorded his impressions of Churchill’s 
creation as, “a good idea in itself if it had been carried to a logical conclusion.”653 As First 
Sea Lord, Churchill formed the Royal Naval Division on the 18th of August 1914, nearly a 
week after Britain entered the war, with an order from the Admiralty which began with a 
naval brigade which would consist of seamen from the reserves of the Royal Navy.654 This 
original formation would expand to a Naval Division, consisting of three brigades, two of 
naval reservists and the third of Royal Marines. Each brigade was to consist of four 
battalions of 1,000 men each.655 Made up primarily of sailors and Naval Reservists not 
assigned to ships of the fleet, many resented the idea of being turned into soldiers. The 
Naval Division was made up of two brigades of sailors and one of Marines. The sailors of 
the naval brigades consisted primarily of unemployed stokers, free on account of the 
latest ships being oil fired.656 Officering the brigades was an assortment of navy and 
marine officers, including officers who as Jerram recalled, “were largely Royal Naval 
Volunteer Reserve, who hated it and wanted to serve at sea.”657 Despite designation for 
service on land as soldiers, naval traditions were kept in naming the battalions of the 
brigades of sailors after famous admirals: Drake, Nelson, Anson, Collingwood, Benbow, 
Hawke, Howe, and Hood. The Marine Brigade named their battalions for their parent 
Divisions at Plymouth, Portsmouth, Chatham, and the training depot at Deal. 
This development coincided with an Admiralty paper exploring the historical employment 
of the naval brigades, concluded that, “The practice has always been to use them only in 
combined expeditions – that is when Fleet and Army remain in tactical touch”658 
Exceptions were cited were the “sudden call in distant parts of the Empire when troops 
are not available” which, the paper claimed, also included the Indian Mutiny and South 
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Africa, where the latter case was most notably in the Methuen expedition.659 The paper 
cited that the first employment of naval brigades in the Crimean War, were “merely 
extensions of traditional practice by which seamen [&c.] assisted troops ashore in sieges 
of maritime towns that were the combined objective.”660 The paper also cited two concrete 
instances where the ambiguous command relationship of a naval party ashore, working 
with the army, created problems.  
The first cited instance was in 1801 at Aboukir where sailors and marines were landed to 
aid in the guarding and maintaining the supply lines for General Abercromby’s 
expeditionary force in its bid to expel Napoleon from Egypt. Friction between the army and 
the navy emerged when news that a French squadron from Brest had entered the 
Mediterranean, requiring Lord Keith, Commander in Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet, to 
recall his men to meet the enemy. Abercromby protested, citing that the recall of the 
sailors and marines would endanger his operations on land.  Writing to Keith, Abercromby 
expressed his dissatisfaction in the strongest of terms, stating: “I shall consider your 
withdrawing as a dereliction of public service”, and demanded that since the two services 
were now so closely linked together in their bid success, only the strongest of assurances 
that the recall of the marines and sailors to counteract the French squadron were 
necessary.661 Ultimately, Keith relented rather than provoke further problems between the 
two services.  
The second cited a more recent incident in 1904 in the opening days of the Russo-
Japanese War at Port Arthur where the Royal Navy had a presence in this Russian held 
portion of Manchuria. Here, crew members and ships’ guns from the fleet were lent to the 
army to defend a land front as hostilities between Russia and Japan developed. When the 
fleet commander asked for the ships’ crew and guns back, “the army openly and with 
much bitterness accused the Navy of wanting to run away and desert them.”662 It was 
described further that “a very bad feeling was engendered between the services and it is 
said that the taunts of the army were one of the main causes of the squadron’s continued 
inactivity.”663 Within the continuous state of service rivalry, the ambiguous command 
relationship gave way to inter-service enmity. The paper in summary stated that “in 
principle and practice Naval Brigades are intended for combined operations only.”664 
Reinforcing the ad-hoc nature of the employment of the naval brigades, the paper 
emphasised that “if used as a purely military unit while the enemy’s fleet is still potent, 
experience shows that at a time of crisis the effect is likely to be a serious disturbance of 
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either the military of the naval plans and possibly of both.”665 The Royal Navy strategy 
instead emphasised delivering a decisive naval engagement and blockading. There was 
no thought to reconciling the cooperation of land and naval forces, or how the navy might 
create or and exploit of landing a force from the sea. The Royal Navy could neither 
conceal the fact that at the start of the war it held massive reserves of manpower and 
created an infantry force called the Naval Division, much to the frustration of the army 
which was scrambling to deploy men to France and beyond.  
Early debacles – Belgium 1914  
Days before the start of the war, on 2 August 1914 orders came to the Royal Marines 
Headquarters directing two battalions of three companies each from Eastney and 
Chatham, to form and draw stores and equipment for rapid mobilisation. Once formed, 
two further battalions, one each from the Divisions at Portsmouth and Plymouth, would 
join them.  It was made clear that these were not to interfere with the current requirements 
for manning of the Fleet, but “the work on which these Battalions will be employed will be 
similar to that performed at Scapa Flow in 1912”.666 Such a contingency and deployment 
had in fact originally been designed for a possible defence of the Orkneys per previous 
Admiralty instructions rather than operations on the continent.667 Surviving 
correspondence shows the extent of the chaotic preparations, and the fact that neither a 
staff, personnel, proper equipment, or any planned rehearsals of such a contingency 
existed or had taken place.668 With so many other units around the country rapidly 
mobilising, it became clear by 4 August that original assumptions about any support from 
the War Department being able to supply the Royal Marines with essential military 
equipment was not possible, and that the new formations would need to assess 
availability of supplies from the dockyards. Furthermore, the necessary manpower 
requirements for officers and men necessitated a wider look to the Portsmouth and 
Plymouth Divisions and the depot at Deal.669 Even so, the battalions were successfully 
organised on short notice and arrangements were made to the extent that the Adjutant 
General of the Corps, William Nichols, was able to report on 6 August to the Admiralty on 
the formation of the new Special Service Brigade. The first two battalions were prepared 
and had been detached for service at Scapa Flow while the remaining two battalions were 
awaiting further instructions. The report first stated that the battalions were “ready for 
service”, but that “very little time to organise and train them as a complete unit”, had been 
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available, and certain items of equipment, such as khaki uniforms, still were not 
available.670 The report also queried “the probable nature of their employment” might be 
made available so that further training could be conducted with more efficiency.  The reply 
from the Admiralty indicated that the Brigade was “to be trained as a Brigade of regular 
Infantry available for immediate service in the Field at home or on the Continent”.671  The 
minimum acceptable size for this force was to be 3000 men. A large enough suitable 
training space was identified near Portsmouth, only for the order that the brigade must be 
stood down on the 20 August.672 Then, just as suddenly on 25 August, the Brigade was 
ordered to reform to be sent to the continent at Ostend under Brigadier General George 
Aston who learned he was to be in command that same evening.673 
Given no staff of his own, Aston seconded officers to his staff from the available officers in 
his battalions. The short notice and lack of information as to where the brigade was 
headed and to what purpose, added to the confusion and subsequently the brigade 
packed all they could from their available stores.674 Despite these challenges, the brigade 
arrived in intervals in Ostend in the early hours of the 27th. A young Captain Frederick 
Jerram, who would later serve at Gallipoli and the Western Front with distinction, recalled 
transporting elements of the Marine Brigade to Ostend while serving as the marine 
detachment commander on HMS Euryalus. Aston, who was badly in need of staff officers, 
begged the Admiral the release of Jerram but was denied as he was the ship’s only 
Marine officer. Jerram later recalled his disappointment of missing out on this early 
venture, but consoled himself by transcribing essential maps and documents during the 
voyage to lend Aston’s staff some assistance.675 Orders were to maintain a small pocket 
and perimeter defence at Ostend, in order that they might be easily supplied. The marines 
initially worked in their standard blue uniforms; khaki uniforms eventually caught up with 
them. Facing what was one of Europe’s field armies at that time, the marines faced a 
greater problem than uniforms. No artillery was landed, requiring the marines to rely on 
heliograph and signal flags to communicate with naval guns offshore, who themselves 
were more anxious of German submarines patrolling the area.676 In part over concerns of 
the safety of the fleet, and the fact the Brigade was for the moment unemployed, the 
Admiralty decided that after just four days, the Marine Brigade was to return to England on 
the 31st.   
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By mid-September, the ongoing crisis of the rapid German advance on Paris was at stake 
in the Battle of the Marne. The Marine Brigade was called on again to deploy, this time to 
Dunkirk on 18 September. By this time the lessons around organising a brigade size force 
on short notice had been suitably exercised; it was now also known as the Third Brigade 
of the Royal Naval Division.677 The brigade was now located at Walmer which was to be a 
principal training location for the new Royal Naval Division. The battalion formed from 
Eastney, made up of artillery marines, was exchanged for another battalion from the other 
Divisions – the battalions now available represented and were named for Chatham, 
Portsmouth, Plymouth, and Deal.678 The orders to occupy Dunkirk, on the extreme left of 
the Allies, was designed to convince the Germans that they were an Advance Guard of a 
much larger force.  
In Belgium, matters for the Belgian army were rapidly disintegrating with the advancing 
Germans and urgent attention was needed for a hastily improvised defence. Churchill 
himself arrived in Antwerp, via Dunkirk to inspect the Marine Brigade as First Lord of the 
Admiralty. Here, Churchill found Aston in a severe state of mental and physical stress, 
and relieved him in the field, replacing him with an RMA Colonel, Archibald Paris, who 
would later command the Naval Division on the Western Front.679 Paris in turn would be 
replaced by Colonel Alfred Marchant of Graspan fame.680 On 3 October, the Marine 
Brigade advanced to Antwerp. Here, the Marines integrated themselves into a defensive 
perimeter and held off the German attacks. Antwerp would serve as the rally point for the 
defeated Belgian Army until 10 October when the Belgian army retreated into France; the 
marines were able to retire to England to regroup on the 12th.681 Ultimately, Antwerp was 
held long enough to serve the retreating Belgian army from becoming a complete rout, but 
with losses of marines killed and captured.682  
An important lesson, or opportunity lost, in the landing of the Marines was the failure for 
planners and the Cabinet to make efforts to synchronise and coordinate operations from 
the sea and on land. Had army divisions followed up the Marines landing, rather than 
withdrawing the marines as hastily as they had been inserted, opportunities to further 
disrupt and force a German retreat might have emerged. The outcome at Antwerp 
sharpened condemnation for Churchill and the Admiralty’s handling of the war, while 
Churchill cited it a success in delaying the German advance. The German fleet did not 
emerge for a grand confrontation and German submarine raids increased. This first 
venture of the Marine Brigade and the Naval Division on land ended in relative 
embarrassment and failure. While no special blame might have been placed on the 
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Marines, the event draws attention to the fact that their utility and usage were undervalued 
and demonstrably not organised to any degree of efficiency. 
The experiences of these early deployments brought home important lessons. In this short 
period, Aston found coordination with his supporting naval force exceedingly difficult as 
they were preoccupied with the German naval threat. This short and abortive operation 
was followed, three weeks later, by the larger deployment of British Forces to Dunkirk. 
Little improvement had been made in his force’s preparedness or mobility, and this time 
their task was complicated by the need to cooperate with both the French and the British 
Expeditionary Force. To make things worse, operational coordination between the Army 
and Navy was conducted at Cabinet level between Field Marshal Lord Kitchener and 
Churchill, with the latter then giving direct orders to Aston.683 By now, the two short 
expeditions demonstrated the difficulty of improvising an amphibious operation on such 
short notice as well as the challenges of inter-service cooperation; lessons which would 
be highlighted again at Gallipoli. While Aston was not responsible for them, the failings at 
Gallipoli would reinforce and demonstrate the weakness of the views that good relations 
alone between commanders would not suffice. These views had not, under such a high 
tempo and short-lived deployment to Belgium, worked well for Aston under his own 
circumstances.   
The “gradual pressure of sea power” 
In a January 1915 memorandum to the Cabinet, Fisher cited the problem as he saw it, 
one which plagued the British planning of the war from its early days: “At recent meetings 
of the War Council projects have been discussed for joint naval and military operations 
against place on the coast as well as for similar operations by the Navy alone. Up to 
present, however, no clear statement has been made at the War Council as to what our 
naval policy in this war is to be.”684 Fisher continued, stating, “Our naval policy must be 
regulated by that of the enemy”, and cited the “policy of Germany to avoid a decision at 
sea and to keep the command in dispute as long as possible while they concentrate their 
offensive powers on the army ashore.”685 Fisher summed up the present state of affairs as 
similar to those encountered by Britain in the past, such as the Napoleonic Wars, where 
Britain faced a strong belligerent on land which was forced to take the defensive option at 
sea due Britain’s strong navy. The “gradual pressure of sea power”, Fisher believed, 
would force desperate manoeuvres at sea by the enemy.686 Fisher believed Germany’s 
navy had chosen the defensive option, leaving Britain in command of the seas, and 
stated, “We play into Germany’s hands if we risk fighting ships in any subsidiary 
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operations such as coastal bombardments or the attack of fortified place without military 
co-operation.”687 On this important matter of naval and military coordination, Fisher was 
more pessimistic:  
It has been said that the first function of the British army is to assist the fleet in 
obtaining command of the sea. This might be accomplished by military co-operation 
with the Navy in such operations as the attack of Zeebrugge or the forcing of the 
Dardanelles, which might bring out the German and Turkish fleets, respectively. 
Apparently, however, this is not to be. The British army is apparently to continue to 
provide a small sector of the allied front in France, where it no more helps the Navy 
than if it were at Timbuctoo.688 
Previous employment of the Royal Marines in Belgium supported this statement, but the 
further lack of coordination at Gallipoli would be the most infamous example of this failure 
to better sync the efforts of Britain’s armed forces. In 1916, Jutland would prove the 
imperfect large scale naval battle the Royal Navy had longed for, in which the Royal 
Marines would not only serve but gain some distinction from the actions of Major Harvey 
in saving HMS Lion, Beatty’s flagship, from complete destruction.689 Otherwise, the Royal 
Navy remained employed in protecting naval convoys, blockading, or otherwise deterring 
the German navy from further sea actions. Besides Gallipoli, the Marines would serve with 
the Royal Naval Division also in France in many more campaigns which hardly captured 
the public’s attention. In France, the efforts of the Naval Division, and consequently the 
marines, were subsumed within the wider events of the protracted deadlock on the lines. 
This point was not lost on one naval officer of the Naval Division, who stated: “Before the 
war reputations went by regiments, but in a war of this magnitude the regiment has 
merged in the brigade and the brigade in the division. The division is the unit which 
creates a reputation for itself nowadays, and the divisional esprit de corps is most 
marked.”690 This fact was not lost on the new First Lord of the Admiralty, Sir Eric Geddes, 
who frequently fielded demands from the army to deliver marines to reinforce the army’s 
battalions on the front and to likewise surrender other navy men to be turned into 
soldiers.691 Geddes was forced then to justify in detail the contributions of the navy to the 
war effort, and how thinning naval ranks in one area ultimately eroded continued success 
in another, notwithstanding undermining the efforts on land. Late in the war, Geddes 
sought to better justify the employment of marines in the fleet. According to Geddes the 
navy was still anticipating another opportunity for a major fleet action, and was determined 
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not to compromise the fleet and its manning.692 As noted by Richard Harding, navies and 
sea power operate invisibly for most of the time, their utility and presence easily forgotten 
by the public.693 This belief had in part motivated the actions of the naval brigade in the 
South African War and now the First World War, and partly inspired the ambitious raid at 
Zeebrugge on the 23rd of April, St George’s Day, 1918.     
Zeebrugge – the first Marine Commando of the twentieth century 
The outcome and impact of the raids continues to be debated as to their operational and 
strategic impact to this day, and one which again will be argued here as a missed 
opportunity which nonetheless retained an important legacy. The irony was perhaps not 
lost on the Marines, who had landed in Zeebrugge and Ostend in 1914 only to withdraw to 
the Germans advance, that they would now be launching a raid against this hub of 
German submarine operations in 1918. The Zeebrugge raid was planned and executed 
under the supervision of Admiral Roger Keyes. The stated purpose was to block the 
approaches of the canal for the deployment of German submarines, but also as a 
demonstration that the navy was still very much in the war effort. In the summary of action 
published by the Admiralty following the Zeebrugge raid, it was noted that:  
This formidable system has been greatly strengthened and improved since the 
German occupation in 1914, and has recently provided a base for at least 35 enemy 
torpedo craft and about 30 submarines. By reason of its position and comparative 
security it has constituted a continual and ever-increasing menace to the sea 
communications of our Army and to the seaborne trade and food supplies of the 
United Kingdom.694   
As noted by Julian Thompson, the raid at Zeebrugge was a hugely complicated and 
ambitious scheme with little margin for error.695 After a fortnight’s training, the assault 
force of sailors and marines reflected the general composition of naval forces for land use 
of the war to date. In execution, the raid might have resembled the expeditions of previous 
centuries, even those of the landing parties of the nineteenth century. But what might 
have been suitable for command and control purposes in the nineteenth century, was now 
increasingly more complex on modern battlefields. Machine guns and shore batteries 
were also a more formidable challenge. The plan called for an assault on the canal 
entrance used by the German U-Boats, which included the scuttling of ships as an 
obstacle. News of the event was sensational and exploited to maximum effect.696 Results 
were mixed, the raid force suffered over 500 casualties and several captured, while the 
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Germans suffered only a few casualties and claimed “torpedo boats passed in and out of 
Zeebrugge the next day as usual, and submarines the next”, the ships detailed to block 
the canal having failed to achieve their objective.697 Nothing, however, has diminished the 
courage of the sailors and marines who took part, and the Germans also acknowledged of 
the raid force that, “their plucky actions deserved all recognition.”698 Six Victoria Crosses 
were awarded to officers and sailors of the Royal Navy, and two were awarded to the 
Royal Marines through a most unusual method of the Victoria Cross ballot chosen by the 
marines themselves.699 
Jackie Fisher stated in his memoirs in 1919, “no such folly was ever devised by fools as 
such an operation as that of Zeebrugge divorced from military co-operation on land.”700 
This unflattering commentary by Fisher, was in context to his appraisal of operations on 
land conducted by the Royal Navy during the war, which included Gallipoli. Fisher was 
also known to be at odds with the key architect of the Zeebrugge raid, Keyes. Fisher, the 
architect of the revived surface navy, could not reconcile the creation and employment of 
the Royal Navy in a fighting role on land. Even the Germans acknowledged the audacity 
of the littoral strike, stating “there is no infallible means of defence against such attacks. 
The only surprising thing about the enterprise is that the enemy now for the first time 
made such an attack.”701 The operation did serve to demonstrate to the British public that 
the Royal Navy was still very much involved in the war effort regardless of perception to 
the contrary. For these reasons, Zeebrugge has become strongly enmeshed in the 
contemporary narrative of the Corps as one the first commando like operations of the 
Corps. Ironically, the 4th Battalion was disbanded so that no future unit in the Corps could 
would be numbered as such, thus missing an opportunity for the maintenance of a useful 
organisational lineage.702  
At war’s end: the Corps battle for survival begins 
The Royal Naval Division, established at the outset of the war, was formally disbanded in 
1919 in a ceremony at Horse Guards.703 As a non-land army force, the Naval Division had 
proved a distraction from the navy’s tradition sea service role, a fact underpinned by the 
reality that some forty percent of the navy’s entire wartime dead had occurred in service 
on land.704 The realities of modern warfare to those who would be infantrymen, did not 
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discriminate against service branches. Following the First World War, the question was 
not whether or if Britain should ever again embark on amphibious operations, but what 
was the suitable force to execute such an operational eventuality or necessity. The Royal 
Marines were not organised for or designated by the Royal Navy as an amphibious 
landing force. The Ostend expedition signalled to those critical of the Corps, that when 
fielded as an ad-hoc Brigade, poor planning and command structure among other failures, 
had hindered the experiment. Since the navy did not seriously take on the study of 
amphibious warfare in this time, no essential planning could take place and Marines were 
not viewed as subject matter experts beyond their service on ships of the fleet or dockyard 
duties. The choice of the Royal Marines as the de facto stewards of amphibious 
knowledge was not therefore a foregone conclusion. Britain may not have been at the 
conclusion of the war among the preeminent innovators or proponents of amphibious 
doctrine despite its history, but now had the opportunity to build on these experiences and 
did so. First, they had to deal with a severe blow to their organisation. 
Amalgamation – a critical blow to Royal Marine organisational culture 
Prior to the First World War, previous committees of inquiry had raised the possibility of 
amalgamation of the two organisations within the Corps, the Light Infantry and Artillery. In 
1877, a committee for the reorganisation of the Corps was formed and published 
conclusions in 1880.705 One of the stated aims of the committee was, “To prepare a 
scheme for the amalgamation of the Royal Marine Artillery with the Royal Marine Light 
Infantry.”706 The committee ultimately concluded on this instruction for enquiry that, “the 
Royal Marine Artillery shall not be amalgamated with the Royal Marine Light Infantry, but 
be continued as a distinct branch of the corps until – not being further recruited – it is 
reduced to such numbers as to be easily capable of extinction, renders it necessary.”707 
Schomberg, had commented at length on the near preservation of the artillery within his 
wider consideration of the government’s considerations in the same period to make the 
Corps redundant: “The destruction of the Marine Artillery, the most highly trained branch 
of the force, was decided on three years ago; it was saved from its fate almost by 
accident”.708 The committee otherwise concerned itself more with the state of the corps 
present organisational structure and personnel needs, with particular attention to training 
and promotion opportunities. In 1906, the Douglas Committee had examined the effects of 
the Admiralty’s proposed Selborne Scheme on marine officers, had briefly raised the 
question of amalgamation, but did not offer any conclusions on the matter in their 
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findings.709 The preoccupation over what the employment of the Corps might be in matters 
of imperial defence continued to be the subject of debate and serious discussion of 
amalgamation was postponed, but now a new century and new crises linked to fiscal 
concerns and organisational efficiency coincided with the conclusion of the First World 
War. Discussion of an eventual amalgamation or outright disposal of one portion of the 
marine organisation was now an earnest topic of discussion. The debates which followed 
only served to show just how grounded the Royal Marines were in their views as an 
organisation structured in the model of an army regiment, or regiments as they debated 
the fate of a merging of both the artillery and the infantry. No arguments which followed 
truly embraced the idea of an opportunity for real change or that the structure ought to 
best serve the very service which defined their justification for their continued service, the 
Royal Navy.  
Since the conclusion of the war in 1919, the voted strength of the Corps had come down 
gradually from a war time high of 37,896 officers and men in 1919 to 13, 742 in 1922.  
This was from a total of 18,585 at the start of hostilities in 1914.710 All the services faced 
cuts to personnel and expenditures, as was a routine post-conflict practice, but the added 
spectre of amalgamation of the Corps artillery and infantry emerged once again. In March 
of 1923, The Times reported that while the Colonel-Commandant at Eastney had recently 
earned himself a promotion to major-general, no successor had been identified.711  
Furthermore, rumours to the effect that one of the Portsmouth Division barracks, either 
Gosport or Eastney, might be forced to close and that the likely candidate of closure was 
Gosport, feeding speculation that one marine division might occupy Eastney. The article 
continued suggesting that RMLI marines were just as capable at employing field guns as 
their RMA peers, which was “an argument in favour of the proposed change.”712 With an 
air of pragmatism, the article closed stating that, “The total disappearance of the ‘blue’ 
Marines would naturally be received with keen regret, but in view of the many other 
branches and units of the Imperial Forces which have had to be sacrificed owing to the 
urgent need for public economy, such a change, if it came about, could hardly cause 
surprise.”713 Faced with the need to enforce significant economies in the post-war 
environment, the Royal Marines could no longer dodge the issue of amalgamation.  
In 1919, a committee was established, “to make definite proposals for amalgamating as 
far as possible the common Services of the Navy, Army and Air Force, such as 
Intelligence, Supply, Transport, Education, Medical, Chaplains, and any other overlapping 
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Departments, in order to reduce the cost of the present triplication.”714 This committee, 
known as the Mond-Weir Committee, did not publish its findings until 1926, but its 
enquiries into the business of each service prompted, at least in part, the consideration for 
the amalgamation of the marine services. Instructions were passed down through the 
Admiralty that cuts, and economies must be made. The Royal Marines formed a special 
committee to consider the problem in May 1922, the minutes on the consideration of the 
show how the marines framed the problem from a perspective of cost savings in the 
abolition of one of the Divisions or the training depot at Deal.715  
The same minutes show the correspondence following the input from the various divisions 
of the Corps, which in turn revealed the internal friction over the decisions being 
considered. The General commanding the Portsmouth Division RMLI, Major General 
Armstrong, stated, “The title ‘Light Infantry’ is a highly esteemed distinction conferred by 
the Sovereign, whereas ‘artillery’ is merely a term describing an arm.” He continued, “I 
regret that I cannot see any justification for dropping a title of great honour because half of 
the Corps is being converted from Artillery to Infantry.” Armstrong believed, as did his peer 
in the Plymouth Division, that, “There are a good many Royal Regiments but at present 
we are one of six only which have the honour to bear the title Light Infantry as well, and I 
think it will be a thousand pities if we renounce that honour”.716  
Colonel Picton Phillips, the Commandant of the Royal Marines Artillery, voiced unpopular 
and in the opinion of many of his peers, poorly constructed arguments for the retention of 
both branches. Phillips stated, “It is a sheer physical impossibility for a soldier to be 
efficient as an Artilleryman and an Infantryman at the same time, the two sciences, involve 
two different types of brains, two different outlooks, and two life-times of study.”  He 
concluded, “The alternative is to make the Corps a hybrid growth. Inefficient Infantryman, 
inefficient Gunners.”717 In the memorandum published internally by the Chief of Staff, H.F. 
Oliver, it was agreed that, “Colonel Picton Phillip’s letter is the point of view of an Officer 
with a life’s experience of a small Corps and rather a narrow outlook”718  But, it also 
acknowledged that it was “essential to review the functions of the Royal Marines and their 
place in the Naval Organisation.”719 Further in the memorandum, the need for fixing on a 
fundamental mission for the Royal Marines in their new state was more urgent: 
This necessity for a military force within the Naval organisation is fully recognised 
and is accentuated at the present time by the same arguments which render a Naval 
Air Branch imperative. This ideal would be to have a sufficient force of Infantry and 
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Artillery to draw upon, so that the Navy could, at will, employ a mixed Brigade to 
seize and fortify a base of purely Naval importance, or similar Service, without 
necessitating combined operation with the Army.720 
Any decision or committee determining what the new mission might be would, however, 
be put on hold as the Royal Marines adapted to these changes to their organisation which 
now seemed inevitable. Other concerns regarding the proposed changes to uniforms, 
such as what colour tunic the men would now wear, were also considered in detail to the 
consternation of both the RMA and RMLI.721 Overwhelmingly, the decisions favoured the 
adoption of a blue uniform in keeping with the Naval Service and a distinct departure from 
the army’s red tunics. Collar and cap badges would retain the Globe and Laurel, shoulder 
titles would now display “R.M.” in favour of “R.M.L.I” or “R.M.A.”722 
The MP for Battersea South, Viscount Curzon-Howe who was himself a naval officer, 
sought assurances that “the Royal Marine Artillery will not lose its identity in whatever 
proposals the Government are considering.”723 The response was that with the merging of 
two Corps into one, the aim of the Admiralty was for neither to lose their identity. A follow-
on question pried as to whether the once former RMA officers and marines would keep 
their uniform; the answer was “no”.724 The First Lord of the Admiralty, Leo Amery, was 
questioned in the Commons on the proceedings towards cost savings to the Royal Navy, 
and their effects to the Royal Marines specifically. Detailed in The Times, Amery 
explained in Parliament that the reasons for amalgamation were fiscal in nature, with a 
target of saving of at least £50,000.725 Forton Barracks, the home of the Portsmouth 
Division, required extensive renovation at Admiralty expense and was scheduled to close 
and relocation of the division to Eastney. Marine recruits would also be trained at Deal at 
the training depot. Since Royal Marines were still expected to man specific gun turrets on 
ship, specialised training in artillery would remain at Eastney.726 
Debate amongst former serving marine officers, as well as others interested in military 
matters, occurred in the side lines and was printed in the press with a range of opinions. 
George Aston who had commanded the RMA at the end of his career, offered his 
thoughts on the matter in a letter to the editor of The Times, which stated, “Both R.M.A. 
(as artillery) and R.M.L.I. (as infantry) have great historical records and a fine regimental 
sentiment and esprit de corps. There is a strong and healthy rivalry between them, which 
makes for the efficiency of both.”727 Aston believed that the sentiments of senior naval 
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officers was that the amalgamation should not proceed, stating, “my naval friends, from 
flag officers downwards, now serving the Fleet are unanimously opposed to the 
change.”728 In another letter to The Times, Aston wrote on the prospect of the impending 
amalgamation, as a crisis facing the Corps not dissimilar to the dissolution of certain 
British Army regiments: “I fear that the time is far distant when the [R.M.] Forces also will 
be abolished altogether, if the war-lesson of the need for intense specialization is ignored, 
and they aspire to be experts in everything.”729 
This sentiment was evoked and endorsed by others, including Admiral Henry Campbell in 
a similar letter to The Times, stating, “they are invisible forces and hard to define, but of 
their presence and effect there can be no doubt.”730 Adding his voice to this was Admiral 
Bacon, whose experience with the Marines at Zeebrugge added further weight. Bacon 
cited the so called “meddling” of the Conservative government as a wasteful enterprise, 
and endorsed the belief that the “emulation and friendly” within the Corps between the 
RMA and RMLI was in fact a “subtle source of efficiency”.731 Bacon implored the 
government and the country: 
Remember, it was the Marine Artillery who were chosen at a moment’s notice to 
man the 15in. howitzers on the Western front, who manned the new batteries for the 
defence of the Fleet at Scapa and Cromarty, who formed the expeditionary artillery 
in Africa, and performed many other services during the war. Whatever they did they 
did really well.732 
Despite Aston’s assertions, and that of others, that the merging was at odds with 
sentiments of senior naval officers, there were dissenting voices. William Adair, who had 
retired in 1911 at the head of Corps as Deputy Adjutant-General Royal Marines, and 
whose family retained a long heritage service in the Corps733, weighed in with opposing 
views put forward by George Aston, stating that most senior naval officers were unlikely to 
be sympathetic to these proposals affecting the Corps: 
My only real disagreement with Sir George is as to the opinion of senior naval 
officers on the subject, my experience being that most of them are in favour of the 
proposed re-amalgamation, which is no new idea.  In 1880 it only failed of execution 
by the fall of the Government; in 1902, under Sir John Fisher’s scheme for the 
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common entry of officers R.N. and R.M as a commencement or re-amalgamation, 
the newly commissioned officers R.M.A and R.M.L.I. were placed on one list.  What 
happened on the subject in 1919 Sir George Aston probably knows better than 
myself. It is true the Board of Admiralty is now backed up by the need for economy 
and the decay of Forton Barracks, but the scheme has long been over-ripe.734  
Adair closed with deep sympathies over the demise of the RMA, but stated the 
unavoidable reality of the situation: “we have been schooled to the amalgamation of 
distinguished units of the Army – nay, even to their total abolition.”735 The difference here, 
plain to all involved, is the army’s traditions survived in a reconstituted regiment, whereas 
the Marines would not.  
To this point, one retired Admiral, Sydney Eardley-Wilmot, known for his writing on naval 
history and future naval warfare736, wrote that while the marines were “a splendid body of 
men” whose “loyalty to the Navy is beyond question,” that he had advocated some years 
ago that the two bodies of the RMA and RMLI be merged.737 Eardley-Wilmot suggested 
that “the conditions are now very different from what they were when the Marine Artillery 
was instituted.”738 The naval gunnery school at HMS Excellent now provided the navy with 
large numbers of trained seaman gunners. Furthermore, the formation of marines forces 
at sea was due in part to difficulty in manning ships and there had been at one time an 
“advantage to have a number of well-disciplined men on board in case of 
insubordination.”739 Eardley-Wilmot stated further that “as one Corps of Royal Marines, 
their traditions will animate them in the future, as in the past.”740 Another anonymous 
letter, reputedly from a retired officer of Marines, weighed in on the subject stating that 
naval officers were unlikely to offer comment, “being that they have been fairly contented 
to get the work done on board ship, and so long as it was well done it has not mattered 
much to them who did it.”741 The writer opined that the present concerns of many of the 
marine officers writing in to The Times, over seemingly trivial matters over what colour 
uniforms the men might wear, paled in comparison to what might be ahead stating, “I 
foreshadow greater changes in the future as far as economy is concerned.”742 
Ultimately, fiscal pressures prevailed and the decision towards amalgamation was 
decided. A detailed point on the matter of economies and exact monies saved, a figure of 
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some £50,000, was focused on by figures such as Aston as well as in Parliament. Aston 
cited that, “it is by closing Forton Barracks, not by ‘amalgamation’ that the £50,000 will be 
saved.”743 This figure was fixed upon again in June, when questions in Parliament 
rounded on the actual savings that would be brought about by amalgamation, but without 
closure of barracks themselves.744 The Admiralty had already considered closure of 
Forton Barracks due in part to the costs of repair. By June 1923, the decision was made 
and announced by the King, as Colonel-in-Chief of the Royal Marines, as follows:  
It is with great regret that, in consequence of the reduction in numbers, and the 
necessary financial economies necessitating the abolition of one of the historic 
divisions, I have concurred in the amalgamation of the Royal Marine Artillery and the 
Royal Marines Light Infantry. The two branches during their period as separate units 
have each worthily upheld the traditions of the old Corps of Royal Marines from 
which they were derived. As their Colonel-In Chief, I desire to express to them my 
appreciation of their former services, and I am confident that, under the new title of 
Royal Marines, they will continue to maintain that reputation for loyalty and devotion 
to duty which has ever been the pride of the Corps of Royal Marines.745 
The message from the King was personal and relayed the sense of regret and loss that 
was shared between the Corps and the Sovereign. The Corps had, up to this time, 
depended upon the grace and favour of the highest of persons that took an interest into 
the security and efficiency of the Royal Marines. The message also relayed to the public 
the new title of Royal Marines, which in fact reverted the Corps name to its earlier state 
just over a century ago. The message confirmed the abolition of the Royal Marines 
Artillery at Eastney, with the merging of the marines at Eastney with the division of 
marines at Gosport; Gosport would be emptied as a cost saving measure to the Admiralty.  
The three divisions of Plymouth, Portsmouth, and Chatham would be maintained at equal 
strength with marines drafted from Eastney and Forton to balance the numbers.746 The 
final decision on uniform was announced that all marines would adopt the blue tunic, and 
the colours last issued by the Queen in 1894 should be retained, that of the Portsmouth 
Division being moved to Eastney. Instruction in artillery would not cease, however, and 
Eastney remained the place of instruction for all marines, and all marines would be trained 
as infantry soldiers with further instruction in naval gunnery.747 The titles of ‘gunner’ and 
‘private’, were now dropped in favour of that of ‘marine’ for the enlisted ranks. 748 
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What conclusions can be drawn about the amalgamation? Many of the arguments 
proposed were emotive, rather than coldly logical, and were built on records of faithful 
service that did not correspond easily to fiscal realities or operational necessities. The 
Corps could no longer avoid these problems. The recognition that now a clear mission 
had to be defined, a fact long avoided since the mid to late nineteenth century, was now 
showing what delays had caused to the organisational structure of the Corps having failed 
to evolve. The Corps might well have considered itself lucky to have survived at all.  With 
the number of army infantry regiments being disposed of post-war, no clear distinction 
could be made for retention of yet another regiment of infantry – the only murky distinction 
was the marine was accustomed to service at sea and belonged to the Admiralty – so 
long as the Admiralty could have need of them, they would stay. The amalgamation of the 
two Corps into one, made the Royal Marines an infantry organisation for service from the 
sea. The Royal Marines supporting arms, such as artillery or engineers, organic to their 
regiment, but are instead supported by units from the British Army who receive cross 
training with the Royal Marines through a special course.749 With the process of 
amalgamation concluded, attention was brought to a central issue which had plagued the 
Corps for some time: the problem of a definitive mission.   
The Madden Committee - What is the Corps the mission? 
While amalgamation was underway, the unresolved question was the actual purpose of 
the Corps. At this time, the Royal Marines had no specific responsibility for amphibious 
warfare, and some popular views consigned the Marines as a drain on Admiralty 
resources and as a fiscal restraint, rather than a unique organisation of relevance. The 
most urgent issue affecting the Corps, was the Economy Committees of Parliament 
eyeing the Royal Marines entire abolition as a means to save a substantial £400,000, for 
which “a case could be made for the abolition of the Marines which could be difficult to 
resist.”750  
In September 1923, a memorandum from Captain Vernon Haggard, the Director of 
Training and Staff Duties751 for the Royal Navy, outlined the reasons for a new committee 
to be created which would examine functions and training of the Royal Marines. This was 
a residual priority identified from the amalgamation, noting that the “functions of the Royal 
Marines are not laid down,” and also that the “conditions of service have changed since 
the corps was first formed, their original purpose has been outgrown.”752 Training of the 
 
749 These are 29 Commando Regiment Royal Artillery and the 24 Commando Regiment Royal Engineers who are attached 
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Corps and the marines could also not be attained “without a definite purpose to aim at”.753 
It was acknowledged further that the recent “disturbance in the corps” caused by the 
recent amalgamation of the light infantry and artillery, and only served to accentuate the 
problems; “postponement now can only pave the way to another disturbance in the corps 
later,” it was stated.754 Haggard voiced this last point with some dismay, as he had in 
March earlier that year, urgently noted that a major reorganisation of the Corps had been 
seemingly rushed through to cut costs without a real opportunity to examine in detail the 
important questions of mission, training, and organisation: “if the need for economy were 
not so urgent it would be desirable to delay giving effect to the decision to amalgamate the 
R.M.A. and R.M.L.I. pending the report of the above committee, observing that this 
decision is based upon economic considerations and only involves a saving of 
£47,000.”755  
The committee was established under the supervision of Admiral Sir Charles E. Madden, 
known from then on as the Madden Committee, was composed of four naval officers and 
two Royal Marine officers, which included the serving and a future adjutant general, and 
the secretary of the Admiralty. The committee would examine the functions and training of 
Royal Marines, “to consider & report on functions, strength, organisation & equipment of 
the [R.M.] Corps”.756 The reasons were set out formulaically, noting the present 
circumstances of “financial difficulty when the services are liable to be placed at the mercy 
of Economy Committees”, with an acknowledgement that the Corps mission was ill 
defined and out of date: “The functions of the Royal Marines are not laid down. Their 
conditions of service have changed since the corps was first formed, their original purpose 
has been outgrown, and has not revised in the light of modern requirements.”757 
Recognition of this fact by the committee at this critical juncture undermines the argument 
of Zerbe that the Corps functions or doctrine, amphibious or otherwise, were clearly 
scripted. It was acknowledged that the recent upheaval in the Corps, now presented an 
opportunity to be taken up urgently: “The disturbance in the corps occasioned by the 
recent amalgamation of the R.M.L.I. and R.M.A. accentuates rather than diminishes the 
present necessity for reaching a decision upon their functions; and since conditions in the 
Corps are now in a state of flux, the opportunity for laying down a well thought out policy 
for the future is excellent. Postponement now can only pave the way to another 
disturbance in the corps at a later date.”758 Deputy Adjutant General, H.E. Blumberg, 
having only recently supervised the Corps amalgamation, had long lobbied for a summit 
on these matters and responded early with his views on the early proposals set forth from 
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the Admiralty. Blumberg pushed back on two early recommendations he felt were attacks 
on the unique character of the Corps. Firstly, that Marine Officer training should be kept 
separate “in a military form and atmosphere”, and secondly, the urging for consolidation of 
the entire Corps to Portsmouth and out of the other home ports “could not be done without 
destroying the whole character of the service and making it so unpopular that recruiting 
would become impossible.”759 Blumberg clearly felt the linkage to the port town 
communities was important to the character of the Corps, but practical reasons for 
mobilising and training detachments for the fleet were also in his mind.  
Drawing on the rich history of experience 
With a clear mandate, the committee deliberated on the appropriate functions following a 
lengthy consideration of recently assigned tasks. It used several sources to inform their 
conclusions. Firstly, the rich history both past and present of the Corps’ relationship with 
the navy, secondly, the recent innovations of the US Marine Corps, and finally, the 
reflections of the more experienced junior officers from its own ranks.    
Acknowledging the fact that the early regiments were utilised in part to fulfil manning 
requirements for the fleet, as they were still being done in the late nineteenth century and 
even early twentieth century, it was the “large number of amphibious operations” the 
committee drew attention to, such as the seizure of Gibraltar in 1704.760 The reconstitution 
of the Corps under the Admiralty cited the necessity of marines to outfit the fleet for what 
was described as periods of almost continuous warfare from 1755 to 1815.  Marines were 
at that time essential for maintaining discipline at sea, and that the 1853 Continuous 
Service Act in turn made this role largely redundant.761 It next cited that “compared with 
the preceding century, the period of 1815-1914 was for England a century of peace”, but 
with several “colonial wars” in which the Corps took part. While marines were no longer 
needed for close ship engagements, the findings stated, a justification to keep marines on 
ships were the landing parties and the need to man more guns on ships of the fleet. With 
this historic perspective, the findings then focused sharply on the employment of the 
marines, and the absence of specific guidance or instructions as it pertained to any use 
for organised expeditionary purposes designed for assaults from the sea: “It is perhaps 
idle to speculate as to whether the course of events during the war would have been 
appreciably altered if the value of such a force to the Navy had been more fully explored 
in the preceding years and a definite place assigned to it in the sphere of Naval 
Operations.”762 The committee cited the inefficient utilisation of the marines during the 
Great War, especially in the early operations in Belgium which it described as an “an 
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infantry brigade, totally un-organised” and “hastily formed” which had failed  “as a Naval 
operation, to prevent the enemy from forming submarine bases.”763 It also cited how the 
equally hurried infantry brigade of the Royal Navy was rushed to the Dardanelles in the 
Gallipoli expedition, “was only partially trained and, later, came under the Army, gradually 
dwindling to one Battalion owing to the Naval requirements prevented the sending of [re-
inforcements].”764 It also concluded that with the absence of marines in the navy, the 
duties that recently had fallen to marines would have to be replaced by army soldiers or 
navy seamen:  
However gallant the Seaman may be and however gallantly he may be led he can 
never under present conditions afford the time to become a really efficient soldier, 
the best he can hope for is to become an indifferent Marine.  He could probably 
perform the duties nearly as well as the present untrained Marine but that is not 
good enough and the statement is rather a plea for the better training of the Marine 
than for his replacement by the Seaman.765 
The committee recommendations fell short of suggesting that Marine officers be in 
command of detachments on land or in landing parties: “At the same time this mixture of 
Naval and Military qualifications produces indirectly a further and highly important quality 
which soldiers lack. This can be described as the amphibious quality.”766 It was concluded 
that the experience of marines on ships, as a ‘naval force’, would make them naturally 
suited to embarkation and disembarkation: “The amphibious quality coupled with the fact 
that Marines are carried in most ships gives the Navy the power of extending its grip 
ashore to a modest degree on all stations, and enables the mobility of ships to be turned 
to full account for all operations within the scope of the ship’s detachments. Thus the 
Marines have a peculiar value and par in the Navy that the Army cannot replace.”767 The 
committee was not prepared therefore, to venture further from the contemporary thinking 
of marine employment.  
Consideration was next given to recent exercises by the Americans since the war on 
amphibious operations, undertaken by the US Marine Corps. The US Marines had formed 
a unit at Quantico in Virginia, reorganised as an expeditionary force and conducted a 
large scale landing at Culebra, Puerto Rico in 1916.768 These were part of a new concept 
known as the Advanced Based Force, not dissimilar from Hankey’s, and prompted the 
reorganisation of the US Marines around this new mission of seizing and defending 
temporary bases for the navy.769 This experiment, along with serious study of the 
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amphibious strategy in the Pacific sanctioned by the Commandant of the US Marine 
Corps, John A. Lejeune, demonstrated to what extent the US Marine Corps was permitted 
to develop and innovate these ideas. While the United States had not solved the problem 
of combined or joint operations, the United States Marine Corps at least had a clearer 
mission in mind. The development of these ideas throughout the 1920s, and into the 30s, 
remained more theoretical than practical, but tactical manuals and papers on amphibious 
thought and strategy became the foundation of the amphibious doctrine employed by the 
US Marine Corps in the Pacific during the Second World War.770 The US Marine Corps, 
which had up to this time so closely mirrored the Royal Marines, would now definitively 
begin to evolve along its own very different path.771  
The commission had made extensive use of new reports and recorded observations by 
the Americans on the Great War and their belief that the next war would see naval 
operations of a decidedly amphibious nature. The committee scrutinised the conclusions 
of the US Marine Corps on the Gallipoli campaign: “One of the greatest disasters in 
history was the failure of the Gallipoli campaign in the World War. How different the result 
would probably have been if the British Mediterranean Fleet had been accompanied by an 
adequate expeditionary force when its first attack was made.”772 Another published report 
of interested was by US Marine Major E.H. “Pete” Ellis for the US Navy in 1921 
concerning the US posture in the Pacific in the event of war with Japan.773 Ellis concluded 
the US would need advanced bases, but was concerned with the problem of efficient 
combined operations between the army and the navy in order to guarantee these aims:  
Experience itself is comparatively limited; as a result of which it is to be expected 
that the development of combined operations has been backward. Such is 
submitted to be the case; we are lacking in knowledge and the development in 
organization, administration, tactics and material necessary for successful combined 
operations. For instance – navies have given very little thought to their own tactics 
for supporting landings against opposition; no one has paid much attention to even 
designing equipment specially adapted for the purpose; and the instances of actual 
exercise of troops in making landings are certainly few.774 
The committee also included a 1924 report from the US Marine Corps, which noted that: 
“the United States authorities have given considerable thought and attention to the 
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functions, organisation, and training, of their Marine Corps, and have included in it a 
considerable body of men trained to operate with their fleet and to secure for it suitable 
oversea bases, so essential in a naval war conducted at some distance from bases in the 
United States. We should be glad to see the value of the Royal Marine Corps for similar 
operations appreciated with equal clearness.”775 The Royal Navy and the Army were 
giving extensive thought to these experiences and how to improve their joint operations. 
How and if the Royal Marines were to be reorganised along any improved model for 
efficiency was more problematic.  
Finally, the committee pored over a paper submitted by the previously cited Major Charles 
Frederick Jerram. Jerram was a member of the up and coming junior officer ranks who 
entered the Corps before the war and therefore had experience of service at sea in the 
traditional occupations of marines with the fleet, but had also seen combat with the Naval 
Division. He had personally experienced Gallipoli and the Western Front and was five 
times mentioned in dispatches.776 Jerram’s observations were in fact the only ones 
included from the population of junior officers of the Corps, lending a critical voice to the 
hard lessons and experiences of the recent war. In this light, his perspective was therefore 
important and served as a good representation of views put forward by officers in this 
period. 
Jerram addressed his comments broadly along two specific items, firstly his thoughts on 
improving the Royal Marines for “its efficiency and usefulness to the Royal Navy and the 
Empire”, and secondly, his proposals for the useful employment of marine officers in 
senior ranks.777 The latter had been a source of discontent for a considerable time. Jerram 
stated that except for the period from 1915 to 1919 where he served with the Naval 
Division and in staff jobs, his entire career had been one of service at sea which he 
believed “that except as a Naval Force the Royal Marines can have no justification for 
their continued existence.”778 Jerram felt it essential to establish this point, lest he be 
mistaken for what he called the “ultra-Military School” of marines who had seen the main 
action of the war on land, not at sea, and believed the destiny of the Corps to be more 
closely aligned towards operations on land, which had its own problems.779 Jerram then 
succinctly stated what several others had written about over the years, that “England 
being a Maritime power, whenever she fights on land she will have to transport her Armies 
overseas; in other words she will always fight in an amphibious War and the Navy will 
have the first part of it. That being so it would seem almost a necessity that a body of 
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troops be maintained, trained to the Navy’s way for use.”780 Jerram clearly believed that 
the identity of the Royal Marines was inextricably linked to a function within the Royal 
Navy, which he also believed retained was significant to a British national maritime 
identity. 
He next outlined his suggestions on the best employment of the Corps. These included 
his belief that the Corps should work in close conjunction with the navy for purposes 
primarily naval in nature: the seizure of ports, destruction of enemy bases, punitive 
expeditions from the ships of fleet dispatched to the point of crisis, and preliminary 
landings for follow on forces of army troops. To his last point, Jerram stated the marines 
were not to join the army forces, but having done their job, would reform and re-embark 
with the fleet for their next mission.781 Jerram insisted that, “the Marines are to be a Naval 
Force whose base is the Sea and mobility dependent on the sea”.782 Reflecting on his 
Gallipoli experience, Jerram stated:  
It is the Navy’s duty and proud privilege to be able to carry a threat against any part 
of the frontier. There is no threat in the presence of a few ships as was seen in 
Gallipoli; but when those ships carry a Striking Force the threat becomes a very real 
one and one which the enemy cannot ignore. The threat must be a combination of 
ships and Striking Force, when the Navy and the Country recognise this, the 
problem of the Royal Marines is solved.783 
Interestingly, Jerram argued for the numerically smaller but geographically dispersed 
Corps to abandon the Division structure and consolidate in one dockyard location. The 
actual size Jerram stated, should be that of an Infantry Division, or Brigade size if 
manning was a restriction, supported by its own “following” of supporting arms of 
signallers, engineers and light mobile artillery.784 Bolder reforms to fleet manning were 
presented, and Jerram considered the role of marines as gunners on ships dated stating, 
“there are many duties in Ships where a knowledge of Gunnery is valueless.”785 The same 
was said of the ‘off jobs’ on the ship from storekeeper, mess servants and stokers.786 On 
one point Jerram was emphatic, namely that of the command of and over the Marines: 
“The Command of the Marines should be retained in the hands of its officers right through 
top to bottom.”787 Jerram also advocated that the Corps should have as its head a 
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Lieutenant General who would also have a seat on the Board of the Admiralty so as to 
best advise the Navy.788 Jerram commented likewise on the broadening of opportunities 
for senior Marine officers in the Admiralty, The War Office, and Colonial Office or as 
Governors of military and colonial provinces.789 “Even present Senior Officers of the Corps 
might be well employed, they are not nearly so useless as seems to be very generally 
supposed.”790 
Jerram’s aim was ultimately to inspire and direct a new organisational structure and 
purpose to the Corps. Even while his ideas were not immediately acted upon, the Royal 
Marines in fact years later utilised an expeditionary brigade structure, supported by 
engineers and artillery, which exists today as the 3 Commando Brigade; in this way, 
Jerram’s ideas were in fact prescient.  
The committee submitted its report on 6 August 1924, concluding that the corps had three 
essential functions, listed in order of importance. The first function directed the Marines to 
provide detachments, as it had always done, for service on the ships of the fleet. Not 
surprisingly, the committee concluded that one of the original functions of the Corps, 
keeping order and discipline on ships, was now no longer necessary.791 To this the 
committee added the necessity of marines being utilised in landing parties for punitive 
expeditions and “shore operations on a small scale with a limited objective.”792  The 
committee was against the idea of the utilisation of marines in fixed garrison duties, which 
would affect the manning, training, and readiness for the purposes of fleet manning.793  
The second function directed that the Marines were to provide forces “to carry out 
operations for the seizure and defence of temporary bases, and raids on the enemy coast 
line and bases, under the direction of the Naval Commander-In-Chief.”794 These forces 
were to seize and hold advanced bases for the Fleet using a Mobile Naval Base or MNB 
concept, to carry out attacks on the enemy’s bases and lines of communication in order to 
assist the either navy or army objectives, and finally to assist in the landing or evacuation 
of army forces from a hostile coast. Recalling the earlier work of Hankey, this function 
known as the Mobile Naval Base Organisation or simply the MNB was formally adopted, 
but predicated on a projected steady but conservative increase in manning.795 The 
committee reflected that previous wars and campaigns in which Britain had embarked 
upon, had frequently relied on the use of existing British territories or friendly ports from 
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which to land and build up forces, but the future of such an eventuality was no longer a 
certainty. The committee proposed a revised statement on the purpose of the Royal 
Marines stating:  
we shall describe the Corps as an integral and essential part of the Naval Forces, 
whose duties fall under two headings, first, duties afloat, which it is called upon to 
discharge in common with all branches of the Naval Forces, and secondly specialist 
duties on shore which constitute its [raison d’etre] as a separate branch of the Naval 
Service, and for which its military training is necessary.796  
The third function was that the Marines might “serve as a connecting link between the 
Navy and the Army.”797 Following submission of the report, the findings were scrutinised 
by the Admiralty, among them Roger Keyes, now Deputy Chief of Naval Staff. Keyes, who 
planned and led the Zeebrugge raid, agreed that the third function, service as a 
connecting link to the army, should be struck as it was determined that “liaison of this kind 
is a function of the Naval Staff to which the Board can and do appoint Marine Officers.”798 
The committee also concluded that it was not the duty of the navy to furnish troops for 
another service, namely the army, stating that despite the duty of the services to work in 
unison and in mutual support, “we consider that it is no part of the duty of the Admiralty to 
maintain or train forces solely with a view to their employment in operations which are the 
special province of another Service.”799 The Naval Division had filled this purpose, and the 
Admiralty had confronted this problem of manpower shortages and demands with the 
army.  
The commission also concluded the Corps should be organised as an independent strike 
force. The manned strength of the ‘independent striking force’ was proposed at 3,400, 
which was four battalions or the size of a small infantry brigade, and force which the 
Corps expected could be reliably fielded based on the experience of the First World War. 
The committee believed that the present Division system, while not optimal, afforded the 
best existing structure from which to form and base three battalions of the new striking 
force, from which a fourth battalion would be drawn from these and the balance made up 
from reservists. The former divisions would continue to supply detachments to also man 
the fleet.  
The Committee Concludes 
While there was agreement between senior naval and marine officers over its 
conclusions, and perhaps even a feeling that now finally the Royal Marines had a better-
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defined mission, the Madden Committee brought no significant changes to the Royal 
Marines. The MNB concept went forward where it continued to be the nucleus of many 
further amphibious experiments, and for the purposes of establishing temporary naval 
bases, but only under benign conditions and not amphibious assault.800 Alan Millett has 
suggested this was because the presumption which prevailed was that a naval war would 
still be fought from fixed bases under allied control sited in home territories.801 The 
‘independent striking force’ was never properly realised. The Royal Navy could not justify 
further expenditure on a peace-time Royal Marines force, especially one demanding an 
increase of 16,000 men and officers in a time of post-war austerity and cuts levied by 
naval reduction treaties. Without the increase in troops, only a third of the Corps could 
expect, at best, to train for the naval strike force role and amphibious training. The limited 
increase in the number of Marines went to ships' detachments, a traditional mission and 
that which the Madden Committee listed as the first priority of the corps. Some units were 
sent overseas, such as the 11th R.M. Battalion in Turkey in 1922 to assist in the defence 
of Constantinople and the 12th R.M. Battalion in China in 1927 to help guard the 
international settlement in Shanghai. But they were raised on an ad hoc basis, sent to 
their destinations, served until the crisis passed, returned home, and then disbanded.802  
Ultimately, while the Madden Report did serve to codify to an extent the role and functions 
of the marines, it did not radically alter the organisation of the Corps itself. Save for the 
MNB, the Corps role changed little from the routine of dockyard duties and manning 
detachments of the naval fleet. Ambitions for a devoted role in amphibious warfare were 
likewise not adopted or further developed, and no real efforts emerged to restructure the 
organisation to permit such an option. Marine identity, mission and function were still 
grounded in traditional roles in the fleet while the Royal Navy grappled with its own post-
war fiscal constraints and navalist doctrine prevailed. Unbeknownst to the committee, the 
1927 Madden Committee was the last opportunity for the Royal Marines to innovate 
change before it would be thrust upon them.  
An amphibious epilogue and real transformation, 1927 to 1948 
It would take the Second World War for Britain to realise its potential for the real meshing 
of land and naval forces in combined operations from the sea. While traditional roles 
remained in the ships of the fleet, the emergence of the new role as Commandos 
emerged in 1942. Inspired in part by operations like Zeebrugge, the new role held promise 
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for real transformation. In 1948, the Corps experienced its greatest transformation of its 
identity and organisational purpose in the Commandos of the Second World War, an elite 
body created from both the army and navy.803 Following the war, the army discarded the 
role, which offered the Royal Marines the opportunity to fully assume what had been a 
successful role; the Corps was considering incorporating this distinctive title of 
‘Commandos’ to their organisational name.804 Memorandums concerning the “Suggested 
alteration of the title Commando”, detailed the nuances over a new titular designation, and 
which best described the organisation in its present state while also considering the title 
which was most recognisable to the public.805 The suggestion was raised for the Corps to 
be renamed ‘The Royal Marines Commandos’. “Commandos”, it was argued by its 
champions, was a “household name, known to every service and carries with it enormous 
prestige and morale value”.806 The Corps Chief of Staff, D.D. Thomas, suggested “To 
change the title ‘Commandos’ for ‘Light Infantry’ which can be equally performed by Army 
units, or to give them another name which would not be clear to any other Services, to my 
mind at this moment is suicidal.”807 Major General Lamplough of the Plymouth Division, a 
veteran of the 1918 raid on Zeebrugge, when asked to provide comment understood the 
value that the new term brought to the organisational identity of the Corps. Lamplough 
framed his thoughts in favour of the retention of the Commando title in terms of their 
effects tradition, national morale, and those officers and men who had lately entered the 
Corps as Commandos, stating that, “the effect of doing away with the term ‘Commando’ at 
the present time would be bad.”808 A significant tranche of the Corps membership by now 
had been trained, seen war service as, and identified as Commandos. The title was 
adopted. The Corps had for years, since at least the mid-nineteenth century, struggled to 
adopt and define a coherent purpose; it was now seemingly in their grasp. In doing so, as 
mentioned previously by Julian Thompson, the Royal Marines adopted a new identity as 
well as organisational mission.809 The Commando title reflected both the new mission and 
specialised role which now informed a new identity for its members but might also 
guarantee its future.  
Conclusion 
The amalgamation of the two corps proved a traumatic event for the Corps in the early 
1920s. The forced changes were in many ways more difficult than the hardships 
experienced during the recent war itself, as the new threats of fiscal austerity towards 
 
803 The definitive history of the Royal Marines Commandos in this period has been written by James Ladd, 
804 The Commandos had been created during World War II and were initially trained in Achnacarry, Scotland. For the British, 
the Commandos were part of both the Royal Navy and the Army. Other allied nations trained their own elite commandos at 
this location, many of which continue their traditions to this day from the formation of these units in Scotland in 1942. See 
Ladd, By Sea By Land, 137, Thompson, Royal Marines, 264, 302.  
805 ADM 201/98, Suggested Alteration of Title “Commando”. 
806 ADM 201/98. 
807 ADM 201/98. 
808 ADM 201/98. 
809 Thompson, The Royal Marines, 3.   
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naval and military expenditure proved to be an existential threat to the Royal Marines. The 
effect of this signalled a level of urgency towards identifying a cogent and achievable 
mission for the Corps, one that must prove distinctive in a way that would prevent the 
possibility of future redundancy. The event caused further suffering to the Corps, however, 
in that time otherwise spent on attending to consolidating the lessons of the recent war 
and focusing on their mission and better employment, instead had them reacting to their 
internal affairs. While the will was present, a clear method and decision as well as the 
proper direction from Admiralty authorities failed to allow this.   
In this chapter, it has been shown how the Royal Marines struggled to adapt to the 
changes taking place as it affected technology, but also their employment in Britain’s 
imperial defence needs in the both decades preceding the twentieth century and those 
which immediately followed. Whereas the Corps might have served as a ‘bridge’, linking 
the army and the navy and its needs related to amphibious planning, it was not in a 
position to do so. As a service within a larger service, its role and influence were much 
diminished in contrast to the larger entities of the Royal Navy and the British Army. The 
marines serving in the Naval Division were used to hold the line on the Western Front as 
common infantry, but ultimately gained little recognition for it as they strayed far from any 
distinguishable unique amphibious role; a problem which resonates with some Royal 
Marines Commandos today.   
The findings of the 1927 Madden Committee proved the final opportunity for the Royal 
Marines to reshape their Corps in a similar manner as their peers elsewhere such as the 
United States Marine Corps or the Imperial Navy of Japan; but this was not to be. 
Ultimately, Britain became a leader in the execution of amphibious operations during the 
Second World War, as well as the necessity of cooperation between the services in 
combined operations and on a much larger scale with allies. The role of the Royal 
Marines, in this eventuality, would ultimately prove marginal.810 A complete transformation 











The continuity of the Royal Marines from 1827 to 1927 and how they struggled to promote 
their identity in a positive and meaningful way, reveals how failure to adapt early enough 
can mean extinction for organisations which fail to plan. It showed that identity must be 
malleable and flexible if it is to survive; the Royal Marines have so far proven they can. If 
governments and taxpayers are expected to continue to outlay resources and monies for 
the sustainment and modernisation or military forces, historical nostalgia is not a suitable 
rationale for continued existence. New advances in technology are again forcing navies to 
innovate, littoral strike is complicated by improved weapons with longer ranges and 
enhanced capabilities. Britain today at least recognises that amphibious warfare is a 
spectrum of warfare which cannot be entirely discarded, and not easily taken up again 
without relearning difficult lessons. 
This thesis has argued that the Royal Marine identity, as it was created and based around 
army traditions, was fragile and also an impediment towards innovating real change. 
Thinking of themselves as members of an organisation apart or other than the navy, this 
put them in conflict with the navy. At the same time, links to the Naval Service were what 
defined them as something other than an army regiment. Their mission, once easily 
defined, was not in fact based on the idea of their organisation being an amphibious force. 
This has been argued contrary to more recent historiography presented by Britt Zerbe. 
The Royal Marines emphasised their unique identity as something other than a sailor or 
soldier; being a marine meant something and was something else. Yet while the Corps 
could point to and define a clear identity, this did not mean their continued employment 
was guaranteed. Tensions arose when it was clear that the marine identity sought in ways 
demonstrated here to emulate the army, causing a clash of culture with the parent service. 
Fixation on retaining the older missions from the days of sail, such as shipboard security 
and marine artillery, were shown to be anachronistic and distractions from the urgent 
necessity of defining a clear mission. The Corps had no clear claims to a coherent 
mission, and the concepts of amphibious warfare were tenuous and not well embraced by 
either the Corps itself or the parent service. The periods of tension between the Corps and 
the Royal Navy occurred when these competing cultures clashed, such as in the late 
nineteenth century when naval officers would routinely lead missions ashore which marine 
officers thought best befitted their own martial skill set. Marine artillery, originally intended 
as a touchstone for naval gunnery, soon came into competition with the necessity of 
improving naval gunnery organically. Grander designs of fully absorbing the marine officer 
role into that of the naval officer ranks, such as under the Fisher-Selborne scheme, and 
marines adopting naval uniforms were further challenges which have again been brought 
forward today. These were all seen as attacks and efforts to erode the distinct identity felt 
by the Corps membership. The term marine was yet to embody an elite image.  
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Marine officers had pursued a deliberate agenda of improving institutional identity, 
inculcating their membership with a clear understanding of their historical record and 
traditions. As the Corps grappled with the dual challenges of constructing and retaining a 
viable mission, its participation in the multitude of small wars of the nineteenth century 
served to simultaneously underscore both their contribution and their long held view, both 
in their own ranks and those of the public, that their efforts were frequently left 
unrewarded or under appreciated. The First World War served as the final great example 
of this during the period examined, subsuming the contributions of the entire Corps’ 
organisation under the Naval Division and the fleet.  
At the same time, the Corps also recognised that a unique characteristic of its 
organisation and identity was its clear link to the navy. Increasingly, emphasising how 
marines might best serve within the navy was what sparked both exciting opportunities, 
but also tension in resistance to change and calls for complete abolition of the Corps. The 
First World War might have furnished opportunities for furthering not only its public image, 
but also the more urgent matter or its organisational function. Instead, it faced a more 
urgent battle over its own institutional identity with the amalgamation of its own regiments. 
The image of the elite organisation was still years away, yet the idea that the Corps would 
need to fix itself to something utterly unique and inspirational in order to survive was not 
lost on its youngest generation of leaders.  
The Royal Marines benefitted from their basing in a port town environment, an essential 
element for their success. Basing in these communities was necessary for rapid 
deployment with the Royal Navy, and also ensuring their presence was never far from the 
eyes and thoughts of the Admiralty. The urban port town environment had an effect on the 
development of the Corps, a crucible of sorts where multiple military communities 
intersected, and where interaction with the population was a source of tension but also 
essential to maintaining the more positive image of the Marines for the nation. Nowhere 
else was the bond between the Corps and country felt as strongly as in these 
communities. While the Marines were shaped by their experiences in these towns, this 
study has shown the Marines left their own lasting impression on the civic identity and 
fabric of these towns.  
The Royal Marines demonstrate that identity is never fixed. At times fragile, the Corps’s 
identity ultimately proved malleable and adaptable. Its earliest claimed origins showed a 
precarious and ephemeral quality to its structure, the marines could not ultimately link 
their identity and image to a particular mission or function without facing abolition. The 
Corps struggled with this necessity, failing at multiple opportunities to claim and define a 
clear role for itself. The Corps were not pioneers of amphibious doctrine, though they 
might have been its most likely implementors and custodians at such an early stage.  
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They would not be offered the opportunity to fundamentally recast their identity or secure 
a viable mission until a greater national crisis emerged during the Second World War.  
The institutional expertise the United Kingdom possesses in amphibious warfare has been 
hard won and continues to be maintained today in the UK Armed Forces by a group of 
specialists, mainly found in the Royal Marines and in the Royal Navy’s amphibious fleet. 
Dispensing with a unique cadre of military expertise from across the three Services or 
reducing it to the level where it cannot be deployed on a strategically meaningful scale, 
would be an irreparable act of folly. The UK is one of the few nations that have a 
sovereign capability in this specialism. Reductions of the type and scale that are 
reportedly being contemplated would wipe this out, and there would be no going back.811 
In 2020, the Royal Marines again are embarking on a structural reorganisation and quest 
to distil the essence of their function and mission to the British armed forces. This 
endeavour is as much about organisational identity as it is about survival and emphasis 
on relevance. This thesis has shown that these matters are not new, and the forging of the 
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